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A crucial question is investigated in the present work, namely: in which way has the 
2011 Egyptian Revolution affected, economically speaking, firm performance, 
ownership structure types, and corporate governance mechanisms? Ownership 
structure and corporate governance (hereafter referred to as CG) are two of the most 
important variables affecting firm performance. Accordingly, this study shows how 
the Revolution impacted the relationship between CG mechanisms and firm 
performance, as well as that between ownership structure types and firm performance. 
Furthermore, it studies the extent to which Egyptian listed firms which voluntarily 
comply with and disclose Egyptian CG practices have been affected by the 
Revolution of 2011. This essential question is answered using a sample of 101 (992 
observations) non-financial listed Egyptian companies for the period spanning 2008-
2017 using agency theory and resource dependence theory.   
 
The results revealed that the Revolution has had a negative and significant impact on 
firms’ performance measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. Similarly, the 
Revolution has had a negative effect on the relationship between ownership structure 
types and firm performance, but a positive impact on the relationship between CG and 
firm performance. These findings shed light on the important role of CG in helping to 
overcome the negative effect of the Revolution and putting an end to companies’ 
internal drawbacks. Overall, the results are consistent with the predictions of agency 
theory and resource dependence theory. The thesis’ results have important 
implications for investors, analysts, regulators, policymakers, and managers who are 
interested in firm performance and who wish to overcome the economic consequences 
of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Said implications include highlighting the 
importance of the CG practices to improve firm performance in Egypt by enhancing 
the current disclosure of CG practices and the CG annual reports to support future 
empirical studies. Moreover, the findings are useful for researchers investigating how 
the Revolution has affected the ownership structure of Egyptian firms.  
 
The thesis’ main contribution is to study the economic impact of the Egyptian 
Revolution on Egyptian firms. This contribution can be explained and divided into the 
following key parts. First, this thesis illustrates the impact of the Revolution on the 
relationship between firms’ internal CG mechanisms and firm performance, while at 
the same time highlighting the importance of the internal CG mechanisms. Both of the 
above-mentioned theories are used, as the economic impact is a crucial question, 
meaning that different theories are needed to answer and support it. Furthermore, the 
study provides evidence related to the aforementioned economic impact in a voluntary 
CG setting and a “comply or explain” CG code together in Egypt. Second, the 
Revolution’s impact on the relationship between ownership structure types and firm 
performance is examined. Said examination shows the importance of having certain 
types of ownership in order to recover from such an economic impact. The thesis 
advances knowledge of the Revolution’s impact by studying how a revolution 
influences financial performance. Third, and finally, in order to ensure that the 
findings are robust, the present thesis employs a number of econometric methods that 
deal with different types of endogeneities and lagged effect, namely the system 
generalized method of moments (SGMM) and principal component analysis (PCA). 
The purpose of this is to ascertain the exact effect of the Revolution on the mentioned 
relationships.  
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Studies published during the past two decades agree that ownership structure and CG 
have important implications for firm performance and may point to certain 
conclusions for a firm (Jaskiewicz, Block, Combs, & Miller, 2017; Kumar & 
Alessandro, 2015; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Perrini, Rossi, & Rovetta, 2008; Tam & 
Tan, 2007; Visintin, Pittino, & Minichilli, 2017). The subject is an ongoing debate 
and a worthy motivation to study the relationships among the roles of ownership 
structure types, different CG variables, and firm performance in Egypt, the latter of 
which is an emerging market influenced by the underlying facts of the Egyptian 
Revolution. The thesis uses a sample of 101 firms (consisting of 992 observations), 
including non-financial Egyptian listed companies, for the period spanning 2008-
2017. 
 
Findings of studies in developed countries, as well as emerging and developing 
markets, have shown how ownership structure and who owns the firm’s equities 
affect firm performance (Abdel Shahid, 2003; Bolbol, Fatheldin, & Omran, 2003; Xu 
& Wang, 1997). This explains why the present thesis will examine the above-
mentioned relationship in depth, and particularly the relationship between the 
different ownership structure types and corporate performance. The other group of 
variables consists of the CG variables, which must be covered in order to study firm 
performance implications. CG is an extremely fascinating, developing, changing, and 
interesting topic and has many definitions which qualify it as a set of mechanisms 
relevant to economic efficiency, minimising problems of agency such as excessive 
consumption and underinvestment decisions. It is also defined as a structure that 
includes rules, relationships, systems, and processes supporting corporation authority 
(Council, 2014). In order to explain and link the variables and the results, certain 
theories are used to identify the relationship between the above-mentioned variables. 
This shows the importance of ownership structure types and CG variables for firm 
performance efficiency, which is very interesting and vital for an in-depth study, 
 14 
especially concerning the Egyptian Revolution. This chapter presents the research 
motivation, aim, objectives, and research contribution. 
 
1.2 Research Motivation  
 
Several motivations for this research spring from the literature, which contains an 
important gap that must be filled. Egypt has political and economic environments 
which are different from those of other countries. Said environments usually suffer 
from closed/family companies, state ownership of companies, weak legal system, 
and weak institutions (Mensah, 2002; Young et al., 2008). These characteristics 
support the importance of this thesis, and will help to apply the results to a wide 
range of countries and give Egypt a unique place among the countries of the 
Mediterranean basin.  
First, since the work of Berle and Means (1932), the relationships among ownership 
structure, CG, and firm performance have spurred a debate in the corporate finance 
literature dedicated to explaining why these relationships are important in 
considering the effect of the Egyptian Revolution. Second, it is important to 
concentrate on the effect of ownership structure, firm performance, and CG on 
companies after a revolution similar to the 2011 Egypt example. Emphasising the 
fact that after any regime change politicians and citizens set their focus on public 
and governmental corruption and side-line attention to companies and corporate 
obstacles, this thesis concentrates on Egyptian companies and how their 
performance changed after the Revolution. There is further need for detailed study at 
the corporation level, showing the Revolution’s effect on Egyptian companies’ 
performance, different types of ownership, and CG variables. Taking this motivation 
into account gives the thesis the advantage of filling the existing research gap, 
explained in the following sections concerning the aim and objectives and the 





1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
1.3.1 Research Aim  
 
The thesis aims to study the Egyptian Revolution’s economic impact on the 
CG internal mechanisms, ownership structure, and firm performance, filling an 
existing gap and creating an important advantage in this regard. The study seeks to 
illustrate the pre- and post-Revolution harmful effects and enhancement, presenting 
new evidence regarding financial performance’s relationship with ownership 
structures, and showing that some types of ownership structure are more important 
than others when it comes to recovering from economic impacts. This work can also 
enhance understanding of poor performance or government intervention. The 
researcher believes that, to date, the present thesis is the only study to cover these 
economic impacts of the Revolution alongside the above-mentioned variables, with 
respect to the listed Egyptian corporations.  
 
1.3.2 Research Objectives 
 
The aim of the thesis is pursued via the following objectives:  
• To investigate whether the economic impact of the Revolution has had 
an effect on CG with reference to the financial literature by examining board size, 
CEO duality, board independence, and board diversity.  
• To investigate whether the relationship between ownership structure 
types and firm performance has been affected by the impact of the Revolution.  
• To identify the differences between pre- and post-Revolution 
weaknesses and enhancement by using panel data for the years spanning 2008-
2017 for a 101-strong sample (992 observations) of companies listed in the EGX. 
• To analyse and discover how different industry types can affect 
Egyptian firms and how said firms have been impacted by the Revolution in 
Egypt.  
• To reach an updated conclusion regarding how to enhance corporate 
performance by studying different theories, such as agency theory and resource 
dependence theory. 
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• To examine ownership structure types in order to conclude how having 
certain types of ownership structure may be more important than having others 
when it comes to recovering from economic impacts. These types include block 
ownership, government/state ownership, institutional ownership, and 
managerial/director ownership. 
 
1.4 Research Contribution 
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no prior study has, theoretically or 
empirically, examined the economic impact of the Egyptian Revolution on Egyptian 
firms. Therefore, the present work contributes to the existing literature on firm 
performance by analysing the impact of the Revolution, and particularly the economic 
effect; indeed, the Revolution is not reviewed strictly as a political event, but is 
narrowed in order to cover only how companies have been affected and changed in 
terms of CG, as this is what should matter most during the Revolution period. It 
shows that the Revolution has had an important impact on the relationship which 
board independence, CEO duality, board size, and board diversity have with firm 
performance. The Revolution has caused this impact by influencing the internal 
mechanisms which firms use to face their internal weaknesses.  
 
Thus, the present thesis first investigates the impact of the Revolution on the 
relationship between firms' internal CG mechanisms and firm performance, covering 
the following points. The thesis has both theoretical and practical contributions. In 
general, it highlights the importance of the internal CG mechanisms. It then illustrates 
how to enhance and improve the internal mechanisms so as to have significant effects 
on Egyptian companies. The dataset makes it possible to analyse the change using 
detailed information, so as to compare the situation before and after this event. It 
assesses the influence of the Revolution on enhancing performance and creating 
healthy firms. The author suggests that the board of directors is important on a day-to-
day basis when it comes to formulating board actions which can overcome crisis 
situations similar to that which occurred during the Revolution. The impact of the 
Revolution on CG internal mechanisms is important, which could explain why the 
board of directors directly monitors and supports strategies designed to produce 
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growth opportunities, because said opportunities will be more important when 
ownership is diffused. Board of directors incentives and abilities can be used to 
manage and to coordinate efforts to enhance performance after events such as a 
revolution. Furthermore, the present study also provides related evidence regarding 
this impact in a voluntary CG setting and a “comply or explain” CG code together in 
Egypt. Thus, the findings may have important implications for the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) when it comes to developing a CG policy in Egypt to enhance the 
level of financial performance. This is important from a regulatory point of view, as it 
shows that authorities should focus on the development of CG and ownership 
structure to enhance and create a more improved financial performance.  
 
Second, the thesis analyses the economic impact of the Revolution and the effect that 
it has had on the relationship between ownership structure types and firm performance 
through influencing the structure which firms use to face internal and external threats. 
The author suggests that the Revolution has had different effects on the various types 
of firms’ ownership, and these differences can be used to overcome what happened 
during the Revolution. It indicates that having certain types of ownership is more 
important than others when it comes to recovering from such economic impacts. The 
author considers that this could be explained by the fact that firms have to face many 
challenges, such as a faster decision-making process, ensuring that effective 
management is in place to gain stability and effectiveness, coping with market 
discipline, achieving better leadership, and aligning firms’ interests with those of their 
shareholders. Firms have had to accept new investments to cover what was happening 
before the Revolution and its negative effects on performance. This thesis advances 
knowledge of the Revolution’s impact by studying how a revolution influences 
financial performance; indeed, the author provides new evidence regarding financial 
performance’s relation with CG and ownership structure, such as block ownership, 
government/state ownership, institutional ownership, and managerial/director 
ownership. Therefore, it enhances the already-existing information pertaining to the 
Revolution’s impact by studying how a revolution can influence financial 
performance and ownership structure. 
 
Finally, the thesis uses two different analysis methods and compares both of them. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis is the first of its kind to use the GMM 
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and PCA to ascertain the exact effect of the Revolution on the above-mentioned 
relationships.  
 
1.5 Summary of the Results 
 
The thesis’ empirical results are classified into three categories according to 
the relationship with the dependent variable, which was examined using four different 
methods. The results indicate major changes between the pre-Revolution and post-
Revolution periods. First, prior to the Revolution, ownership structure types and CG 
had a positive effect on firm performance; this was established using SGMM and 
PCA, and was supported by the mentioned hypotheses. The above effect can be 
explained by the fact that previous studies did not add the impact of the Revolution.  
The Revolution had a negative effect on Egyptian firms’ performance in 2011. 
Finally, after the Revolution, the positive effect of the relationship between ownership 
structure types and firm performance changed to a negative impact on the ownership 
structure types combined (PCA) or individually (SGMM). The relationship between 
CG and firm performance is positive, thus showing that voluntary CG setting and a 
“comply or explain” CG code together have a better impact on the CG practices 
within the Egyptian companies. All of these findings will be discussed and explained 
throughout the thesis chapters.  
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 includes the introduction, the 
motivation for the thesis, a description of the aim and objectives, and, finally, the 
research contribution. Chapter 2 describes CG development and presents an overview 
of Egypt and the Egyptian Revolution. Chapter 3 consists of two parts, the first of 
which addresses the theoretical framework, including agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, while the second pertains to empirical studies concerning the 
different ownership structure types and the CG variables. Chapter 4 puts forth the 
research design and methodology of the thesis, following which Chapter 5 presents 
the main empirical results, before Chapter 6 covers the conclusion, implications, 





































Chapter 2: Overview of Corporate Governance Developments in Egypt 
and Egyptian Revolution 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to cover corporate governance, as it is an 
important variable to be examined and has many effects on, and advantages for, 
developing countries regarding growth rates, capital market, savings, national 
economy, investment rates, and minority shareholders’ rights. It is expected that the 
corporate governance variables will be the most affected ones. These advantages and 
effects were the main reasons for choosing this variable to be included in the thesis. 
Corporate governance development worldwide is essential in terms of being able to 
understand it more and to be able to make comparisons between the countries with 
regard to the UK corporate governance code, the US corporate governance code, and 
the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG). The UK and US corporate 
governance codes are among the first to be created, which presents a good opportunity 
to compare them with the Egyptian governance codes. Egyptian corporate governance 
code is a combination of the UK voluntary and USA mandatory reforms, therefore the 
thesis’ findings might add to the comparative corporate governance debate (Elsayed, 
2011). This will be discussed in detail in the upcoming part. 
The following part will discuss CG Code structure, ECCG Development, and a 
corporate governance report (ROSC) regarding Egypt; in addition, an overview of the 
Egyptian Stock Market (EGX 100) will be presented. Finally, this chapter includes the 
Egyptian revolution’s background until the one in 2011. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Definition, Importance, and Development 
 
From decades, history has observed that the corporate governance system 
changes from time to time and has become a matter of growing concern for the 
shareholders’ protection worldwide to adopt with the increase of industrialization, 
global economies and to improve firms’ management in a complex environment 
(Abid & Ahmed, 2018). Corporate governance, as mentioned previously, is one of the 
main variables in this thesis, and in order to understand it and its importance, the next 
part will discuss the basics of the Egyptian corporate governance code. In 1978 the 
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first governance code was issued in the US; in 1989 Hong Kong was the second 
country to issue it, while Ireland, in 1991, was the third country, and the UK was the 
fourth in 1992. The US and the UK created 25 codes and codes revisions, while Hong 
Kong issued nine; Belgium and France eight; Canada seven; Australia, Spain, and 
Sweden created six each; and Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal created five. The rest of the countries have fewer than five codes (Aguilera 
& Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).  
Corporate governance definitions are continuously developing and changing, due to 
the change in society’s expectations. The Australian Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council (Exchange & Council, 2003) defines corporate governance as 
“the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which 
authority is exercised and controlled in corporations” (Council, 2014). Most of the 
corporate governance literature continuously focuses on the investors, shareholders, 
and controlling managerial misbehaviour, while at a broader level comprehending and 
recognising the importance of corporate and social responsibility (Maassen, 1999; 
Mubarak, 2011; Najib, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Good corporate governance is 
more than direction and control; it should reduce the number of fraud risks and 
collapse of companies while simultaneously increasing wealth creation, improving 
performance, and determining the capital cost in the capital market globally (Shimeld, 
Williams, & Shimeld, 2017). Corporate governance is a system which helps investors 
to be confident that their funds will be used in an efficient way and that they will see a 
competitive return; this is achieved through highlighting the importance of 
shareholders’ high transparency. This system eases the rights and duties distribution 
through the firm, and provides rules and procedures for making decisions; moreover, 
the aims and objectives are set and monitored (Shimeld et al., 2017; Zheka, 2005). 
 
The meaning of corporate governance, from a corporate perspective, is to balance 
between the interests of shareholders and those of stakeholders and to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth. Corporate governance helps to determine the firm’s directions, 
rights, and responsibilities and to design institutions and mechanisms which are able 
to control board directors and management in a better way, so as to achieve the 
objective (Mubarak, 2011). Stakeholders are the bondholders, workers, employees, 
lenders, suppliers, creditors, and consumers of the company who monitor the 
behaviour of the board and the management (Fawzy, 2003). It has many advantages 
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for the developing countries, e.g. allowing them to realise high/sustainable growth 
rates, deepen the capital market, increase their ability to mobilise savings, and 
increase their confidence in the national economy (Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & 
Stapleton, 2012). It also helps to raise investment rates, protect the minority 
shareholders’ rights, and encourage private sector growth; all of this is achieved by 
supporting competitive capabilities, helping to secure financing for projects, 
generating profits, and creating job opportunities (Fawzy, 2003). Some corporate 
governance practices should be redesigned in developing countries, e.g.: cross-
ownership pyramiding of shareholdings, reduced liquidity dual-class of shares, and 
lack of agency between concentrated and minority owners. Countries with weak legal 
environments should apply and improve corporate governance, especially those that 
use external finance. The Arab firms are government or family-owned (with stock 
markets), but their openness changes due to privatisation, hence why there is a need 
for more external financing (Dahawy, 2008).  
 
Corporate governance is very important because of its effects on the economic and 
social factors of firms over recent times. Its function is to increase the ethical 
behaviour of managers, to develop ownership structures, and benefit shareholders. It 
includes standards, laws, and rules to enhance the relationship between a company’s 
insiders and its outsiders, namely management, shareholders and stakeholders. It 
helps to increase the responsibility, accountability, and transparency of the firm and it 
includes the protection of shareholders’ rights, fairness, ethics, managerial discipline, 
independence, and social awareness (Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Fawzy, 2003). Corporate 
governance can help to reduce any corruption occurring in a company, because, as 
mentioned above, corporate governance can reduce fraud risks, and the company 
collapses while improving performance and balancing the interests of shareholders 
and those of stakeholders. This is one reason for the Revolution’s effect on 
responsibility, accountability, and transparency. Indeed, it has effects on the economic 
factors of firms – which is the main concern here in the thesis – and especially on one 
of the developing countries, namely Egypt. The factors are as follows: raising 
investment rates, protecting the minority shareholders’ rights, and encouraging private 
sector growth, which is needed. Corporate governance has consequences for 
institutional investors, the national level of governance quality, and agency conflicts 
that may occur in Egypt.  
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2.3 Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG) Development 
 
2.3.1 Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG) Background 
 
As mentioned, the Egyptian corporate governance system is a combination of 
the UK and USA codes and its basics from both codes. The upcoming part includes a 
short description of the corporate governance development to reach the Egyptian 
corporate governance code structure. The UK corporate governance development has 
its roots in the late 1980s and early 1990s when there were a series of corporate 
collapses and scandals. In 1992, Sir Adrian Cadbury issued the “Cadbury Report”, 
which includes the relationship between the chief executive and chairman, the 
reporting on internal control and on the company’s position, and the role of non-
executive directors and it was a comply-or-explain code. The UK government asked 
Sir Richard Greenbury to observe the directors’ rewards and directors' remuneration 
and issued the Greenbury Report in July 1995. Two years later the Hampel report was 
issued in January 1998 and stressed the need to restrict the companies’ regulatory 
burden. It categorises the CG “principles in four distinct classifications which are 
directors, directors' remuneration, shareholders, and accountability and audit” (Short, 
1999). The Combined Code (Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury (1996), and the 
Hampel Report (1998)) was issued in 1998 and shows the importance of corporate 
governance while also signalling that firms should adopt board structures that are 
consistent with corporate governance. This code suggests that one-third of the board 
should be non-executive directors, which increased non-executive directors’ 
proportion of the UK boards decreased duality, nomination committees are more 
common, agency cost decreases, and performance increases (Boone, Field, Karpoff, 
& Raheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Coles, Lemmon, & Meschke, 2012; 
Harold Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001b; Himmelberg, 2002). Separate guidance was 
then issued in 1999, which was aimed at guiding directors on how to develop internal 
control systems and risk management. The Code was updated in 2003 to combine 
recommendations from reports on the role of the audit committee and the role of non-
executive directors.  
 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) – independent regulator responsible for CG 
and reporting – took the responsibility of maintaining and publishing the code which 
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was decided by the UK Government. In 2010, the code was updated by the FRC to 
reflect the problems which had occurred in the UK ‘s financial services sector 
(Financial Reporting Council, October 2010). The next update was in 2014, at which 
point the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) focused on providing companies with 
information on the risks that affect their long-term survival as solvency, liquidity, risk 
management, and sustainability. The last update was in 2018, following amendments 
to the 2014 and 2016 codes. It focuses on providing companies with information on 
risks that affect their long-term survival, then the company will continue to monitor 
compliance with these changes. The code and the standards of auditors are updated 
and finalised before the implementation of the European Union Audit and Guidance 
Regulations. Moreover, updated guidance on audit committees is also issued.  
 
As a conclusion of the UK CG code and after all of the updates which have been 
created, the first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code (1992) still has the 
classic definition of the code context in its paragraph 2.5: 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. 
The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and 
to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing 
the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and 
reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to 
laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting” (Financial Reporting 
Council, October 2016). 
 
The last three code updates (2014, 2016 and 2018) have almost the same principles 
which are:  
1. Leadership: (The Role of the Board, Division of Responsibilities, The 
Chairman, and Non-Executive Directors). 
2. Effectiveness: (The Composition of the Board, Appointments to the Board, 
Commitment, Development, Information and Support, Evaluation, and Re-
election). 
3. Accountability: (Financial and Business Reporting, Risk Management and 
Internal Control, and Audit Committee and Auditors). 
4. Remuneration: (The Level and Components of Remuneration and Procedure). 
5. Relations with shareholders (Dialogue with Shareholders and Constructive 




This indicates that the UK knows and appreciates the corporate governance code’s 
importance, and the need for modifications and updates to cope each time with the 
frame and the needs of the country’s companies, which is not the case in Egypt, as 
shown in the upcoming parts and should be modified as it has an effect on Egyptian 
firm performance.  
 
Worldwide, the US was one of the first nations to concentrate on the governance of its 
publicly-listed corporations. The US does not have a single or authoritative national 
corporate governance code, which is explained by the resistance to the centralised 
regulation of corporate law, the fact that the developing standards process is 
decentralised, and because the US has a history of rules-based regulation, rather than 
a principles-based one (www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php). Governance code is split 
widely into only nine categories, but there is variation in the wording and emphasis. 
These categories include the separation of the chairman and CEO, the naming of a 
lead independent director, the board size, limitations on tenure, majority voting 
standard in non-contested elections, classified boards, and availability of directors to 
meet with shareholders, compensation disclosure of specific executives, and the 
ability of shareholders to call special meetings (Gregory, Grapsas, & Powell, 2014). 
Each set of standards has a different organisation, concerns, campaigns, leadership, 
and rules or a set of criteria. This even stretches to the extent that each code may 
appear reactive and deals with a certain set of governance issues and arguments. As 
stated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, there is a direct association between law and 
regulation under external governance and internal control systems. The internal 
governance is divided into five basic categories (The Board of Directors, Managerial 
Incentives, Capital Structure, Bylaw and Charter Provisions, and Internal Control 
Systems); in addition, the external governance is also divided into five groups ( a) 
Law and Regulation; b) Markets including capital markets, the market for corporate 
control, labour markets, and product markets; c) Markets which provide information 
for the capital market; d) Markets focusing on accounting, financial and legal services 
from parties external to the firm; and e) Private sources of external oversight). Since 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, there have been some changes in board structure, 
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such as an increase in board size and independence (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2004; 
Coles et al., 2008; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008).  
 
In the years following World War II, the US experienced an economic boom, 
successful corporations grew rapidly, and the shareholders also profited (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003). The collapse of Penn Central in the 1970s developed the trend of 
executives and directors wanting to gain control over corporate management in the 
1950s and 1960s (M. Eisenberg, 1989; Megginson, Nash, & Randenborgh, 1994; 
Ramsay & Blair, 1993). America’s contribution to corporate governance in the 1980s 
and early 1990s was weak compared to that of Germany and Japan. By the early 
2000s, Enron and WorldCom were major corporate governance scandals; indeed, the 
senior executives of these companies wanted to profit from stock opportunities and 
incentive-orientated compensation and tried to ensure that their companies met the 
quarterly targets of earnings (J. Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Pi & Timme, 
1993). Here is general information about the US corporate governance code, as its 
main objectives are to: protect the expectations of the investor, improve board quality, 
improve information availability to equity markets, and encourage corporate 
democracy with a high standard. The code covers NYSE-listed companies, issued by 
the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD); the code is voluntary.  
 
US/UK corporate governance systems have similarities as well as differences 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006; Toms & 
Wright, 2005). The UK and US CG systems are similar in the following ways: the 
importance of shareholders benefitting from duties of the fiduciary, equity financing 
importance, enhanced managerial accountability through active markets for corporate 
control, and flexible labour markets (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lehmbruch, Streeck, 
& Yamamura, 2001). In addition, neither of these codes has concentrated on 
individual block-holders, cross-shareholdings, or family-owned firms in large 
numbers (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997).  
 
Table 2.1 shows a summary of the main parts of both countries’ codes which are the 
basics for the Egyptian corporate governance code as board structure, CEO duality, 
board independence, the board size, CEO tenure, voting standards, boards and 
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shareholders, audit committee, and internal control systems. This will be explained 
more in the following part of the chapter.  
Table 2.1: Summary of the UK and US Corporate Governance Codes Structure  
UK Code of Corporate Governance USA Code of Corporate Governance 
In Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report 
(1995), Hampel report (1998), The Combined 
Code (1998), A separate guidance (1999), Code of 
2003, 2010, 2014 covered the following:  
- Chief executive, chairman, directors’ rewards 
and remuneration, board structures and board 
independence,  
- Companies’ regulatory burden, the audit 
committee, internal control systems  
- Risk management, the UK ‘s financial services 
sector problems, and long-term survival  




- Accountability  
- Remuneration 
- Relations with shareholders  
The first governance code (1978) 
There is no single or authoritative national 
corporate governance code and it is split widely 
into only nine categories: 
CEO duality, board independence, board size, 
CEO tenure, voting standards, boards and 
shareholders, compensation disclosure of 
specific executives, and the ability of 
shareholders to call special meetings  
The internal governance is divided into five 
basic categories: 
The Board of Directors, Managerial Incentives, 
Capital Structure, Bylaw and Charter 
Provisions, and Internal Control Systems 
The external governance is also divided into 
five groups: 
Law and Regulation, Capital markets, 
Corporate control market, labour markets, and 
product markets, Capital market information, 
Markets focusing on accounting, financial and 
legal services from parties external to the firm, 
and Private sources of external oversight 
 
2.3.2 Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG) and Development  
 
As this thesis is concerned with companies’ performance in Egypt, the following part 
will cover the Egyptian corporate governance code and its development, while it will 
also present a comparison with the corporate governance code of developed countries. 
In the late 1990s, the term “Corporate Governance” was a novel one in Egypt. Hence, 
Egypt is one of the first countries in the region to have focused on corporate 
governance, as included in the World Bank report. Some Arab countries have taken 
quick steps towards better applying corporate governance, such as the UAE (Kabir, 
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2011). The Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance was drafted by the Chairman of 
the Egyptian General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, Dr. Ziad Bahaa El 
Din, with the support of Mr. Maged Shawky, Chairman of the Cairo and Alexandria 
Stock Exchange. The ECCG draft was prepared with the help of an opinion survey, 
carried out by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and assistance 
from consultation with the local accounting, auditing, and general business 
community leaders. ECCG preparation was based on the United States Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), South Africa, Malaysia, and the Philippines Codes, as 
well as the Corporate Governance Principles and Standards through Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. The ECCG includes five main sections 
about the rights of shareholders, equal treatment of shareholders, their role in 
corporate governance, disclosure and transparency about the corporation, and board 
responsibilities. Each section includes certain principles. There are two main groups 
of laws that govern the legal framework that impacts the concepts of corporate 
governance in Egypt (see appendix for short explanations of these laws).  
1. Laws that govern the incorporation of companies in Egypt  
a. Investment Law (IL 8/1997) recommends investment in specific industrial 
locations or economic sectors by offering specific income tax exemptions or 
tax-free zones. It discusses the role of the BOD of a joint-stock company. 
 
2. Laws that govern public and private sector companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange (EGX), including:  
a. Capital Market Law (CML 95/1992), which is the main law regulating the 
Egyptian financial market in terms of monitoring the market status in general 
and maintaining steadiness and growth. It includes information about the 
general assembly meetings, the board of director’s authority, how the audited 
financial statements are prepared, and information disclosure.  
b. The Central Depository Law (CDL 93/2000), which is aimed at reducing risks 
associated with trading physical securities, and enhancing market liquidity, in 
addition to assuring fast securities exchange. In other words, the law maintains 
all registration, clearance and settlement procedures associated with trading 
transactions. It mentions the board of directors, general assembly, how to deal 
with other parties’ interests, and how to audit the financial statements.  
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In the late 1990s, the Egyptian government recognised the need for, and importance 
of, a high level of corporate governance practices to gain the trust of the international 
community and foreign direct investment, and to encourage Egyptians to invest in 
Egypt rather than investing abroad. In 2001, the first corporate governance assessment 
in Egypt was conducted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), as Egypt was the first Arab country to undergo a ROSC analysis (ROSC, 
2001). The assessment evaluated Egypt’s CG practices against the requirements of the 
OECD Corporate Governance Principles (Dahawy, 2008). In 2003, under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Egyptian government established 
the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) to develop this investment environment. 
The EIoD improved corporate governance practices in Egypt by providing 
information on corporate governance principles and codes, while also improving 
corporate governance practices and strengthening the boards of directors in regional 
companies, which was applied by issuing the Egyptian Code of Corporate 
Governance. It is the first institute to have launched governance guidelines for state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The Ministry of Investment (MoI) was one of the 
important institutional reforms in Egypt. It was established to lead corporate 
governance reform efforts, such as the creation of the EIoD (Bremer, 2012).  
 
In 2005, the first Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG) was written in 
Arabic and was introduced by the Ministry of Investment and the General Authority 
for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI). The ECCG rules are not mandatory or legally 
binding, which gives the aforementioned code different and unique characteristics. 
The purpose of this is to increase the transparency of the Egyptian companies and to 
make them more understandable for international investors. These standards are 
implemented in Joint Stock Companies, Partnerships, and Limited Liability 
Companies, as well as companies that use the banking systems as a major source of 
financing. CG helps publicly-listed Egyptian firms to take less time to publish their 
annual financial reports, as this period was 134 days in 1998 and in 2007 was only 72 
days. In 2006, the Ministry of Investment issued the Code of Corporate Governance 
for state-owned companies. The code introduces the principles of governing state-
owned companies, by presenting an organisational and legal framework for this type 
of company.  
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Egyptian companies were required to implement the ECCG on a comply-or-explain 
basis and modify the code in order to better meet good practices, but an important 
opportunity was also lost when the ECCG was issued on a voluntary basis. Corporate 
governance rules have seen a development in Egypt over recent years and there is an 
obligation for companies to disclose their non-financial operations about their 
performance. Egypt ranks in the 43rd percentile on the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI), in terms of regulatory effectiveness (Shehata & Dahawy, 2013). 
Version 1 of the Corporate Governance Code, issued in October 2005, was updated in 
March 2011. The new code is a guideline on CG practices. Companies should apply 
all of the regulations of this guide in the first place. However, the code expects 
companies to comply with everything it stipulates, or to explain the reasons for non-
compliance and non-regulation. Each company must prepare a schedule with all the 
regulations of this guide, showing that it has complied/has not fully complied with all 
of the explanations and plans required to apply those regulations in the future if any. 
The company should disclose this report on its website and in its annual report. 
However, corporate governance regulations regulate and state the appropriate conduct 
within a company's management, in accordance with international best practices, 
which balance the interests of different parties involved. 
 
In 2011, the Central Bank of Egypt issued a decision on CG guidelines that all banks 
in Egypt now apply, in accordance with a principle of proportionality, which may be 
similar to a compliance or interpretation approach. International audit firms and rating 
agencies exist and operate in Egypt. In view of the banking laws and instructions 
issued by the Central Bank of Egypt, the external auditor should not be appointed as a 
natural person for more than five years, and he/she may not be reappointed until two 
years after the termination of his/her employment as an external auditor. The Egyptian 
Corporate Governance Law (2005 and 2011) assigned the Egyptian banking sector to 
enhance the CG in the business sector. This can be achieved if corporate governance 
practices in the banking sector are the same as good CG practices outlined in the 
Basel Committee guidelines (Egypt Code of Corporate Governance Guidelines and 
Standards October 2011). 
 
As such, improving the management of the Egyptian banks will have influential 
benefits other than the banking sector (K. Sorour, Howell, & Mishra, 2012). This 
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provides a useful approach to improve CG in the business environment, specially 
since most Egyptian companies are family owned or unlisted. As a result, since banks 
are the main funds’ source for most of these companies, banks can maintain good CG 
on their part if they are good models of stellar corporate governance. The reform of 
the Egyptian governance of banks is a constantly developing process, as banks apply 
the principles of CG to achieve the Central Bank of Egypt legitimacy and the 
shareholders (M. K. Sorour, 2011). 
 
In 2016, the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) updated its previous codes, 
combining them into the more comprehensive Egyptian Corporate Governance Code. 
The new Code is broader in application, enabling it to cope with the distinct nature, 
complexity, rates of growth, and size of Egyptian companies. Companies can apply 
what fits them best; the Code acts as a guideline for updating CG regulations and 
legislation for all Egyptian legislative and regulatory bodies.  
The 2016 updates and modifications to the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code:  
a) introduced a Governance Code drafting methodology, employing an 
advanced CG manual in Egypt, and highlighting the State’s crucial role in 
supporting governance concepts and applications; 
b) highlighted the benefits and importance of good governance; 
c) determined the scope of application of these principles and the extent of 
their compatibility with each company’s nature and size;  
d) introduced the “Comply or Explain” rule as a fundamental pillar on which 
rests the enforcement of the principles’ implementation;  
e) enhanced users’ understanding of the contents of the Code by increasing 
their awareness and knowledge of the concepts and terminology used 
therein;  
f) achieved the objectives of a company through electing a General Assembly 
of Shareholders to choose an effective Board of Directors;  
g) specified that the role of the Board of Directors is to manage and direct the 
company, apply governance principles while considering diversity, and 
taking responsibility for performing functions and duties;  
h) addressed the roles and responsibilities of the Board Secretary;  
i) stressed the importance to companies of controlling the environment, 
beginning with the establishment of internal control; 
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j) emphasised the need for each company to have its own corporate governance 
department, as well as the importance of external auditors, internal auditors, 
and risk management; 
k) outlined the critical nature of investor relations activity in listed companies;  
l) highlighted the importance of the disclosure of material information, such as 
non-financial disclosure, and clarified the disclosure methods and tools that 
should be used in various periodic reports.  
 
The most recent update to the Code aims to assist all bodies to understand and apply 
good governance in order to achieve sustained growth, thereby achieving the mission 
and strategy of the EIoD and helping companies’ stakeholders as well as the national 
economy.  
 
As a conclusion, Egypt has 3 codes in 2005, 2011, and 2016, which affect the data of 
the thesis, for example, the Code of 2005 is effective until 2011 affecting the years 
2008-2010, etc. The following part shows the strengths of the codes. The strengths are 
as follows:  
• Egypt's corporate governance system is based on the corporate governance 
principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). The code specifically recommends that listed companies adopt the code 
on a comply-or-explain basis.  
• The Egyptian Institute of Directors is responsible for promoting the 
implementation of corporate governance recommendations among listed 
companies, state-owned companies, and public sector companies. It is also 
responsible for promoting awareness of best corporate governance practices 
• In 2011, the Central Bank of Egypt issued a decision on governance guidelines 
applied by all banks in Egypt, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
In practice, this approach means that banks are generally required to apply the 
aforementioned rules. However, if the bank cannot abide by some provisions, it 
must give a strong explanation for its non-compliance based on the above 
principles, to the satisfaction of the Central Bank of Egypt. Although the 
objectives of these rules are precautionary and differ from the objectives of a 
corporate governance code, compliance monitoring may be similar to the comply-
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or-explain approach. In practice, most banks generally refer to compliance with 
these rules or disclose governance structures accordingly. The Egyptian Banking 
Institute, which operates under the supervision of the Central Bank, offers training 
courses for bank employees to enhance banks' compliance with these regulations.  
 
As conclusion Table 2.2 shows the differences between all the Egyptian corporate 
governance codes and highlights that the last update concentrated more on the boards, 
policies to be applied, code of ethics, and the comply or explain rule.  
Table 2.2: Summary of the Differences between Egyptian Corporate Governance 
Codes Structure 
2006 and 2011 Codes Code of 2016 
1. General assembly. 
2. Board of directors 
3. Internal audit department 
4. External auditor 
5. Audit committee 
6. Transparency and disclosure 
7. Rules for avoiding conflicts of 
interest 
8. Corporate governance regulations for 
other companies 
1. General Assembly of Shareholders 
2. Board of Directors 
3. Board Committees 
4. Control Environment 
5. Disclosure and Transparency 
6. Code of Ethics and Business Conduct 
7. Board of Directors’ Charter 
8. Board Committees Charters 
9. Policies for Succession Planning, Disclosure, 
Whistleblowing, Conflict of Interest, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
10. Comply or Explain Rule 
 
2.3.3 Corporate Governance Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC) about Egypt 
 
The ROSC identifies the weaknesses affecting a country’s financial and economic 
vulnerability. Its benchmarks are the country’s regulatory and legal framework, and 
the corporate governance practices of listed firms regarding the OECD principles. Its 
assessments are systematic, standardised, and focus on the corporate governance of 
companies listed on stock exchanges. Those assessments are used to measure progress 
over time.  
The World Bank complied with the ROSC report 3 times in 10 years, between 2001 
and 2009, for Egypt. This report suggests a number of reforms to the laws, 
regulations, and institutions; these reforms affect the corporate governance as a cadre 
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of experienced, qualified, and professional directors and owners who understand the 
business case for good corporate governance. The upcoming part will summarise the 
ROSC’s findings.  
The relationship between board oversight and management, board policies 
development, and concrete action plans implementation is often blurred in Egypt. The 
boards fail to examine key performance objectives, the company’s risk policy, and the 
developing success policies, while also failing to monitor managerial and corporate 
performance.  Audited annual and semi-annual financial statements must be produced 
for any company with 100 shareholders or more. The Accounting and Auditing ROSC 
finds that the quality of financial disclosure is thought to have improved greatly, 
though some concerns remain regarding the application of the new EAS. 
ROSC Report (2009) comments stated that Mr. Sebastian Moleineh (Operation 
Manager in the corporate governance sector of the World Bank and Head of 
Teamwork, as well as the person who prepared this report) said that the governance 
rules application is facing problems. He mentioned that the problem is that it is 
difficult to have accurate information about the BOD of family companies. He also 
added that the existence of companies owned by the government represents an 
obstacle to the disclosure rules, as there is an embarrassment on the part of audit 
committees in reporting to the companies’ board of directors, to shareholders, or to 
the state.  
Mr. James Christopher Rezok (Chief Officer of Governance Operations in the Middle 
East and North Africa of the International Financing Corporation) mentioned that 
there are conflicts of interests between the chairman and the BOD, and these conflicts 
damage one of the corporate governance principles, as the managing director is 
required to evaluate himself as a chairman of the BOD (Youssef, 2012). 
Among nations, with respect to world governance indicators, Egypt does not rank 
high (World Bank, 2016). The country in fact ranks in the 32nd percentile in control of 
corruption, the 28th percentile in government effectiveness, the 18th percentile in 
regulatory quality, the 36th percentile in rule of law, and the 14th percentile in voice 
and accountability. As shown in the table, there is a big difference in some of the 
indicators between the year 2008 and 2016, e.g. government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and rule of law; indeed, this supports the notion that the revolution could be a 
reason for this progress. 
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Quality  Rule of Law 
Voice and 
Accountability 
2008  23.79 43.20 49.51 51.44 13.46 
2009  36.36 47.37 46.89 52.61 14.22 
2010  30.95 42.11 46.89 49.76 13.74 
2011  25.59 35.07 41.23 41.78 14.08 
2012  33.18 23.22 33.65 40.38 25.82 
2013  31.75 20.85 29.38 33.33 16.90 
2014 30.77 20.19 26.44 29.33 14.78 
2015  30.29 22.12 22.12 31.25 14.78 
2016  32.21 27.88 17.79 35.58 14.29 
Source: World Bank, 2016 
 
2.4 Overview of the Egyptian Stock Market (EGX 100) 
 
The main data source of this thesis is EGX, which motivated the author to give a 
brief overview of how it started and how the companies are listed. Cairo and 
Alexandria are the two locations for the Egyptian stock market and are managed by 
the same chairman, who is appointed by the government, and the same board of 
directors, who are elected from representatives of the capital market authority, market 
participants, the public sector, the banking sector, and the Central Bank of Egypt. 
Cairo and Alexandria were established in 1883 and 1903 respectively. In the 1940s, 
they reached their historic peak after constituting the fifth largest market in the world, 
following which there was a reduction in activity on the stock exchange in the mid-
1950s. In 1990, the exchanges started growing after a long low market activity. The 
EGX 100 Index includes all companies in the EGX 30 and 70 Indexes. 
 
The number of listed companies in the EGX rose from 656 companies in 1992 to 
1,148 companies in December 2002 and 1,079 companies were listed at the end of 
September 2003 (Fawzy, 2003); (Kabir, 2011; "World Bank - Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance Country 
Assessment, Egypt," 2004). The Egyptian Stock Exchange issued strict delisting 
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rules, forcing the publicly-listed companies to make a commitment to CG 
requirements or to be delisted. After applying corporate governance, the number of 
companies listed on the stock market decreased from 1,148 companies in 2002 to 333 
companies in 2009; there were 240 companies in April 2010, and then fewer than 150 
companies (Shehata & Dahawy, 2013). The exchange is updated every six months, in 
order to account for the changes happening in trading volumes and values, as well as 
the new listings. The EGX is a self-regulatory and independent organisation (Shahid, 
2003). 
Moreover, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) is an official supervisory authority in 
Egypt which is responsible for the transparency and security of market activities and 
institutions, for facilitating capital growth by improving required disclosure, and for 
promoting new investment instruments.  
Enhanced electronic filing systems have been developed by EGX and CMA, so that 
the annual financial statements for the most active stocks are available online for 
limited five-day periods on the official EGX website, after which time they are only 
available for a fee via an EGX subsidiary (Shehata & Dahawy, 2013) article. The 
EGX listing rules contain three criteria to begin the process of differentiating and 
branding listed issuers, which include profitability, minimum share capital, and the 
number of shareholders.  
 
Fawzy (2004) reported that listed companies in EGX have four important 
characteristics that make them different from the developed countries and help to 
implement corporate governance in Egypt:  
(1) Most of them are closely held.  
(2) Considerable state ownership in privatised companies. 
(3) Weak board independence. 
(4) Disclosure is not a common practice.  
 
2.5 Egyptian Revolution 
 
In general, past and current revolutions have huge effects on the world economy on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, on regional, national (i.e. engaged countries) and 
local economies as well. For example, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution’s consequences 
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for Russia changed the legal, political, and economic positions of natural and legal 
persons, and it was the reason for the rise of the world’s greater authority, known as 
the Soviet Union. Communism resulted in ending privatised agricultural lands and 
creating state-supported collectivisation. It affected world economic factors as per-
capita income, the national income of the Soviet Union (Smith, 1994; Worobec & 
Metcalfe, 2001). Another example is the Chinese Revolution during the Mao-Zedong 
era and the emergence of Mao's theories as Maoism. China had a market transition 
followed by communism and did not instantly carry out privatisation nor lower 
government control over prices and exchange rates. Per-capita income reached its 
lowest level compared to national income. Limited foreign investment was allowed. 
(Ch'En, 1967; Huang & Wei, 2011). This explains that while a revolution has 
political, economic and market transition effects, this thesis is only concerned with 
economic effects.  
 
Egypt is the 30th largest country in the world, with major economic power and a prime 
geopolitical location in North Africa; it is also the cultural leader of the Arab world. 
This intercontinental country is bordered by the Gaza Strip (east), Libya (west), Sudan 
(south) and the Mediterranean Sea (north). The country has varied terrain, with a long 
coastline along the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. A large part of the Sahara 
Desert lies within Egypt’s borders. The ancient Egyptian civilisation dates back 3,000 
years before Christ, culminating in the Great Pyramids and the Pharaohs (Economy 
Watch, 2017). The country's population stands at over 97 million, with many young 
people (median age is 23.9 years). Egypt has an area of 1,001,450 square 
kilometres and its capital city is Cairo, which is located in the north of the country 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). Revolutions and protests already have a history 
in Egypt, as follows: strong protests against the British (1882); and against British 
occupation in 1914 (British troops did not leave until 1956); there were huge popular 
protests against the imposition of martial law in Cairo in 1921 and a growing sense of 
nationalism and Egyptian identity; the Egyptian revolution of 1952 overthrew King 
Faruk, and Nasser became leader, not only of Egypt but of the Arab world, promoting 





Urabian Revolution, 1919 Revolution, and Revolution of 1952 
 
Egypt has a history of revolutions over the last two decades. During the 
Urabian Revolution, or al-Thawra al-Urabiyya, 1879-1882, in which Ahmed Urabi 
played a prominent role, the Egyptian people were originators of this revolution, and 
the officers were the reliable representatives of the people. In 1882, the British 
occupation started in Egypt, following which, towards the end, Urabi's voice fell 
silent and could not defeat Khedive's regime against the people. Therefore, the 
national forces and national leaders, Qasim Amin, Mohamed Abduh, Ahmed Lotfi al 
Sayid and Mustafa Kamal, reached their peak in the 1919 Revolution (Azeez, 2015; 
Gopal, 2016; Koehler, 2018; Nasser, 2017).  
The Revolution of 1952 in particular had a massive effect on the financial, legal, and 
economic positions of the natural and legal persons, as well as the economic activities 
of the financial and non-financial companies, and on the stock market performance. 
The consequences of the Revolution of 1952 are as follows: The Command Council 
of the Revolution decided to stop the Egyptian Stock Market activities and the 
exchange between legal persons and between companies, be they national or 
international. After the reduction in activity on the stock exchange in 1961 and then in 
1990, the exchanges started growing after long low market activity. The Suez Canal 
Company is an important economic example of the activity of one of the companies 
affecting the per capita income, and national income in worldwide economies; this 
example also reflects the revolutions’ consequences, and especially the Revolution of 
1952.  
Revolution of 1952 effect on Suez Canal activities 
 
The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal, or Suez Canal Company 
(Egyptian joint-stock company), was established on January 5th 1856, and the opening 
was in 1869, with a capital of 2 million French francs representing 400,000 shares, 
each costing 500 francs. Its shares were owned by foreigners and Egypt owned 
176,602 shares, equating to 44% of the company’s capital. The concession of the 
canal was that it shall be open forever to any merchant’s vessel and on its expiration, 
99 years following the opening, the Egyptian Government takes ownership and 
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control of all the company's materials and supplies. Egypt sold its shares to Britain 
during the era of Ismail Pasha, khedive of Egypt and Sudan and enjoys only 15% of 
the company’s profit. Egypt also sold 15% in 1880 to France for 22 million francs; 
following this, by 1938, the 15% owners had gained 137,229,296 francs, which 
explains the profit jump from just 15% (Abou‐El‐Fadl, 2015; Delson, 1957; 
Vermeyden, 2017). The Suez Canal is an important waterway, connecting the 
Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, through the Isthmus Suez. It has decreased 
transportation costs and time by around 40%, benefitted industrial countries and was 
connected by raw materials sources. It created new economic and development 
activities, such as Port Said, Ismailia, Suez, and El- Qantara. It has been established 
that other companies related to canal activities fall into the areas of maritime, fishing, 
shipbuilding, ship catering, and food (Amin Mostafa Afifi Abdallah 1952). 
 
As a comparison, between the years 1952, 1956 and then 1967, when the Suez Crisis 
Tripartite Aggression Sinai War (Israel, UK, and France) happened, Port Said was 
mostly affected and sustained great damage, resulting in it being wiped off the map. 
This war stopped the economic activities in Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez, while also 
closing the Suez Canal, thus affecting the national income due to loss of the canal’s 
income and of course the per capita income of the three canal cities. Studying the 
reasons for the 1952 and 1967 events, which stopped and decreased the canal’s profit, 
revealed that they were due to political decisions taken by the Revolution of 1952 
leaders until reaching the Canal’s nationalisation, which was the main reason for the 
Tripartite Aggression Sinai War. Accordingly, the political decisions of the 
revolutions’ leaders regarding the conflicts between Arab nations and Israel ended 
when Sinai fell under Israeli occupation in 1967. As mentioned before, the canal has 
not been working at full capacity since 1952 and was closed in 1967 before being 
reopened in 1975. Thus, when comparing the canal’s performance before 1952 to that 
between 1952 and 1975, the researcher concluded that there is a relation between 
revolution and the economy and the company’s performance.  
 
Revolution of 25th of Jan, 2011:  
 
The past decade witnessed one of the most vital periods of Egyptian protest 
against Mubarak’s regime for various reasons, such as Arab causes, civil domestic 
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issues, international matters, political, economic, and social rights (Ali, 2012). 
Egyptians had complaints and explanations that drove for the Egyptian Revolution 
2011, namely: surging food prices, poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption and 
authoritarian rule that smother public protests quickly and often brutally (Korotayev 
& Zinkina, 2011). The Egyptian Revolution put an end to the 30-year regime of 
President Mubarak (Azzam, Fouad, & Ghosh, 2013).  
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Table 2.3: Summary of the Egyptian Revolution 25th of Jan  
This table is based on the author’s personal living of the events and supported by Attia et al. 2011. 
 





Success to force Tunisian President after 4 
weeks of considerable demonstrations and 
the president flee the country, 
The Egyptian people were motivated by this success which 




Facebook event for the 
January 25 
demonstration 
Demonstrations of the Egyptian’s people 
were spread quickly on Facebook and Twitter 
Over 90,000 subscribers confirmed their participation 
25th of 
Jan 
Day of Revolution All over Cairo and other cities’ streets in 
Egypt, there were tens of thousands of 
Egyptians protestors 
Another call on social networks for other huge demonstrations 




Block Facebook,  
cut Internet and cell 
phone communications 
The Egyptian government decided this for six 
days beginning the 26th 
This lead the protestors to demonstrate day and night all over 
Egypt and especially in Cairo’s Tahrir Square 
28th of 
Jan 
Friday of Anger 1–2 million people demonstrated expressing 
their anger across Egypt 
The demonstrations turned the uprising into the Egyptian 
Revolution. 





Mubarak addressed the 
nation again 
He stated that he would stay in power until 
September and then he will not run for 
president again 
A large number of Egyptians sympathize 
2nd of 
Feb 
Battle of the Camel 
(Bloody Wednesday) 
on this day, many Egyptian demonstrators 
were beaten and killed 
The number of demonstrators increased and reached 4–5 




The protestors reached 20 million people 
across Egypt 




Again, Mubarak refused to step down from 
the presidency 
He delegated his duties to his vice president 
The parliament, national TV, ministries, and, Mubarak palace 









Celebrations of the 
success of the revolution 
Egyptian Revolutionary leaders and the 
Egyptian Army Supreme Council highly 
collaborated together 
revolutionary leaders’ goals were to safeguard the revolution 
accomplishments and 
Reinforce the revolution demands in positive manners 
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Revolutions affect the economy in general and firms (financial or non-financial), 
especially one of the most important industries in Egypt, which is tourism; when 
compared to before and after 2011 (Egyptian Revolution), based on the State 
Information Service and the Egyptian Travel Agents Association (ETTA established 
in 1968), it can be concluded that the following factors are affected and had affected 
the performance. 
 
1. Number of tourists before and after the Revolution  
2. Hotels occupancy  
3. Number of temporary workers 
4. Certain companies stopped working  
5. Inability to pay employees’ obligations  
6. Inability to pay debts to banks  
 
Other activities were affected as 
1. Tour guide companies 
2. Food supply  
3. Airplane companies  
4. Security and cleaning ones 
5. Tourism Transportation companies  
6. Others   
 
Throughout the history and most of the previous revolutions made major changes as 
Bolshevik Revolution in year 1917 changed legal, political and economic positions 
(Smith, 1994; Worobec & Metcalfe, 2001) and in China, there was a market 
transition, changes in per-capita income and in foreign investment (Ch'En, 1967; 
Huang & Wei, 2011). Also, previous revolutions in Egypt as Urabian Revolution, 
1919 Revolution, and Revolution of 1952 had a massive effect on the financial, legal, 
and economic positions of the natural and legal persons, as well as the economic 
activities of the financial and non-financial companies, and on the stock market 
performance (Azeez, 2015; Gopal, 2016; Koehler, 2018; Nasser, 2017). Accordingly, 
as per the author’s knowledge, this is the first study covering the impact of the 
Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between firms' internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. Therefore, these suggest the first hypothesis. This 
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hypothesis is used to show and contribute the effect of the Egyptian Revolution on 
corporate governance, ownership structure variables and the Egyptian firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
 
The author selected Egypt because it is a major economic power with a history of 
revolutions and protests. Over the past two decades in particular, revolutions have 
affected both the wider economy and the firms operating within it. However, the 
revolutionary history of Egypt begins much earlier, with the Urabian Revolution (or 
al-Thawra al-Urabiyya) of 1879–1882. This was followed by an uprising against the 
British in 1882, another against British occupation in 1914, two revolutions in 1919 
and 1952, respectively, and finally, the 25 January 2011 revolution, which was driven 
by national discontent over corruption.  
 
2.6 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter includes a comparison between the UK, US, and Egypt corporate 
governance and it determines the level of corporate governance application in Egypt 
to help investors and highlight the importance of responsibility, accountability, and 
transparency of the firm. As suggested developing countries should redesign cross-
ownership pyramiding of shareholdings, reduced liquidity dual-class of shares, and 
lack of agency between concentrated and minority owners. Corporate governance 
affects Egypt and should be used to reduce the company’s collapse, improve 
performance, and balance the interests of shareholders and those of stakeholders. The 
Capital Market Authority (CMA), works on enhancing the transparency and 
electronic filing systems of the annual financial statements for the most active stocks. 
CMA should suggest more modifications for ECGC as in the UK, the corporate 
governance codes are modified and updated frequently to cope each time with the 
frame and the country’s companies’ needs. Egyptian corporate governance code 
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should focus more on leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration, 
relations with shareholders as in the UK; and should focus on investor protection, 
board quality improvement, improve information availability to equity markets, and 
encourage the corporate democracy with a high standard as in US corporate 
governance code. This thesis’ analysis covers the year 2008 to 2017 which explains 
that these data are affected by Egyptian Corporate Governance Codes of 2005, 2011, 
and 2016. This clarifies the importance of discussing the ECGC and to study the 
impact of the Egyptian Revolution on corporate governance. It is also concerned with 
Egyptian companies and how to enhance the corporate governance code with the help 
of the developed countries’ ones because all these arguments are related to each other.  
The chapter also reviews the Egyptian Revolution 25th of January and Egypt’s 
government effectiveness indicators. These indicators highlight the big difference 
between year the 2008 and 2016 which supports that the Revolution can be a reason 
for this progress and encouraged the author to study more about the Revolution 
impact. The revolutionary history of Egypt has begun with the Urabian Revolution (or 
al-Thawra al-Urabiyya) of 1879–1882 reaching the 25th of January 2011 revolution, 
which motivated the author to select Egypt. Revolutions have affected the wider 
economy and the firms’ performance worldwide as explained it is this chapter by 
giving examples of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Chinese Revolution. As per the 
author’s knowledge, there are no prior studies about the impact of the Egyptian 
Revolution, one of the most vital revolutions, on the relationship between corporate 



















































The main objective of this chapter is to explain theories relevant to the relationship of 
ownership structure and corporate governance with firm performance. This chapter 
includes a review of agency theory and resource-dependence theory by adopting a 
theoretical framework to answer the important question of how the Revolution has 
impacted the Egyptian firms. Corporate governance and firm performance have 
complex nature in line with prior studies and need multiple-theoretical approach 
adoption (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kiel & Gavin, 2003). It also includes a review of 
the empirical literature development of the ownership structures and the relationship 
between corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm performance in 
developed countries, Arab countries, and specifically Egypt. The section ends by 
stating the hypotheses for this research. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Literature Review  
 
Corporate governance and firm performance have complex nature in line with 
prior studies and need multiple-theoretical approach adoption (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Kiel & Gavin, 2003) such as agency theory and resource dependence theory. 
This explains the study’s multiple-theoretical orientation. These theories are drawn 
from a variety of views, such as finance, accounting, economics, and law (Boris & 
Puzone, 2009; Rwegasira, 2000). Common among them include agency theory and  
resource dependence theory. 
 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
This section discusses agency theory, decreasing problems of agency, 
maximising performance and enhancing harmonisation of interests. The ownership 
structure comprises two potential agency problems. One occurs when shareholders are 
numerous and dispersed, and no one can manage them as a group, leaving that 
constituency unconstrained and pursuing its members’ interests. In this case, when top 
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managers own large amounts of stock, they will make decisions to maximise 
stockholder wealth, primarily to maximise their own wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). These problems lead to diluted ownership because no shareholders have any 
motivation to monitor or to manage, nor do they have ownership rights to control the 
firm or receive private benefits. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that separating 
management from the decision-making process may reduce agency conflicts that arise 
from a disagreement between shareholders about management policies or when the 
interests of owners, managers and outside shareholders differ from those of the 
controlling and the minority shareholders. By increasing equity ownership and 
encouraging managers to work more efficiently, the agency conflicts will decrease, 
wealth will increase and conflicts of interest will be controlled (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
 
The second potential agency problem arises when the absolute control of the firm lies 
with only one shareholder who can take actions to benefit himself (La Porta et al., 
1997). Kaur (2008) mentions that the separation of ownership and control in the 
modern corporation is the reason for agency problems. Control of top-level decisions 
rests with the board of directors (BOD), which deals with agency problems caused by 
the separation of ownership and control. BOD includes firm managers (inside 
directors) and members who are not full-time employees (outside directors). In 
developed countries, agency problems are the source of high shareholder costs. Legal 
protection is one of the main methods for solving the minority investors’ agency 
problems, frequently seen in the US and other developed markets. Methods of solving 
agency problems also include using boards of directors to monitor management and 
control corporate activities. Another line of research examines the impact of corporate 
governance (CG) mechanisms on managing agency problems. For example, Omran 
(2009) says that CG is a set of internal and external mechanisms for motivating 
managers to work harder to increase firm performance and value. Agency problems 
can be solved and controlled by a board of directors that maintains effective corporate 
governance, ownership concentration and managerial ownership to increase firm 




Agency problems are the best way to explain the meaning of agency theory and 
behavioural agency theory. Agency theory focuses on cost control and harmonisation 
of interests, while behavioural agency theory model emphases agent performance at 
the centre, saying that the shareholders and their agents’ interests are likely to be 
aligned when executives perform their best potential. Behavioural agency theory 
proposes reconceptualising and developing a new model that assumes constrained 
rationality, recognising the importance to agents of human capital and following the 
rational-choice model when it comes to loss, risk and uncertainty aversion, time 
discounting, indignity and replacement between internal and external motivations. 
Agency theory places less emphasis on the goal of motivating agents to reconcile the 
interests of agents and principals by performing to the best of their ability. The 
behavioural agency theory says that maximising an agent’s performance should be a 
primary objective of the relationship between the agent and the principal, recognising 
the importance of the agent’s work motive. If the relationship between inputs and 
outputs is disproportionate, then the agent becomes dissatisfied and not motivated to 
work. Agents will be happy in their work and motivated to continue to contribute at 
the same level or higher if they feel that the input, effort and skills put into their work 
are rewarded adequately with the tangible and intangible rewards of employment 
(Hoskisson, Chirico, Zyung, & Gambeta, 2016; Pepper & Gore, 2012). The 
behavioural agency theory assumes that the concentration of ownership facilitates the 
translation of individual members' goals into uniform organisational goals, 
particularly where the overlap between family members and the organisation is 
intense, covering a wide range of economic, social and cognitive dimensions and the 
generation of embedded business decisions in a visible family system of rules and 
values. This perspective applies when the relationship between owners and managers 
is not ‘at arm’s length’. Such circumstances require considering the contextual role of 
the ownership structure and the identity of the owners in efforts to chart the 
implications of efficiency and effectiveness of the corporate governance system 
(Visintin et al., 2017). 
 
In conclusion, agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership and control 
leads to agency problems, and separating inside directors and outside ones from the 
decision-making process may reduce agency conflicts. The corporation should 
maintain effective corporate governance mechanisms to encourage managers to work 
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more efficiently. It should also enable ownership concentration and managerial 
ownership to decrease agency conflicts, increase wealth, cost control and 
harmonisation of interests, control conflicts of interest and increase firm performance 
and value. Behavioural agency theory asserts that the main objective should be 
maximising performance and enhancing the relationship between the management 
and shareholders. Moreover, the relationship between inputs and outputs should be 
proportional, rewarding the input, effort and skills with the tangible and intangible 
rewards of employment. Finally, the concentration of ownership facilitates the 
translation of individual members' goals into uniform organisational goals. 
  
3.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Resource-dependence theory (RDT) states that the board is a tool for 
managing environmental and strategic uncertainty by accessing scarce resources and 
information, making the board an important factor and component of firm efficiency 
(Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978b). This theory includes two important effects 
on board structure: environmental pressures and demands that affect it and the 
differences in board structure that affect the firm’s performance. Most studies that 
discuss predicting the firm’s financial performance emphasise factors such as board 
size, financial ties, number of interlocks, number and percentage of outside directors 
and competitor ties. 
 (B. Boyd, 1990).  
 
This theory addresses the relationship between an organisation’s behaviour and 
actions and its environment. It represents and explains the political and economic 
model of organisational and interorganisational behaviour, in terms of the important 
resources the organisation needs to survive and function. It focuses on certain 
resources as they flow between organisations, and on power differentials and 
dependencies that result from an unequal exchange of resources, dependence effects 
on organisation action and the organisation leaders’ management of dependence. 
Thompson (1967) examines the external flow of resources into organisations and the 
uncertainty implications of this flow for the organisation’s action and behaviour. It 
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clarifies power differences within organisations and describes the appropriate choice 
of strategies as a political activity (B. Johnson, 1995).  
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) mention that boards can manage environmental 
dependencies and needs. They explain that directors bring benefits to the organisation, 
such as advice and counsel, access to information channels between the firm and 
environmental contingencies, access to resources and legitimacy. Also, they describe 
RDT as an open system that is dependent on incidents in the external environment. 
They suggest five possibilities for minimising environmental dependencies: merger 
integration, joint ventures and other interorganisational relationships, boards of 
directors, political action, and executive succession. RDT recognizes joint ventures 
and interorganisational relationships, such as research and development, strategic 
alliances, research consortia, buyer-supplier relationships, agreements and joint-
marketing agreements (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Oliver, 1990).  
Boards of directors allow firms to decrease dependence or increase resources (Pfeffer, 
1972), and RDT is also used to examine boards. Such examination includes board size 
and composition, as indicators of the board’s ability to provide critical resources to 
the firm. In addition, RDT explains mergers and acquisitions of firms (Haleblian, 
Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Haunschild, 1994; Yin & Shanley, 
2008). Pfeffer (1976: 39) suggests three reasons for mergers and acquisitions: to 
reduce competition by absorbing an important competitor of the organisation, to 
accomplish interdependence through input sources or output purchasers and to expand 
operations that will decrease dependence. Resource dependence has two dimensions, 
namely, mutual dependence and power imbalance. Mutual dependence is an important 
reason for mergers and acquisitions, while power imbalance or power differential 
between two organisations can create problems for their formation.  
 
The theory suggests that a firm’s survival depends on its ability to control 
environmental resources, a determinant of firm performance (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; 
Pfeffer, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978b). It states that social forces, regulation and 
competition are reasons for the firm to have environmental linkages. Resource-
dependence theory holds that when the firm is more dependent on its environment, it 
may acquire more control over resources by strengthening linkages with that 
environment (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; 
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Tolbert, 1985). Firms that cannot reduce interdependence and uncertainty create an 
environment that better suits their interests but also attempt to modify external 
economic environmental conditions. Firms that face the same environmental 
dependencies usually use the same co-optation strategies that help to predict firm 
responses and seek to create linkages with the government through their boards to 
manage their interdependence (Aharoni, 2000; Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978a). 
 
Dalton and Kesner (1983) mention that RDT is used to examine the relationship 
between an organisation’s size and internal or external candidates. They find that 
companies with reasonable or poor performance tended to choose insiders as new 
CEOs, while companies with midrange performance select outsiders (Dalton and 
Kesner, 1985).  
 
Resource-dependence theory and its relationship with firm efficiency concern the 
board’s ability to manage environmental and strategic uncertainty and deal with 
resources and information scarcity as they advise, counsel and access information 
channels and resources. Firms create environments in which to modify external 
economic environmental conditions, when they cannot reduce interdependence and 
uncertainty, and to create linkages with the government through their boards to 
manage interdependence. RDT discusses mergers, acquisitions, board size, 
composition and relationships between the organisation’s size and internal or external 
candidates and suggests controlling environmental resources that will affect the firm’s 
survival and performance. It is used to represent and explain social forces, regulation 
and competition and reasons for the firm to have environmental linkages to survive, 
function and reduce dependence or increase resources. 
 
3.2.3 Theoretical Literature Review Summary 
 
The theories discussed above were chosen using the following assessment, about 
which more detail follows. Agency theory shows the relationship between equity 
ownership, managers, agency conflicts, wealth and conflict of interest. It includes the 
difference between minority and majority shareholders, external and internal 
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shareholders and different internal shareholder groups, such as companies, financial 
institutions and family members. The behavioural agency theory pertains to 
performance maximisation and ownership concentration. Ownership concentration 
and managerial ownership figure in the board of directors solving and controlling 
agency problems through effective corporate governance. Resource-dependence 
theory explains the important resources the organisation needs to survive and 
function. Boards of directors allow firms to decrease dependence or increase 
resources by providing access to resources, as RDT is an open system dependent on 
incidents in the external environment. It examines board size and composition, 
explains mergers and acquisitions, shows how the ability to control environmental 
resources is a determinant of firm performance and the variance between outsiders 
and insiders as CEOs.  
 
There is no evidence that only one single theory can completely explain the effect of 
the Egyptian Revolution on Egyptian firms and thereby the thesis draws on agency 
theory and resource-dependence theory. The following part will summarize some 
examples of how these theories suggest and support the chosen variables. The first 
theory is agency theory which suggests that board diversity can increase board 
independence, improve executive monitoring and thus improve market value (Kesner, 
1988; Lincoln & Adedoyin, 2012) (Abdullah, 2014). Board diversity enhance and 
increase variety in ideas, skills, creativity, knowledge, and innovation in boardrooms, 
abilities to cope with organizational external environment and more effective 
decision-making process for better firm performance (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2009; 
Bart & McQueen, 2013; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Secondly, agency theory suggests 
larger boards are associated with a positive effect on corporate performance and 
higher managerial monitoring (Samaha et al., 2012), while others suggest that larger 
boards is associated with negative effect on financial performance, less coordination, 
communication, and more monitoring problems (Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 
2015). From an agency theory perspective, blockholder ownership is associated with 
closer managerial monitoring, fewer agency problems, and improved firm 
performance (Botosan, 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Michael, 1993).   
Board diversity helps firms to secure its resources as different backgrounds, skills, 
contacts, buyers, communities, suppliers and to have a link to the external 
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environment and improve opportunities through the board and in particular, the non-
executive directors (Arnegger, Hofmann, Pull, & Vetter, 2014; Ntim et al., 2015; 
Westphal & Bednar, 2005) this also explains that larger boards size increases the 
variety of expertise, experience, knowledge (Jennifer & Roberts, 2010). This 
highlights the importance of resource dependence theory in this thesis. It also supports 
that blockholder ownership resources as sources of finance, contacts and contracts are 
important for firms to sustain operations (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Jennifer & 
Roberts, 2010). Resource dependence theory indicates that government ownership 
complies with corporate governance practices and can have more secure access to 
critical resources as finance sources that can improve firm performance (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008). 
 
Both theories, agency theory and resource-dependence theory are used to examine the 
Revolution effect as explained as follows. It is important to reduce and control 
conflicts of interest to reach smoother decision-making process (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) and maintain effective 
corporate governance mechanisms to encourage managers to work more efficiently 
(Chi & Wang, 2009; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kaplan & Minton, 1994; Kaur & Gill, 
2007; Omran, 2009). This can be reached by agency theory. It helps to maximise 
performance and enhance the relationship between management and shareholders 
employment (Hoskisson et al., 2016; Pepper & Gore, 2012). All these characteristics 
help to cope with Revolution effects and enhance any negative consequences.  
 
Resource-dependence theory is also used as a theoretical background for the 
Revolution effect on the relationship between ownership structure, corporate 
governance and firm performance. This can be explained because RDT is concerned 
with environmental and strategic uncertainty (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978b) 
to modify external economic environmental conditions by dealing with resources and 
information scarcity. The main demonstrates of the Egyptian Revolution were the 
youths, who are one of the important resources of any country and especially the 
firms. They have capabilities and new advanced ideas than the elderly managers 
which can be utilised to adopt new technologies and survive after a crisis like a 
revolution. Therefore, it creates linkages with the government through their boards to 
manage interdependence (Aharoni, 2000; Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002; Pfeffer & 
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Salancik, 1978a) and affect the firm’s survival and performance to enhance resources 
usages and to cope with the Revolution demands.  
Having discussed these theories and shown their effects on different ownership 
structures and some of the CG variables, the thesis goes on to review these variables 

































Corporate governance literature is a very wide field. One of its interesting 
developing topics is the relationships among ownership structure, corporate 
governance and firm performance. This has been an important topic of debate since 
Berle and Means (1932) formulated the thesis suggesting that a negative relationship 
could be observed between the diversity of shareholders and firm performance. On 
the other hand, (Harold Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001a) find that there is no significant 
relationship between these variables. The various circumstances facing firms, such as 
regulations, environmental stability and the economic scale on which they operate, are 
the main reasons that ownership structures differ across firms. These perspectives 
motivated the author to search further and add new findings, especially about the 
developing country of Egypt, to the existing literature.  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and two aspects of Egyptian companies, namely, ownership structure 
and corporate governance, and whether they are affected by the Egyptian Revolution, 
an important event but not solely from the political view, and examining its effect will 
contribute to the relevant literature. Therefore, for the reader’s clarity and 
understanding, the researcher classifies empirical studies covering these relationships 
into two main groups dealing with the main variables of interest in this thesis.  
 
The first group addresses the association between firm performance and ownership 
structure. This is followed by a discussion of the different ownership-structure types, 
including block ownership, government/state ownership, institutional ownership and 
managerial/director ownership. Many studies about ownership structure consider 
developed countries, due to their different institutional, cultural, political, economic 
and social situations. Some developing countries, such as Egypt, Oman, Tunisia and 
Jordan, suffer from poor performance and a large concentration of ownership, due to 
frequent government interventions, weak and illiquid stock markets, weak legal 
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controls and investor protection and economic uncertainties (Ahunwan, 2002; Rabelo 
& Vasconcelos, 2002; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 2007). Corporate 
governance helps to raise investment rates, protect the minority shareholder’s rights 
and encourage private-sector growth by supporting its competitive capabilities, 
helping to secure project financing, generating profits and creating job opportunities 
(Fawzy, 2003). It increases the ethical behaviour of managers in developing 
ownership structures and benefitting shareholders. Ownership structure affects the 
firm performance of listed corporations on the Egyptian Stock Exchange, as studies 
have shown (Abdel Shahid, 2003; Bolbol et al., 2003).  
 
Boards are important for smoother organisational functions; therefore, this thesis 
discusses boards in-depth, including board size, board diversity and CEO duality. 
Boards are expected to provide access to resources, management monitoring to 
decrease agency costs, hiring and firing of management and strategic direction for the 
firm (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Mayur & Saravanan, 2017; 
Nguyen, Rahman, Tong, & Zhao, 2015; Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005; Shleifer, 
1998). Boards seek to protect shareholders’ interests and to maintain managerial 
accountability leading to good firm performance (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; McIntyre, 
Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007)). A board member may acquire the position due to large 
holdings of the company’s stock. Internal mechanisms include ownership structure, 
populated by the board of directors, the CEO and the chairperson. External 
mechanisms rely on the takeover market and the legal and regulatory system. The 
ownership type has an insignificant impact on stock-market performance measures 
because economic and market conditions affect that performance.  
 
The second group addresses the association between firm performance and corporate-
governance variables, followed by a discussion of the different ownership-structure 
types, including factors such as board size, CEO duality, board independence and 
board diversity. Corporate governance is one of the important variables throughout 
the thesis. It suggests that ownership structure is affected by cultural characteristics, 
geographical position, industrial development and the tax system (Pedersen and 
Thompson, 1997). Bad corporate governance is the reason for takeovers that enable 
outsiders to control the firm, due to the gap between potential and actual firm value. 
The legal system requires good corporate governance, positively associated with firm 
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valuation. This chapter continues this discussion in detail. First, the chapter discusses 
the ownership-structure types and related hypothesis development, then corporate-
governance variables and related hypothesis development. 
 
3.3.2 Block Ownership/ Family ownership 
 
 Blockholders represent shareholders who own extremely large amounts of 
company stock that create a block of stocks. Their voting rights can influence 
membership of the board of directors and improve the value of the firm (Edmans, 
2009). Blockholders are external shareholders with at least 5% of the shares, but 
neither they nor their representatives are the chairman, chief executive officer, 
financial manager, another executive of the company or a relative of the person in 
such a position (Hope, Wu, & Zhao, 2017). OECD countries’ ownership and control 
rights are examples of blockholder ownership. They are increasingly held by both 
financial and non-financial institutions that acquire the benefit of ownership 
concentration as a direct measure of corporate control (Xu & Wang, 1997).  
 
Larger firms, industrial and manufacturing firms and those that operate in a less open 
economic environment show superior performance that could account for monopoly 
power not gained through greater efficiency. Firms with higher ownership 
concentration, nonmanufacturing firms and those with no separation between the 
CEO and chairperson positions (i.e. CEO duality) have a higher market value. 
Ownership concentration in Arab corporations is negatively related to legal protection 
because fewer restrictions on economic activity with more active stock markets 
correlate with less concentration of corporate ownership. Arab financial institutions 
have less ownership concentration than corporations in other sectors, due to sizeable 
foreign participation (La Porta et al., 1997). Another study, with a sample of 300 
firms in Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunisia, covered manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing industries, financial institutions and services, studying the 
determinants and the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance and 
market measures, as well as the effects of ownership identity and block holdings . It 
found that firm performance improves when the concentration of ownership merges 
owner and managerial interests. Jordan’s ownership structure and concentration affect 
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firm performance because the ownership concentration is needed to decrease firm 
losses and increase performance. Government ownership has a negative relationship 
with firm performance, so it should be decreased through ownership concentration. 
Concentrated ownership is important for corporate governance when shareholder 
protection is inadequate and controlling shareholders to benefit from expropriating 
minority shareholders, this case in several emerging markets that have weak 
shareholder protections.  
 
Another study supporting the positive relationship between firm performance and 
blockholder ownership shows this as well. Shahid (2003) investigated this ownership 
type and its effects on key accounting-performance indicators, such as ROA and 
ROE, and stock-market performance indicators, such as P/E and P/BV ratios, of the 
90 most active listed Egyptian companies at the end of 2000. Her study indicates the 
conspicuous presence of concentrated ownership structure in Egypt, due to the 
dominance of socialism and central planning and the late industrialisation from 1952 
to 1970. She found that in emerging markets, the value increases with increased 
concentration of control rights, in which shareholder protection decreases and the 
large investors exercise corporate governance. Blockholders use accounting 
information for their personal benefit. With the increasing share of ownership by large 
blockholders, other shareholders create an incentive to increase corporate 
performance and control management. Due to the block owners’ interests and 
investments in the company, they are more active than other shareholders, which 
helps to achieve the goal of maximising return on investment (Oluku, 2017).  
 
Examining and reviewing block ownership/concentrated ownership includes 
discussing family ownership to present a full image of this ownership-structure type. 
Family firms are ‘those in which the founder or a member of his or her family by 
either blood or marriage is an officer or director, either individually or as a group’ (R. 
Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). At least one family member other than the co-
founder is an owner, manager or board member. The relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance throughout the literature is mixed. That positive 
relationship is explained in the following part.  
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Agency theory and resource dependence theory suggest that family ownership is 
positively related to superior performance. Agency theory predicts a positive 
relationship between the value of the firm and family management (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006), from the perspective of the importance of sustainability for future 
generations, which may involve a long-range orientation towards promoting effective 
governance and long-term investment (D. Miller & Le Breton‐Miller, 2006). 
Furthermore, close relationships between family members may reduce 
shareholder/manager conflicts and encourage the stewardship orientation that reduces 
agency costs (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Katou, Budhwar, Woldu, & 
Al‐Hamadi, 2010). The viewpoint of the resource-dependence theory includes the 
concept of family capital, suggesting that family firms have advantages in terms of 
social, human and financial capital through family relations (Mirza, Akhtar-Danesh, 
Noesgaard, Martin, & Staples, 2014). Family ownership contributes positively to firm 
performance under some circumstances, as when there is strong protection for 
minority shareholders, when belief in the independence of the legal system prevails 
and when family businesses operate in contexts that avoid relatively strong 
uncertainty (Dow & McGuire, 2016). 
 
As founders tend to focus on growth and performance objectives, principal-principal 
agency problems are relatively few (Miller et al., 2007, 2011) where founder and 
family-owned firms exclude each other. By contrast, family owners may have broad 
socioemotional goals, such as maintaining the family's reputation for good business 
and hiring family members, which create principal-principal conflicts for nonfamily 
shareholders (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013). Both owners influence strategies, 
corporate governance and performance of the firms. These influences are important in 
showing that owners have very different goals with different consequences for 
shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. They also differ in influencing CEO 
compensation and its link to firm performance (Jaskiewicz et al., 2017). Firm 
founders increase the firm value and add unique skills to the firm, while descendants 
decrease firm performance—perhaps because they get the CEO position through 
family relations rather than their job qualifications, which explains differences 
between young and old managers. Founder-family CEOs can provide value-
enhancing, innovative, special-skills expertise to the firm, which outside managers do 
not offer (Morck et al., 1988).  
 61 
Compared with nonfamily firms, family firms have less divergence of interests from 
shareholders and bondholders, which explains why family firms have lower costs of 
debt than nonfamily firms. The family founder monitoring and controlling the firm 
enhances operating performance and generates more cash flows to meet debt 
obligations. Placing one of the founding family’s members in the CEO position 
influences agency conflicts by enabling families to closely align the firm’s actions 
with their own interests, reducing their agency costs compared to family firms with 
outside CEOs or nonfamily firms. Family members’ presence in the firm creates a 
powerful reputation that improves firm performance due to its motivations for family 
managers. External organisations, such as providers of capital or suppliers, dealing 
with old family firms are more likely to deal for longer periods with the same 
governing bodies than occurs with nonfamily firms (R. Anderson et al., 2003). Chen 
et al. (2005) provide evidence of poor alignment between managerial incentives and 
shareholder interests at low levels of family ownership, as well as evidence of 
managerial entrenchment at higher levels of family ownership. Accordingly, family 
ownership differs between young and old family firms (firm age less than 50 years 
and greater than 50 years, respectively); both have stronger and better firm 
performance than non-family firms. Founding families are concerned with their own 
interests and benefit themselves through their incentives, power and maximising their 
personal utility, which negatively affects firm performance, productivity and 
employee effort (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997).  
 
The literature also shows the negative effects of family ownership. Family-controlled 
economies are less developed, and throughout the 19th century, the predominance of 
family firms caused poor performance, as they are more interested in survival and 
succession than in growth and innovation (Bodnaruk, Massa, & Yadav, 2017). 
Families can gain and are interested in their own wealth, which can influence the 
expansion plans for the firm's capital and lead to poor operating and stock-price 
performance (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000). Those firms can also provide a 
competitive advantage, as their wealth is linked to firm welfare, and families can use 
their incentives to monitor managers and minimize the free-rider problem related to 
small shareholders.  
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To summarise, blockholders’ influence on the company and concentrated ownership 
is important for corporate governance in emerging markets that have weak 
shareholder protection. They improve performance and decrease firm losses by 
increasing the concentration of control rights and voting rights, especially when 
ownership and managerial interests align and merge through concentration of 
ownership. The author concludes that blockholder ownership is more active, due to 
the interests and investments that help to achieve its goal of maximising block 
members’ wealth. As the share of blockholders increases, corporate performance and 
control management increase. The presence of this ownership-structure type in Egypt 
was due to the power of socialist central planning and late industrialisation, which 
have changed in recent years. Firm performance in Egypt and other Arab countries 
was found to improve through ownership concentration and merging ownership and 
managerial interests. Another reason for its presence in emerging markets is weak and 
inadequate shareholder protections, while fewer economic restrictions and more 
active stock markets decrease block ownership. The strong presence of concentrated 
ownership structures in Egypt is not the case over the last few years that this thesis 
addresses.  
 
Family firms are interested in survival, succession and maintaining the family's 
reputation to ensure sustainability for future generations, promoting motivation, 
effective governance and long-term investment and predicting a positive relationship 
between firm performance and family management. Close relationships between 
family members reduce conflicts, different goals and agency costs (agency theory); 
enhance family capital through family relations (resource-dependence theory); protect 
minority shareholders; increase independence; avoid strong uncertainty and reduce 
the cost of debt and debt obligations by enhancing operating performance and 
generating cash flows. Family ownership may also decrease firm performance, as the 
CEO position is filled through family relations rather than job qualifications. Most of 
the previous literature suggests that block ownership has a positive effect on firm 
performance for reasons cited, but interestingly, a negative relation was also found 
that was due to the predominance of family firms. Furthermore, to search if this 
ownership type still has a positive effect or is it changed in recent year after Shahid’s 
study in 2003 and especially if the Revolution has an impact on it.  
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This is the first type of ownership structures creating the first sub-hypothesis of the 
first hypothesis suggesting that ownership structures have different effects which will 
be explained throughout the chapter. Based on these arguments, the following 
hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 1a1: There is a positive relationship between block ownership and 
firm performance before the Revolution. 
 
To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first thesis to examine the impact of the 
Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between block ownership and firm 
performance. Depending on the previous literature studies in Egypt between the 
period 2009 to 2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-Habashy, 2018; Elfeky, 2017; 
Fayez, 2019; Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; Sarhan, Ntim, & Al‐Najjar, 
2019), the next hypothesis was developed and therefore, the author hypothesises that 
block ownership will eventually cease to exist after the Revolution than pre-
revolution based on the following.  
 
Hypothesis 1a2: There is a negative relationship between block ownership and 
firm performance after the Revolution. 
 
Family or block ownership will not be able to survive or success after the Revolution 
due to the financial losses that will happen. There will be more protection for 
shareholders and companies will avoid any bad management as having CEO positions 
which are filled through family relations rather than job qualifications or to have 






3.3.3 Government/ State Ownership 
 
Government involvement in business gained global concentration during the 
period 1900–1970, the last few decades before the crisis of 2008, which led to large-
scale privatisation and a general decline of government intervention in firms in 
developed countries (The Economist 2012). Accordingly, it was important to seek 
information on Egypt’s government and its relationship with Egyptian-firm 
performance. Government ownership can include direct ownership of firm equity, the 
most visible possibility, or indirect support through credit guarantees, subsidies and 
tax credits (LI, SUN, & ZOU, 2009). Therefore, state or government ownership 
identifies firms in which the government has a significant equity stake. Since the state 
owns and controls the company, the government intervenes for political reasons 
disguised as social policy. Government ownership plays an important role in shaping 
corporate governance and firm performance, by helping to determine the 
government’s role in implementing and enhancing CG practices and reporting quality.  
 
Government ownership stands in two different relationships with performance. First is 
a negative relationship between firm performance and government ownership, due to 
the lack of minority shareholder protection. Government ownership is often 
characterised by the waste of resources, political intervention, human-capital 
problems and lack of incentives (the main reasons for inefficiency), state-owned-
enterprise weakness and recognition of its political nature. Some bureaucratic levels 
exercise ownership rights, and individuals do not have the right to transfer ownership 
or direct claim to their residual income without clear directions and incentives to 
improve the company's performance (Ullah, 2016). Another study exploring this 
negative effect and the highest percentage of government-owned firms in the Arab 
environment focuses on Saudi Arabia’s high percentage of shares in the country’s 
publicly listed companies (PLCs), due to the tendency towards privatisation and 
investment of treasury funds in listed companies.  
This thesis investigates the government’s pressure on companies to implement 
government objectives at the expense of shareholder objectives and maximising 
profit. Independent directors try to minimise the agency problem between 
shareholders and strong management and have strong incentives to monitor 
management and provide quality information that results in an effective monitoring 
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system. Government ownership has the power to weaken the directors’ independence 
through government interference in director selection (Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman, & 
Alazzani, 2016). Additional studies contribute to the research on government 
ownership and the value of European firms during the global financial crisis (2008–
2009). In short, during the crisis, governments easily expropriated the firms they 
controlled, due to weak institutions and poor investor protection. At the same time, 
the government-ownership benefits decreased and, with them, firm performance, 
compared to firms without government ownership (Beuselinck, Cao, Deloof, & Xia, 
2017). Considering firm performance an internal impact and firm value an external 
impact, a negative relationship forms between state ownership and its property (i.e. 
the impact of state ownership on firm performance) and the effect on establishing the 
firm’s market value. Government ownership reduces corporate value, due to political 
interference (Tian and Estrin, 2008). Firm profitability correlates negatively with the 
proportions of state shares and tradable shares held by individuals. The negative 
relationship between firm performance and government ownership was supported by 
bad management, one of the reasons for low performance and bankruptcy (Zeitun, 
2009). Bremer and Elias (2007) examine corporate governance development in Egypt 
and conclude that several factors hide the course of its development. Family-owned or 
closely held corporations control the Egyptian private sector, and state-owned 
enterprises play a major role in the Egyptian economy, so Egypt has a new and thin 
capital market and weak economic structure, as well as a lack of board independence 
and awareness of corporate-governance concepts and benefits. Privately held firms 
are more efficient and more profitable than publicly held firms (Bolbol et al., 2003). 
 
The second relationship between government and firm performance is the positive 
relationship motivated by the government’s long-term orientation towards providing 
funding across the business cycle. This presents some benefits, such as helping firms 
to cope with external uncertainties, facilitating access to financial resources and 
providing obvious guarantees to secure debt financing (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; 
Faccio, 2006; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). The government's commitment 
secures the firm in times of economic distress, minimising the risk of default, 
allowing firms to take on more risk and increasing the government-owned firm’s 
value (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2013). Countries with high income usually have 
high budget surpluses that make it easier to invest in companies, increasing 
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government ownership. One of the important examples is China, with one of the 
highest percentages of state-owned enterprises in the world. Directly or indirectly, the 
state has a controlling stake in nearly one-third of the listed Chinese companies (Hope 
& Vyas, 2017). Xu and Wang (1997) investigate the relationship between ownership 
structure and the performance of publicly listed companies in China and find that 
ownership structure has significant effects on the performance of stock companies. 
The positive and significant correlation between ownership concentration and 
profitability is stronger for companies dominated by legal-person shareholders than 
for state-dominated firms.  
Other examples include the most profitable Egyptian firms with the largest presence 
of government, compared to those in Jordan, Oman and Tunisia, as the Egyptian 
companies have the largest market capitalisations and deeper stock-market 
penetration. Tunisia has the largest foreign participation in firm ownership (Bolbol et 
al., 2003). Others believe that corporate-governance practices may be irrelevant to 
performance, whereas bad practices may be more strongly related to 
underperformance. Company performance supposedly is better with a government-
ownership structure and a positive relationship between state ownership and firm 
performance, due to the government’s administrative manipulation and financial 
support. State ownership also affects the relation between firm performance and firm 
value (Ab Razak, Ahmad, & Aliahmed, 2008; Le & Chizema, 2011). 
 
Thus, government ownership includes types comprising equity or indirect support, its 
role in shaping and implementing corporate governance and its positive and negative 
relationships with firm performance. The author concludes that the reasons for having 
government ownership are the tendency toward privatisation, investing capital funds 
in companies (especially countries having high income and high budget surpluses) 
and weak institutions and poor investor protection, as during the financial crisis. The 
negative relationship is due to the lack of minority-shareholder protection, waste of 
resources, political intervention, bureaucratic levels of ownership rights, 
government’s pressure on companies to implement government objectives, weakening 
of the directors’ independence, human-capital problems, lack of incentives, state-
owned enterprise weakness, bad management and being politicised, resulting in 
inefficiency and negative impact on firm performance. On the other hand, the author 
finds that the positive relationship is due to government’s long-term provision of 
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funds, facilitating financial-resource access, market capitalisations, stock-market 
penetration, coping with external uncertainties, providing guarantees to secure debt 
financing, minimising the risk of default during economic distress, allowing firms to 
take on more risk and increasing the government-owned firm’s value. As the main 
concern is Egypt’s emerging market, about which previous studies show mixed 
findings— some positive and some negative—it is interesting to analyse and conclude 
the appearance of negative or positive relationships in recent years. Based on these 
arguments, the following hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 1b1: There is a positive relationship between government ownership 
and firm performance before the Revolution. 
 
To the author’s knowledge, none of the extant empirical studies has adequately 
addressed the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between 
government ownership and firm performance. Depending on the previous literature 
studies in Egypt between the period 2009 to 2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-
Habashy, 2018; Elfeky, 2017; Fayez, 2019; Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; 
Sarhan et al., 2019), the next hypothesis was developed and therefore,  the author 
hypothesises that firms will need government support to recover after the Revolution 
than pre-revolution based on the following.  
 
Hypothesis 1b2: There is a relationship between government ownership and firm 
performance after the Revolution. 
 
Some companies will need the government’s long-term provision of funds to recover 
from what happened during the Revolution. It also helps to protect shareholders and 
investors rights. Government ownership can be used to cope with external 




3.3.4 Institutional Ownership 
 
Institutional ownership is a major force in capital markets and is rapidly 
expanding in developing countries. Institutions are expected to monitor managers and 
have higher monitoring incentives, due to institutional characteristics such as 
shareholding concentration, firm-management independence and long investment 
horizons (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988; Bushee, 1998; H.-L. Chen & Hsu, 2009; 
Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) state 
that large-institution shareholders play a significant role in corporate governance. 
Institutional investors have access to inside and management information, and they 
may depend more on direct monitoring than on accounting numbers (Carleton, 
Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; Prendergast, 2002). Developing and improving the 
performance of investee companies requires encouraging the development and 
improvement of the investment environment and increasing privatisation, in order to 
avoid mismanagement of enterprises, lower accounting standards, loss of investor-
protection systems and, more importantly, to allow institutional investors to become 
owners, control with long-term investment strategies and reduce government 
ownership in some countries where it exists at high percentages. Investors can reap 
the monitoring benefits through long investment horizons that allow them to remain 
as shareholders. Shareholding concentration increases the influence of investors over 
managers and the gain from monitoring them. Dependent investors, unlike 
independent investors, like to have long-term business relationships with the firm, 
which help them to maintain direct access to the managers of the firm and depend less 
on accounting information (Ramalingegowda & Yu, 2012). These investors—mutual 
funds, social-security funds, insurance companies, brokerage dealers and qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFIIs)—affect corporate managers’ monitoring role, 
such as voting initiatives and board selection, which align the firm interests with 
executive compensation, increase future operating performance and increase 
shareholder wealth (Hartzell & Starks, 2003; La Porta et al., 1997; Larcker, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Smith, 1994). Institutional ownership is classified as 
pressure insensitive and sensitive. Insensitive institutional ownership is a percentage 
of the total shares held by mutual funds and QFIIs. Pressure-insensitive institutions 
monitor and face management more than pressure-sensitive institutions, having a 
more positive impact on corporate performance than a sensitive institutional 
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investment that does not seem to generate such an effect (Firth, Gao, Shen, & Zhang, 
2016). Sensitive institutional ownership is the total number of outstanding shares, 
expressed as a percentage held by such institutions as insurance companies, social-
security funds and broker-dealers.  
 
Institutional investors are also classified as domestic or foreign institutions, depending 
on their geographic origin. Domestic institutional ownership is the percentage of the 
total number of outstanding shares held domestically. Foreign institutional ownership 
is the percentage of the total number of outstanding shares held by foreign 
institutions. The active-monitoring view (active institutional investors) shows that 
institutional investors have representation on boards of directors and can supervise 
and monitor investee firms actively, reduce information asymmetries, avoid agency 
problems, maximise shareholder value and enhance firm performance by providing 
funding, using their relationships to help the firm source financing and applying their 
highly developed managerial skills, substantial resources, professional knowledge and 
voting rights to influence managers to improve both firm efficiency and corporate 
governance. They are long-term-oriented and focus on long-term performance. 
Pressure-insensitive, foreign and large institutional shareholders have a more positive 
relationship with firm performance than pressure-sensitive, domestic and small 
institutions (Lin & Fu, 2017). In firms where shareholders are institutions, the 
ownership structure can generate an economic incentive, enhance performance and 
corporate policy and create an opportunity for active shareholders. Firms monitored 
by institutional investors achieve better performance because institutions have the 
experience to manage at lower cost than is possible for individual shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The negative relation between firm performance and 
voting power suggests that distributing voting power in an equal way among the 
largest institutional stakeholders will have a positive effect on firm performance 
(Bhattacharya & Graham, 2009). Grossman and Hart (1980) declare that the free-rider 
problem is the reason that small individual shareholders in China do not monitor the 
management well, because they have no incentive and no capability to monitor and 
influence the management’s behaviour. Individual shareholders are insignificant for 
firm profitability. Alternatively, the passive-monitoring view suggests that 
institutional investors are short-term traders with short-term performance preferences, 
who act as passive observers, do not interfere in management and trade shares to 
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speculate on short-term profits based on informational advantages or to satisfy 
personal-portfolio needs, rather than to improve corporate governance and firm 
performance. Therefore, there is no relationship or, at most, a weak one between firm 
performance and institutional ownership (Brickley et al., 1988; Victoravich, Xu, & 
Gan, 2012). Institutional investors might constrain the research-and-development 
activities that prevent firm growth, and accordingly, they increase short-term instead 
of long-term financial performance (Bushee, 1998; Coffee, 1991). 
 
Additionally, the exploitation view demonstrates cooperation between institutional 
investors and firm managers to exploit small shareholders and weaken firm 
performance. They may overlook management fraud if it could benefit them, 
indicating a negative relationship between firm performance and institutional 
ownership (Elyasiani, Jia, & Mao, 2010). Weakening the insider control could 
enhance firm performance; the greater the insider ownership is, the poorer the firm 
performance will be, as insiders can be more entrenched and have sufficient power to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Insiders can also reduce agency costs 
through efficient alignment of management and shareholder interests. Passive 
investors and those who are pressure sensitive prefer to strengthen the business 
relationship with the firms in which they invest, and active investors and the pressure 
insensitive need not strengthen this kind of relationship because they can access the 
research materials and more sophisticated resources by themselves.  
 
This ownership type is expanding in developing countries, motivating the author to 
include it in this thesis about Egypt and to understand the different institutional types. 
There are several possible explanations for this ownership type. Institutional 
ownership involves voting initiatives and board selection to align the firm’s interests 
with executive compensation and increase future operating performance and 
shareholder wealth. It has different relationships with performance. Institutional 
investors have the experience to manage at a lower cost than individual shareholders. 
The positive relation between pressure-insensitive, foreign and large institutional 
shareholders reflects pressure-insensitive institutions monitoring and facing 
management and active institutional investors reducing information asymmetries, 
reducing agency problems, maximising shareholder value, providing funding, using 
their relationships to help the firm source financing and applying their highly 
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developed managerial skills, substantial resources, professional knowledge and voting 
rights to influence managers. Pressure-sensitive, domestic and small institutions have 
a weaker relationship with firm performance. The exploitation view demonstrates 
cooperation between institutional investors and firm managers by exploiting small 
shareholders and weakening firm performance. They may overlook fraud if it could 
benefit them, indicating a negative relationship between the variables. The passive-
monitoring institutional investors have no relationship or a weak one with firm 
performance, as they have short-term performance preferences, do not interfere in 
management and trade shares to satisfy personal-portfolio needs. In the Arab 
environment, Saudi Arabia shows the negative effect of government ownership due to 
privatisation and investment of treasury funds in listed companies. Government 
interference in director selection weakens the directors’ independence. Family 
ownership in Egypt hid government ownership development for a certain period, 
discussed later in this thesis. Stock-market penetration and market capitalisations are 
reasons for the presence of government ownership. Based on these arguments, the 
following hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 1c1: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance before the Revolution. 
 
To the author’s knowledge, none of the extant empirical studies has adequately 
addressed the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. Depending on the previous literature 
studies in Egypt between the period 2009 to 2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-
Habashy, 2018; Elfeky, 2017; Fayez, 2019; Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; 
Sarhan et al., 2019), the next hypothesis was developed and therefore, the author 
hypothesises that institutional ownership will improve after the Revolution than pre-
revolution based on the following.  
 
Hypothesis 1c2: There is a relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance after the Revolution. 
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Institutional ownership through its managers can use their relationships as financing 
sources and their highly developed managerial skills to overcome Revolution impact. 
Institutions can monitor managers in a better way, have higher management 
independence and have access to inside and management information which will help 
to improve firm performance.  
 
3.3.5 Managerial/Director Ownership 
 
Managerial ownership, or so-called equity ownership, is the equity percentage 
owned by insiders and blockholders, where insiders are the firm’s officers and 
directors, and insider ownership is the fraction of shares held by officers and BOD 
(Ruan, Tian, & Ma, 2011). In other words, managerial ownership is the percentage of 
shares owned by the company’s management who participate actively in corporate 
decision-making. BOD must work effectively, accurately and quickly and act 
independently in decision-making processes, motivated by good board composition 
and with full integrity and the experience and the skills to carry out their duties. BOD 
is responsible for generating profitability, ensuring the company’s sustainability and 
reporting results at the General Meeting of shareholders. Accordingly, the board of 
directors plays a prominent and decisive role in setting the strategic goals of the 
corporation and approving the general strategies and policies that dominate the 
workflow (Herdjiono & Sari, 2017). Therefore, the decisions that the board of 
directors makes have a significant effect on the performance of any corporation. The 
rules of corporate governance focus heavily on several issues related to the formation 
of the board of directors and the way it runs the corporation, maintains its assets and 
enlarges the wealth of its shareholders.  
 
The board of directors runs the corporation according to an authorisation from the 
general assembly (Desoky & Mousa, 2012). Therefore, the ultimate responsibility for 
the corporation remains in the hands of the board, even though it forms committees or 
delegates other bodies to take over some of its work. Although the board of directors 
consists of representatives selected from different groups of shareholders, an 
appointed member on the board of directors should consider himself/herself a 
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representative of all the shareholders and committed to doing anything that fulfils the 
interest of the corporation in general, not just the interest of the group he represents or 
the group that voted on his appointment to the board in the first place (Ang, Cole, & 
Lin, 2000; Desoky & Mousa, 2012). Therefore, the board of directors has three main 
functions. They provide the CEO by the required information to optimise the 
managerial decisions, to obtain additional resources to help the firm in achieving its 
aims through external parties and to monitor the CEO’s decisions to ensure they align 
with the shareholders’ interest (Guest, 2008; J. Johnson et al., 1996). Firms have 
many opportunities to set rules for voting and election of the board of directors, their 
duties and responsibilities and their effectiveness. This may lead to shareholder 
difficulty in exercising any influence or control over managers. The corporate value 
affects ownership structure, but not vice versa, and a significant relationship exists 
between insider ownership and corporate value (Cho, 1998; Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988).  
 
The literature regarding the relationship between managerial ownership and FP 
presents different arguments. (Ang et al., 2000) studied the relationship between 
agency cost and ownership structure, finding a negative relationship between agency 
cost and managers’ ownership shares but a positive relationship with nonmanager 
shareholders. A nonmanager shareholder is an owner who provides capital to the 
corporation but is not involved in the firm’s management and has no managerial 
responsibility (Colombo, Croce, & Murtinu, 2013). The relation between insider 
ownership and corporate value is mixed and inconclusive. The level of insider 
ownership increases firm performance, but that performance decreases after 
ownership reaches a certain level (J. Chen, Ezzamel, & Cai, 2011). The following 
sections show and discuss these relationships further.  
 
When ownership and management are separate, managers who hold a small equity 
percentage use their private benefits to control the firm, creating a disadvantage for 
investors. High managerial ownership within the board of directors—the centre of 
company control, with fundamental responsibility for the health and long-term 
success of the company—determines the company strategy that affects its financial 
performance and reduces agency conflict (Coles et al., 2008). According to agency 
theory, increasing managerial ownership causes management to work harder to 
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improve performance because the shareholders, whose wishes they are responsible for 
fulfilling, include themselves, and their interests align with those of other 
shareholders. Accordingly, their preferences for implementing management policies 
change, influenced by the quality of the firm’s corporate governance. This supports 
the concept of positive-psychology capital, namely, that the development of employee 
self-efficacy, optimism and flexibility contributes to strengthening the participatory 
attitudes among workers that enhance the organisation’s efficiency (Bożek, 2015; 
Denis & McConnell, 2003). Other authors support this positive relationship between 
insider ownership and firm value (Mehran, 1995; Wruck, 1989). Drakos and Bekiris 
(2010) investigated the relationship between board ownership and FP, finding that 
when board ownership is treated as endogenous, managerial ownership has a positive 
impact on FP. If interests converge between insiders and shareholders (convergence 
of interest effect), firm performance will improve. Insiders’ stock holdings are strong 
motivation to enhance firm performance.  
 
Alternatively, managerial ownership also negatively impacts performance (Andow & 
David, 2016). Entrenchment theory predicts that firms with higher managerial 
ownership will have worse firm performance. When managers’ shares increase, their 
entrenchment separates their interests from those of other shareholders, and they have 
incentives to enjoy private benefits of controlling the firm that are detrimental to 
investors, then firm performance should decline (Tanaka, 2016). At higher levels, 
managerial ownership makes management less subject to market discipline and more 
entrenched; thus, corporate value decreases. Accordingly, their significant voting 
power will influence their positions out of concern for their own interests, affecting 
corporate performance negatively (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). A large proportion of 
board ownership either negatively influences firm performance or no significant 
positive association exists, as previous studies show (Cho, 1998; Craswell, Taylor, & 
Saywell, 1997; Harold  Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). 
 
A different result shows that managerial ownership does not affect financial 
performance (Din & Javid, 2011). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no 
statistically significant relation between board ownership and FP. They examined two 
dimensions of this structure likely to represent conflicting interests, namely, the 
fraction of shares that management-owned and the fraction of shares that the five 
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largest shareholding interests owned. They also differentiated between managerial and 
board ownership, one measured by the proportion of the shares owned by the present 
CEO and all former CEOs still on the board, the other by the percentage owned by 
firm directors from outside the company. Omran’s (2009) study in Egypt reports that 
the separation of those two positions has no significant impact on firm performance, 
comparable to other studies (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Vafeas & Theodorou, 
1998). Desoky and Mousa (2012) investigated the effect of board ownership and 
characteristics on firm performance of the most active listed Egyptian companies on 
the EGX at the end of 2010. They also examined the relationship between board 
characteristics as an important mechanism of corporate governance and FP. They 
found that measuring FP by ROA supports the argument that a nonlinear relationship 
may exist between board ownership and FP. Internal control and firm performance 
can be improved by separating the CEO and the chairperson positions.  
 
A summary follows of managerial ownership and BOD importance and roles and the 
various mixed arguments from the literature concerning the relationship between 
managerial ownership and FP. The convergence-of-interest effect and agency theory 
support the positive impact on firm performance. The managerial ownership 
shareholders achieve their own wishes because they align with those of other 
shareholders, influencing the quality of corporate governance and leading to better 
firm performance. Conversely, the entrenchment theory shows the negative impact as 
an increasing number of shares separates their interests from those of other 
shareholders, as managerial owners enjoy private benefits of controlling the firm with 
significant voting power and ignoring market discipline, exerting a negative effect on 
firm performance. The separation and differentiation of managerial and board 
ownership results in no statistically significant relation with FP, due to the conflicting 
interests of managers who are former CEOs still on the board and the shareholders 
who are outside directors. 
 
The literature review reflecting the mixed and inconclusive relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance encouraged the author to include it in the 
selected sample, to examine whether the nonlinear relationship found in Egypt still 
applies or changes to show positive or negative significant relations relevant to the 
fifth hypothesis. Throughout the literature, this type of ownership is found to have no 
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significant impact on firm performance in Egypt when there is a separation of the 
CEO and the chairperson positions. A discussion of this point follows, to learn 
whether it has had the same result in recent years. Based on these arguments, the 
following hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 1d1: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance before the Revolution.  
 
To the author’s knowledge, none of the extant empirical studies has adequately 
addressed the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. Depending on the previous literature 
studies in Egypt between the period 2009 to 2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-
Habashy, 2018; Elfeky, 2017; Fayez, 2019; Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; 
Sarhan et al., 2019), the next hypothesis was developed and therefore, the author 
hypothesises that managerial ownership will improve after the Revolution than pre-
revolution based on the following.  
 
Hypothesis 1d2: There is a relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance after the Revolution.  
 
BOD and management of managerial ownership can improve performance by 
fulfilling their own interests and aligning them with those of other shareholders. They 
can easily change policies and strategies and have good corporate governance quality 
due to their relationship with the shareholders.  
 
The various forms of ownership have their own advantages and drawbacks, due to 
their different effects on performance. This thesis provides a broad and important 
contribution with evidence of corporate-governance characteristics, which the next 




































3.4 Empirical Literature Review and Hypotheses Development - Corporate 
Governance Variables 
 
3.4.1 Board Size  
 
Board size is an essential variable impacting corporate governance, defined as 
the total number of directors in a firm, including executive, non-executive and 
independent directors (Elsayed, 2009; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006; Mayur & 
Saravanan, 2017). It plays a significant role in developing countries and emerging 
markets. A board of directors is responsible for the firm’s performance, its 
management, decision-making and strategy determination, and board size is 
associated with agency problems. A larger board of directors taking opportunistic 
action and making effective, precise and quick decisions reduces agency conflicts 
(Herdjiono & Sari, 2017).  
 
Several studies have tested the implications of board size for firm performance, 
covering countries such as the U.S. (Yermack, 1996), Denmark (Bennedsen, 
Kongsted, & Nielsen, 2008), the UK (Guest, 2008) and Japan (Nakano & Nguyen, 
2013). These studies detect a significant negative impact, found to be stronger in 
small firms. Large boards are less profitable and associated with higher operating 
costs that enable investors to assign lower values to such firms. They offer higher 
CEO compensation that depends on the firm’s balance sheet, unrelated to firm 
performance. Other authors agree with the negative effect (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998, 2001; Michael, 1993; Pye, 
2000). These studies reported a negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance where CEO duality exists (Belkhir, 2009; Bozec & Dia, 2007; Kiel & 
Gavin, 2003). They find that in the presence of CEO nonduality, board members are 
the main source of effective governance mechanisms and stronger CEO performance, 
associated with higher market values. Larger boards make decisions less efficiently 
than smaller boards because free-rider and coordination problems weaken decision-
making procedures of the large boards, the reason for the poor performance. Zabri et 
al. (2016) also reveal a negative relationship between the size of the board of directors 
and ROA, which also appears to be negative when measured by return on equity 
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(Nguyen et al., 2015). The effect of board size on performance, when measured by 
Tobin’s Q, appears to be positive, without controlling industry effects (Henry, 2008).  
 
Examining the relationship between board size and FP is inconclusive. Large boards 
offer required resources and capabilities, explaining their positive impact on firm 
performance. However, they can also have a negative effect due to communication, 
coordination and decision-making problems that offset the benefits of the collective 
knowledge of the board members (Mayur & Saravanan, 2017). (Michael, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996) conclude that companies with oversized boards tend to become less 
effective, whilst having a small board enhances the company’s performance and 
positively influences investor behaviour and company value. Board sizes have 
different effects on firm performance; these are good for firms, but when board size 
increases beyond a certain limit, the advantages change to disadvantages and 
accordingly lead to worse firm performance (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Michael, 1993). 
Large boards are useful for discussion in meetings that will affect the firm 
performance in a positive way. Small boards help to hire independent directors by 
using their connections and experience, which improves performance (Al-Najjar, 
2014). 
 
The board is one corporate-governance mechanism, and agency theory reflects the 
board’s role in protecting shareholder interests with strong firm performance. Coles et 
al. (2008) explain that the greater the demand and the more effective external relations 
are, the greater is the need for a large board. The number of directors and firm 
performance has a positive association (Belkhir, 2009; Issarawornrawanich, 2015). 
Larger boards have greater information-processing capacity than smaller boards, 
simply as a function of the division of labour and large-team ability to mobilise 
information and resources. Firms add more board members to react to increasing 
environmental complexity (Seo, 2017). The studies of John and Senbet (1998) and 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) show that the board’s ability to monitor important 
corporate decisions increases with its size, which affects the efficiency of the board-
control function. Some authors suggest that this is a positive relationship, such that 
when the board size is larger, performance is better (Adams and Merhan, 2005; 
Dalton and Dalton, 2005). Large firms may require new, specialised board members 
or large numbers if they seek to grow in order to increase firm performance. A 
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positive relationship exists between board size and firm performance in the presence 
of CEO nonduality that separates decision management and decision control, reduces 
agency costs, enhances discussion and, accordingly, increases decision-making 
efficiency (Elsayed, 2010). Other authors also support this positive relationship 
(Bohren & Odegaard, 2001; Conyon & Peck, 1998; De Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 
2005; T. Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Huther, 1997; Postma, Van Ees, & 
Sterken, 2001; Yermack, 1996). Firms that have smaller boards have stronger 
financial ratios, higher market values and stronger CEO performance than firms with 
larger boards. Therefore, the size of the board of directors plays a role in improving 
corporate performance and reducing agency conflicts that occur in the company. 
Coles et al. (2008) show that the size of the board of directors affects financial 
performance. The larger the size of a company’s board of directors, the better will be 
the company’s performance, through directions for specialisation, increased expertise 
and greater monitoring capacity (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Klein, 
2002). This result proves that the higher the number of board members in the 
company, the more financial performance improves—results consistent with those of 
Coles et al. (2008).  
Walczak (2013) concludes that the behaviour of members has a decisive impact on 
the mechanisms of corporate governance. The board of directors in a company can 
also determine the strategy the company adopts, both long term and short term, which 
may affect its financial performance and reduce agency conflict. A different 
conclusion was drawn by (Horváth & Spirollari, 2012; Yilmaz & Buyuklu, 2016), 
namely, that a board’s size does not have a significant effect on firm performance. So, 
good or poor performance depends on the ability of the board of directors to carry out 
its duties. Increasing the number of directors makes more persons available to 
supervise the managers in the implementation of the company’s business and ensure 
that the managers follow the interests of the council.  
Having discussed the impact on corporate governance and its roles, a conclusion 
emerges that different board sizes and duties have different effects and can change 
advantages to disadvantages, which explains why examining the relationship between 
board size and FP is inconclusive regarding how it affects corporate governance. This 
inclusive relationship is very interesting to test in Egypt, especially regarding the 
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effect of the revolution. A summary of reasons for the positive impact of a large board 
on firm performance, especially improving corporate performance, includes bringing 
resources and capabilities, greater information-processing capacity, resource 
mobilisation, response to environmental complexity, board control-function 
efficiency, usefulness for discussion in meetings, specialised directions, increased 
expertise and greater monitoring capacity and, when CEO nonduality exists, reducing 
agency cost, enhancing corporate discussion and, accordingly, increasing decision-
making efficiency. The small boards also improve FP because, with their connections 
and experience, they help in hiring independent directors and lead to stronger 
financial ratios and higher market values. FP measured by Tobin’s Q relates 
positively to board size. The negative effect is a consequence of offering higher CEO 
compensation, the existence of CEO duality and higher operating costs that let 
investors assign lower firm value, due to problems in communication and decision-
making weakened by free-rider and coordination problems. Measuring firm 
performance by ROA and ROE shows this effect. Other factors show no significant 
effect on firm performance.  
This is the first type of internal corporate governance mechanism variables creating 
the first sub-hypothesis of the third hypothesis suggesting that these variables have 
different effects which will be explained throughout the chapter. Based on these 
arguments, the following hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2a1: There is relationship between board size and financial 
performance before the Revolution. 
 
To the author’s knowledge, none of the extant empirical studies has adequately 
addressed the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between board 
size and firm performance. Depending on the previous literature studies in Egypt 
between the period 2009 to 2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-Habashy, 2018; Elfeky, 
2017; Fayez, 2019; Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; Sarhan et al., 2019), the 
next hypothesis was developed and therefore, the author hypothesises that board size 
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will have a significant effect on firm performance after the Revolution than pre-
revolution based on the following.  
 
Hypothesis 2a2: There is a positive relationship between board size and 
financial performance after the Revolution. 
 
Larger board size can bring more resources and capabilities to generate more revenues 
and greater performance after the Revolution. They have a greater information-
processing capacity which is useful for discussion in meetings and increase decision-
making efficiency. These characteristics are needed to cope with the changes that 
happened during the Resolution and after it.  
 
3.4.2 CEO Duality 
 
One of the most debated issues in corporate finance, academia, the business 
community and discussions of corporate governance is CEO duality and its effect on 
firm performance. CEO duality occurs when the CEO also occupies the chair position 
on the board of directors (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). In other words, a single 
individual works as CEO and board chair. When it happens, executives focus more on 
their personal interests than on the shareholders’ interests (Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009; 
Oak & Iyengar, 2009). The board size and corporate performance relationship is 
confused by the board leadership structure that includes CEO duality (the roles of 
both CEO and chairman reside with the same person) or nonduality (assigning the two 
positions to different people, dividing the CEO and chairman roles). Unsurprisingly, 
many researchers call for the separation of the CEO and chair positions (CEO 
nonduality) to enhance board effectiveness (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 
2009). CEO nonduality causes a positive relationship between board size and 
corporate performance while in the presence of CEO duality, the relationship is 
negative. One previous study adopts the agency theory to investigate and focus on 
board of directors characteristics with CEO duality, showing its impact on the 
performance of family and nonfamily firms in Italy (Rubino, Tenuta, & Cambrea, 
2016). Agency theory represent two different perspectives on discussing and 
explaining the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
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Agency theorists highlight the negative effect of CEO duality on firm performance, as 
it allows the CEO to emphasise his or her personal best interests and depart from 
shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
divergence of interests correlates with CEOs increasing their own interests and 
decreasing shareholders’ interest and value (Michael, 1993). Giving the CEO an 
influential role on the board will help to avoid this agency problem and combine 
control and power, preventing the board from efficiently monitoring and controlling 
decisions (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; Yermack, 1996). This negative relation is a 
result of such reasons as high CEO compensation and high cost to replace the CEO 
(Boyd, 1995; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Therefore, CEO duality negatively 
affects performance, consistent with agency theory, due to the chairman-CEO’s 
control and monitoring of management, implying an increase in agency problems and 
causing corporate-asset expropriation (Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007). It shapes agency 
problems and disagreements with shareholders because of the concentration CEO 
power in decision-making, who is risk-averse and self-interested, with different 
objectives from the shareholders’, thus engaging in self-serving actions at their 
expense.  
The presence of duality can also increase agency costs as a consequence of poor 
performance, creating a need to select business skills and expertise to improve board 
efficiency, help managers and reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders, with 
subsequent benefits for the entire firm. Accordingly, conflicts of interest reduce speed 
and decision-making effectiveness, resulting in poor performance (Brickley et al., 
1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). CEO duality is negative when the CEO has more 
power than other executives in top management and when there are outside 
blockholding directors who are otherwise insignificant (Tang, 2017). The CEO 
duality may reduce the board of directors’ effectiveness by affecting the CEO’s power 
to control information flow, set the board’s agenda and weaken the independence of 
outside members (Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997; Desai, Kroll, & Wright, 2003). 
The top-management team that includes other executives and outside blockholding 
directors who interact regularly will directly influence the CEO, reducing a chair-
CEO’s agency problem and the effect of CEO duality. Other executives should have 
sufficient power to effectively monitor the chair-CEO to be able to reduce agency 
problems, whereas outside blockholding directors tend to conspire and discipline the 
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chair-CEO, which exacerbates the agency problems (Tang, 2017).  
Accordingly, on the other side, other studies stress the positive effect of CEO duality 
and its maximisation of shareholder value and improvement of organisational 
efficiency (C. Anderson & Anthony, 1986; Bhagat & Black, 2001; Brickley et al., 
1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Finkelstein & D'aveni, 1994; Stoeberl & Sherony, 
1985). Firm performance and strategic decisions are more efficient when the 
leadership is single and strong and its commands are unified. The top managers are 
well established and have clear authority, avoiding confusion resulting from multiple 
authorities (Finkelstein & D'aveni, 1994; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978a). The unified 
leadership helps and enhances the firm’s response to external events and efficient 
decision-making (D. Miller & Friesen, 1977). CEO duality may also promote greater 
firm performance by permitting the CEO to gain complete authority over the 
organisation (Desai et al., 2003), promote better communication with the board 
(Stoeberl & Sherony, 1985) and implement consistent strategies (C. Anderson & 
Anthony, 1986). CEO duality also authorises a faster decision-making process and 
strong leadership, resulting in a good performance.  
CEO duality avoids ambiguous leadership and board operating-procedures confusion 
through the manager and shareholder alignment. However, researchers of the 
stewardship-theory perspective recognise the CEO-duality benefits of enhancing the 
unity of command at the top (Finkelstein & D'aveni, 1994). CEO duality produces 
good results for majority and minority shareholders. CEO duality in family firms is 
viewed from two opposing perspectives. Agency-theory supporters claim that family 
CEO duality leads to private benefits within the family. On the other hand, the 
stewardship-theory defenders (T. Miller & Triana, 2009) suggest that CEOs in family 
firms have a greater competitive advantage in these firms (Rubino et al., 2016). CEO 
duality is positive and statistically significant in family firms with members involved 
in management. So, the positive influence of family CEO duality is due to the added 
value for the company, reduction of conflicts of interest and agency costs and 
contribution to company growth and development. This includes assuring corporate 
longevity and creating strong clients’ relationships supporting the firm (Miller et al., 
2008). For non-family firms, CEO duality benefits outweigh its costs (Kang & 
Zardkoohi, 2005; Yan Lam & Lee, 2008). 
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Other researchers mention that there is no significant relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Chaganti, Mahajan, & 
Sharma, 1985; J. Johnson et al., 1996). The Egyptian context shows that CEO duality 
results in fewer corporate-governance voluntary disclosures, negatively associating 
the two variables (Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha et al., 2012). Along the same 
lines, in Egypt, a separation between CEO and chairperson positions may not affect 
firm performance (Omran, 2009). There, CEO duality occurs as CEOs run the board 
as well as the company’s business. Duality exists in some other countries, such as a 
small percentage of large Australian companies and about 80 per cent of large U.S. 
companies (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Kholief, 2008).  
The relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in agency theory, 
including family or non-family firms, blockholders ownership and other top 
management executives, has been discussed, resulting in the following summary from 
the author’s point of view. According to the divergence-of-interests and agency 
theories, CEOs emphasise their personal interests at the expense of shareholders’ 
interests, resulting in CEO duality’s bad effect on performance. A summary of the 
reasons for this effect and the poor performance includes high CEO compensation, 
high cost to replace a CEO and board no longer efficiently monitoring and controlling 
decisions, controlling information flow or setting the board’s agenda. Additional 
reasons are weakening the independence of outside members, increasing agency 
problems, disagreements with shareholders and conflicts of interest, reducing 
decision-making speed and effectiveness, causing corporate-asset expropriation and 
CEOs who are risk-averse and self-interested with different objectives from those of 
the shareholders. When a CEO has more power than other executives in top 
management, CEO duality has negative effects. Based on this theory, family CEO 
duality leads to private benefits.  
On the other side CEO nonduality maximises shareholder value, improves 
organisational efficiency, enhances the firm’s response to external events, enables 
faster decision-making processes, supports majority and minority shareholders, 
reduces conflicts of interest and agency costs leading to improved firm performance. 
The reasons are that leadership is single and strong and commands are unified through 
clear and complete authority apparent in better communication, resulting in the 
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company’s growth and development. Family CEO firms have a greater competitive 
advantage. CEO nonduality enhances board effectiveness and positively affects 
corporate performance. As one of the emerging markets, Egypt is analysed to 
determine if CEO duality has a positive, a negative, or no relationship with Egyptian 
firm performance. Based on these arguments, the seventh hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 2b1: There is a relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance before the Revolution. 
 
To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first thesis to examine the impact of the 
Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
Depending on the previous literature studies in Egypt between the period 2009 to 
2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-Habashy, 2018; Elfeky, 2017; Fayez, 2019; 
Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; Sarhan et al., 2019), the next hypothesis was 
developed and therefore, the author hypothesises that CEO duality should have less 
effect on firm performance after the Revolution than pre-revolution based on the 
following.  
 
Hypothesis 2b2: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance after the Revolution. 
 
CEO duality can be a reason for conflict of interests as they concentrate on their 
personal interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests and they may control 
information flow or setting the board’s agenda for personal benefits. These interests 






3.4.3 Board Independence 
 
Previous studies focus on board independence from the CEO and its relation to 
firm performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), as well as how CEO pay affects 
behaviour regarding shareholders’ interests. Motivations for that behaviour include 
incentive mechanisms as outcome-based controls and monitoring mechanisms as 
behaviour-based controls. Outcome-based CEO pay mitigates agency problems 
between CEO and shareholders by aligning CEO interests with shareholder interests, 
but encourages undesirable CEO behaviours (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 
2007) and affects the use of board monitoring (Seo, 2017). Board independence is 
measured as the ratio of nonexecutive directors to the total board (Hashim & Devi, 
2008). (Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015) predict that when boards have more 
power over CEOs, then CEOs will receive lower compensation, pay that is more 
sensitive to corporate performance (Blau, 2017; Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978a). Independent-director literature is quite mixed regarding the ability to bridge 
the informational deficit and ultimately to impact on discrete board tasks and 
corporate performance.  
Outside directors are not all evenly efficient in top-management monitoring (Coles et 
al., 2008) because some are directed by the CEO and have relations with the firm or 
with its management, while other outside directors who might be affiliated will not 
have the skill to monitor the firm management objectively. Therefore, some authors 
conclude that outside directors the company's management has chosen, whose 
decisions are based on management information, are not really independent (Baker, 
1987; Mace, 1986; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). Hence, independent outside 
directors should not have a material relationship with the firm or its management and 
should be unaffiliated, to be able to advise and monitor board functions (Redor, 
2016). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) say that boards are rarely independent or have no 
relationship with those with whom they engage (i.e. engage in arms-length 
transactions). CEOs may have power over the board members, due to specific 
structural and social-psychological mechanisms that affect the executives’ higher pay 
and pay that is less sensitive to performance but affect board decision-making about 
executive compensation. Inside directors are well informed about the company and 
familiar with it, while outside directors are relatively unfamiliar with the company 
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and more objective. Outside directors may be less informed than inside directors, 
which might lead them to make mistakes in their decision-making process (Bhagat & 
Black, 2001). From the managerial-power-theory view, corporate executives do not 
usually share information related to the firm, to increase their managerial control. This 
can result in an informational deficit among independent board members, reducing 
their monitoring effectiveness, controlling their ability to provide suitable and 
sufficient strategic advice to the management and decreasing overall firm 
performance. This result also occurs to protect corporate executives’ interests through 
choosing boards with little experience or inadequate and poor qualifications (R. 
Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Cai, Liu, Qian, & Yu, 2015). Thus, there is a negative 
relationship between independence and performance.  
On the other hand, powerful shareholders agree on having highly competent 
independent members to maximise their value. Board heterogeneity can be divided 
into two main components (R. Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay, & Zhao, 2011), the first 
based on social factors, such as gender, ethnicity and age; the other related to 
occupational factors that include education, experience and profession. Regarding the 
occupational component, industry expertise and informal network affiliations are two 
sources of heterogeneity. Industry expertise can enhance board effectiveness by 
improving the advising ability of board members, enhancing independent members’ 
monitoring ability and reducing the possible informational gap (X. Chen, Cheng, & 
Wang, 2015; DeHart, Lynch, Belknap, Dass-Brailsford, & Green, 2014; Faleye, 
Kovacs, & Venkateswaran, 2014). Therefore, industry expertise found in independent 
directors helps to promote significant and positive interaction between independence 
and expertise in performance. The second source—informal network affiliation or the 
extent of informal connections with nonexecutive board members and corporate 
executives—is also important because social networks shared with other board 
members should increase directors’ power and effectiveness of directors. Information 
flow between board members is eased by informal connections, and the decreased 
informational deficit is associated with better firm performance (J. Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2008; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2014). Hence, in the 
context of individual heterogeneity, independence negatively correlates with 
performance and decreases when directors have industry expertise or informal 
network affiliations with other board members (Cavaco, Crifo, Rebérioux, & 
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Roudaut, 2017). 
High levels of investment opportunity enable the firm to enhance its technology, 
product and corporate innovations. It also helps the firm to acquire a competitive 
advantage that could increase sales and profit. That explains high investment-
opportunity sets as a reason for a positive relation between firm performance and 
board independence, which might enhance it. Agency problems occur in high-growth 
firms where board independence effectively improves firm performance. In such 
firms, more control and monitoring levels of the board will facilitate the alignment 
between CEO and stockholder interests. Increasing outsiders in proportion to insider 
directors enhance operating performance (Boone et al., 2007). CEO duality increases 
the concentration of decision management and control in one person, reducing the 
effectiveness and performance of the firm and explaining why increasing the number 
of outsiders positively affects performance (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006). 
(Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007; Omran, 2009; Peng, 2004) 
found that outside directors are the reason for better corporate-governance 
mechanisms. The higher number of outside directors has a positive relationship with 
FP. Board independence enhances board effectiveness and is improved when the CEO 
and chair positions are separated, as well as when the number of independent 
outsiders is greater (Kor, 2006). (Booth, Cornett, & Tehranian, 2002) reports the same 
results but uses market value and net income to measure firm performance. Also, 
when market value and net income are higher, independence increases and the firm 
has a higher percentage of outside directors. Furthermore, in the UK, (Peasnell, Pope, 
& Young, 2000) provide evidence of a significant negative association between 
income increasing accruals and the proportion of outside board members.  
 
Higher board independence is probably more efficient in supervising management 
activities and inspiring them to maximise long-term value, increase transparency and 
set long-term performance objectives. Independent boards are less involved in 
controls implementation and the company’s execution operations, according to 
agency theory. They are also more objective in judging management performance, 
ensuring firm sustainability and reducing information asymmetry with different 
stakeholder groups, which explains why they are more effective in governing and 
monitoring management practices. Their compensation is not related to short-term 
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financial performance (Jizi, 2017). The earliest studies on board independence argue 
that outside directors who are not part of the management team indicates better board 
decision-making (Dahya and McConnell, 2005). Boards must have outside directors 
to fulfil their monitoring role, according to agency theory (J. Johnson et al., 1996), as 
they are not elaborated in day-to-day firm management and not accountable to the 
firm’s CEO. They enhance the internal and external governance mechanisms.  
 
Other studies report that there is no relationship between the outside directors and FP, 
or only little impact on FP. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found that firms with a 
higher proportion of outside directors are not significantly associated with high FP. 
The studies in the literature include many findings regarding the relationship between 
board independence and FP. 
 
Showing connections and common ground, independent-directors literature is quite 
mixed but not to an extent that would make it implausible to link board independence 
with firm performance. In general, the negative relationship between independence 
and performance is explained by managerial-power theory, which suggests that 
executives increase their managerial control through informational deficit, not sharing 
firm information and choosing boards with little experience and poor qualifications. 
Therefore, outside directors are unfamiliar with the company and less informed, 
leading them to make mistakes in their decision-making process, reducing monitoring 
effectiveness and decreasing overall firm performance. Independence is negatively 
correlated with performance, but it can be reduced by having industry expertise or 
informal network affiliations among board members. Industry expertise is a reason for 
reducing the possible information gap to enhance independent members’ 
effectiveness, improve their advising and monitoring ability and have a significant 
and positive effect on firm performance.  
Informal connections between independent members and corporate executives 
increase the power and effectiveness of directors, facilitate information flow, help to 
decrease an information deficit and lead to better firm performance. Outside directors 
are rarely independent; they have relationships with the firm or its management, and 
their decisions are based on the management’s information because CEOs may have 
power over the board members, which explains why they can be more effective than 
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those who have no relation and cannot manage objectively. Board independence 
reduces agency problems, facilitates the arrangement between CEO and stockholder 
interests, reduces the information asymmetry among different stakeholder groups, 
enhances board decision-making, promotes efficiency in supervising management 
activities, maximises long-term value and increases transparency. As a result, outside 
directors are less involved in controls implementation and more objective in 
considering management performance. In short, increasing outsiders decreases the 
concentration of decision management, eliminates vesting control in one person and 
results in a positive effect on performance and better corporate governance 
mechanisms. Based on this conclusion and the findings reported, the author seeks 
more about the relationship between board independence and firm performance in 
Egyptian companies reaching the eighth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 2c1: There is a positive relationship between board independence 
and firm performance before the Revolution.  
 
To the author’s knowledge, none of the extant empirical studies has adequately 
addressed the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. Depending on the previous literature studies in 
Egypt between the period 2009 to 2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-Habashy, 2018; 
Elfeky, 2017; Fayez, 2019; Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; Sarhan et al., 
2019), the next hypothesis was developed and therefore, the author hypothesises that 
board independence is improved after the Revolution than pre-revolution based on the 
following.  
Hypothesis 2c2: There is a relationship between board independence and firm 
performance after the Revolution.  
 
The Revolution demands included having transparency and avoiding corruption 
which can be achieved through board independence. It can help to reduce conflict of 
interests and enhance board decision-making to cope with any negative effects of the 
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Revolution. Board dependence increases the possibility of companies’ survival 
through maximising long-term value and increasing transparency by more objectivity 
in considering management performance.  
3.4.4 Board Diversity (Gender) 
 
The current challenges of technology, economy and politics require firms to 
have talented and highly skilled directors with a variety of backgrounds, education, 
experience, knowledge, views and perspectives, to promote good decision-making. 
These characteristics increase and enhance business creativity and generate innovative 
solutions through cognitive conflict (Reguera-Alvarado, De Fuentes, & Laffarga, 
2017). One of the findings is that female representation on BOD has positive impacts 
on top management and firm performance by increasing the firm’s innovation power. 
No single theory can suggest an inclusive framework for the relationship between 
diversity and firm performance (Kiel & Gavin, 2003), so a mix of agency theory, 
resource-dependency theory and stakeholder theory can help in examining this 
relation. The UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 indicates the importance of board 
diversity, supporting participation by women on boards to facilitate and maintain 
successful relationships with stakeholders. Some authors suggest that female directors 
are different in personality, diligence, communication skills, commitment and self-
interest orientation (Cavaco et al., 2017; Huse & Solberg, 2006). Resource-
dependence theory contends that the board of directors is an important resource for 
companies that links them with their competitors and their industry (Van der Walt & 
Ingley, 2003). Hiring female directors enhances firm financial performance because 
female directors have viewpoints that differ from those of male directors. Women 
may also provide better access to skilled and well-connected directors, efficient 
resource utilisation, various benefits and resources for the company and experience to 
improve financial performance.  
Younger directors with qualifications can improve the performance of female 
directors sitting on the board. Diversity develops the directors’ profiles to enhance 
relations with competitors and customers, improve industry knowledge and lead to 
better performance. Therefore, companies that have better financial performance are 
expected to employ female directors. Gender diversity is one of the required 
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corporate-governance practices to establish a good and strong ethical culture within 
organisations (Farag & Mallin, 2016). It will reflect discrimination or equality in fair 
recruitment, compensation packages, how the company treats employees and 
promotes them and whether women reach top positions (Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013). 
Higher levels of managerial ownership increase the number of females sitting on the 
board of directors because they motivate and influence the nomination and decisions 
related to choosing female directors.  
Female directors motivate women in middle and lower-level management to improve 
their own performance and to contribute to the managerial groups to which they 
belong (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). They have better attendance records and greater 
involvement with committees, such as corporate governance and audit committees, 
which require intense monitoring (R. Adams & Ferreira, 2009). The financial 
restatement is required less frequently in the presence of female board members 
(Abbott, Parker, & Presley, 2012). They accept and are assigned more frequently to 
roles related to environmental and sustainable-development matters, as these positions 
are more closely aligned with their roles in society (Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015). Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) find that greater female representation increases the size of the 
human-capital pool, provides some additional skills and perspectives that may not be 
possible with all-male boards and creates tougher monitors characteristic of gender-
diverse boards. Male directors are more concerned with compensation and the 
executive and finance committees, while female directors are selected for public-
affairs committees. Female directors are sensitive market observers and can get 
realistic consumer points of view that increase productivity, firm value and 
profitability. When the female directors are non-executive or independent, the 
reaction of the stock market is positive (Yasser, 2012).  
New Zealand has a smaller market than other developed countries such as the U.S., 
the UK and Japan. Small and medium enterprises and agriculture dominate its 
economy, which may reflect different ownership structures, corporate governance and 
firm performance. The author used 79 listed firms in New Zealand and found that 
boards of directors positively impact firm performance, and if female directors are 
nonexecutive, then the performance will be lower. The female directors on the board, 
leverage and firm size exhibit a significant impact on N.Z. firms' performance. The 
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result reveals that boards of directors, board committees and managerial ownership 
have a positive and significant impact on firm performance (Fauzi & Locke, 2012).  
 
Chinese companies have a dual board structure comprising the supervisory 
board/committee (SB) and the BOD. This reflects a bi-directional relationship 
between performance and the female directors’ number on the BOD in China. Some 
companies succeed to employ female directors, sending a progressive signal to 
institutional investors and stakeholders. This means that firm performance affects 
board gender diversity (performance to diversity). A diversity-performance 
relationship is also apparent, running from diversity to firm performance. As 
mentioned above, greater diversity means different perspectives, backgrounds, 
experience and positive impact on financial performance (Farag & Mallin, 2016).  
 
Agency theory emphasises the conflicts of interest that can indicate asymmetric 
information and incomplete contracts. The board of directors is a key governance 
factor in aligning the interests of managers with shareholders. Accordingly, a 
heterogeneous board has better control, a wider range of views, greater board 
independence, reduction in costs associated with agency problems and increased 
value of the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). To enhance board independence, the 
company needs board diversity with different backgrounds and qualifications for 
better manager monitoring and lower agency costs consistent with agency theory 
(Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Increasing board size and independence of the 
firm will increase diversity, improving supervisory roles and performance. Hence 
when boards are large and more independent, the presence of female directors is 
greater. Therefore, resource-dependency theory and agency theory suggest that 
increasing diversity benefits firm performance. Following the stakeholder theory, 
women on boards offer important indicators and a sign that the firm is stakeholder-
oriented, ensuring the incorporation of stakeholder interests (Fauzi & Locke, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, board gender diversity can be a conflict source, decision-making 
difficulty and negative impact (R. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, 
& Simpson, 2010; De Andres et al., 2005) or have no influence on board effectiveness 
(Rose, 2007; Zahra & Stanton, 1988). It could cause communication problems, 
increasing intergroup conflicts on larger boards; women are more risk-averse and 
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recommend less aggressive strategies (Apesteguia, Azmat, & Iriberri, 2012; Croson & 
Gneezy, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Post & Kris, 2015). CEOs prefer small 
and homogeneous boards for a better monitoring process (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).  
 
To summarise the previous section, the relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance is mixed. First, based on the resource dependence theory, hiring female 
directors enhances firm financial performance by increasing productivity, firm value 
and profitability. Female directors have different viewpoints, personality, diligence, 
communication skills, commitment and a less self-interested orientation. Moreover, 
they are sensitive market observers, get more realistic consumer viewpoints, have 
better attendance records, utilise resources more efficiently, improve industry 
knowledge, increase a firm’s innovation power and are associated with lower rates of 
a financial restatement. Following stakeholder theory, females on boards have 
successful relationships with stakeholders (competitors and customers), indicating 
that the firm is stakeholder-oriented and ensuring the incorporation of stakeholder 
interests. Agency theory emphasises that gender diversity is associated with improved 
control, a larger range of views, higher levels of board independence, different 
backgrounds and qualifications, reduced agency problems, lower agency costs, better 
supervisory-role performance and increased firm value. Female directors accompany 
higher levels of managerial ownership and larger and more independent boards. They 
are talented, highly-skilled, with a variety of backgrounds, education, experience, 
knowledge, views and perspectives. These enhance and promote better decision-
making, increase business creativity and generate innovative solutions. The second 
part is the bi-directional relationship, from performance to diversity and diversity to 
performance. The third and last part of the mixed relation is that performance and 
female directors have a negative relationship or no influence. This is because diversity 
is a source of conflict, decision-making difficulty and communication problems. 
Women are more risk-averse and recommend less aggressive strategies when they are 
nonexecutive. Costs and benefits of board diversity can be summarised as better 
advisory and monitoring roles on one hand, and on the other hand, communication 
costs and disagreement between managerial levels. When benefits outweigh the costs, 
the firm will have a positive relationship with firm performance and vice versa. Board 
diversity and female roles in Egyptian companies and how much they should be 
highlighted to improve firm performance are among the most important topics 
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discussed after the Egyptian Revolution. This is the reason the author chose to analyse 
it and find out if Egyptian companies work on diversity. Based on these arguments, 
the ninth hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
 
Hypothesis 2d1: There is a positive relationship between board gender diversity 
and firm performance before the Revolution.  
 
To the author’s knowledge, none of the extant empirical studies has adequately 
addressed the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm performance. Depending on the previous literature studies 
in Egypt between the period 2009 to 2016 (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; El-Habashy, 
2018; Elfeky, 2017; Fayez, 2019; Mahmoud & Ntim, 2018; Masry, 2016; Sarhan et 
al., 2019), the next hypothesis was developed and therefore, the author hypothesises 
that board gender diversity will improve after the Revolution than pre-revolution 
based on the following.  
 
Hypothesis 2d2: There is a relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance after the Revolution.  
 
It is recommended for any devolving country to concentrate and focus on gender 
diversity and especially on females’ education and work. Therefore, the author 
expects that gender diversity will show an effect on firm performance after the 
Revolution. They can also help with their communication skills and their relationships 
with stakeholders. 
 
In short (and putting it bluntly), ownership structure related to the proportion of shares 
that various shareholders own explains the type of ownership that exists within a 
corporation, including block or family ownership, government or state ownership, 
institutional ownership and managerial or director ownership, discussed in detail 
above. Numerous studies have attempted to explain these types and their relationship 
with firm performance. As noted, block ownership refers to shareholders with 
 97 
extremely large amounts of company stock—external holders with at least 5% of the 
shares—who influence the company and improve the value of the firm. Corporate 
performance and control management increase as the share of blockholders increases. 
Family ownership occurs when the founder or a family member is an officer, director, 
blockholder owner, manager or board member. It covers agency costs and resource-
dependence theories, as the close relationship between family members reduces 
conflicts of interest and goals and enhances family capital, accordingly increasing 
performance. Firm performance can also decrease due to the lack of job qualifications 
when the CEO position is filled through family relations. The relationship between 
block ownership and firm performance was analysed to find out if the predominance 
of family firms has a negative effect or a close relationship between family members 
enhances firm performance by reducing conflicts and agency costs. The analysis is 
also used to assess whether this ownership type was presented and affected firm 
performance as early as 2000.  
 
Government ownership includes direct firm ownership or indirect support that shows 
positive and negative relations with firm performance. One of the important 
ownership-structure types, it concerns shareholder protection and objectives and 
government and political interference effects on management. Inconclusive 
relationships make it interesting to examine its relationship with Egyptian firms’ 
performance. Many reasons for the negative impact on firm performance include 
political factors, government pressure on companies to implement government 
objectives and weakening the directors’ independence. The positive relationship is 
due to the government’s long-term provision of funds, facilitating access to financial 
resources and secured debt financing. This thesis considers the developing countries 
where institutional ownership is rapidly expanding and whether this is the case in 
Egypt, affecting firm performance. Institutional shareholders’ positive effect is 
apparent throughout pressure-insensitive, foreign and large institutional shareholders. 
Pressure-sensitive, domestic and small institutions have a weaker relationship with 
performance; however, the exploitation view demonstrates weakened firm 
performance and a negative relationship between the variables. Other than this, the 
passive-monitoring institutional investors have a weak or non-existent relationship 
with firm performance.  
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The equity percentage owned by insiders and the company’s management 
participating actively in corporate decision-making referred to as managerial 
ownership, have different and mixed effects on FP. One is associated with the 
convergence-of-interest effect and agency theory, which support the positive effect on 
firm performance. The other relates to the entrenchment theory, showing negative 
impact—namely, no statistically significant relation with FP because of the separation 
and differentiation of managerial and board ownership. Figure 3.1 shows all the 




























Figure 3.1 Hypotheses Summary 
Government ownership has a positive effect on firm performance 
 
 Institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm performance 
 
 There is positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.  
 
There is a significant impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance 
 Board size affects the financial performance 
 




There is a positive relationship between block ownership and firm performance.  
 
There is a positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance. 
 






It is important to discuss the impact of corporate governance roles and variables, 
especially in post-revolutionary Egypt. It is interesting to reveal how board size 
affects firm performance in Egypt and to discover the factors influencing this 
relationship. Board size affects the mobilisation of resources, information-processing 
capacity, the ability to cope with environmental complexity, agency costs, corporate 
discussions, and communication. CEO duality, the second variable affecting firm 
performance, is itself influenced by independent outside members, agency problems, 
conflicts of interest, and the cost of replacing a CEO. In turn, CEO duality affects 
organisational efficiency, decision-making processes, communication, board 
effectiveness, and the response to external events such as those that have taken place 
in Egypt. A review of board independence requires examining informational flows, 
experience, qualifications, decision-making processes, the monitoring of 
effectiveness, transparency, and arrangements between CEOs and stockholder 
interests. The final corporate governance variable examined here is gender diversity 
and the roles of women in Egyptian companies, which are of particular importance 
following the revolution. This variable is relevant to productivity, personality, 
communication skills, commitment, market observation, resource utilisation, 
variations in backgrounds and qualifications, supervisory roles, business creativity, 
innovation, and communication skills. To the author’s knowledge, no study 
undertaken to date has examined the effects of the Egyptian revolution on each of the 
abovementioned variables. The chapters that follow will analyse and discuss all of 
these variables to conclude their effects on firm performance following the revolution, 
















































Chapter 4: Research Design 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this research was to examine the relationships among 
ownership-structure types, corporate-governance (CG) variables and corporate 
performance. The first part of this chapter explains the research philosophy, including 
the paradigms (i.e. the interpretive paradigm and the positivist paradigm), the research 
approaches (i.e. deductive, inductive and abductive approaches) and qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. The second part discusses the data and the analysis 
methodologies.  
4.2 Research Philosophy 
 
This thesis examines the influences of the economic impact of the Revolution, 
ownership-structure and corporate-governance on firm performance and identifies 
those factors. Thus, the positivist paradigm is the appropriate research philosophy for 
this thesis. A paradigm is a set of linked assumptions about the world, shared by a 
community of scientists investigating that world and giving their investigation a 
conceptual and philosophical framework, essential for the day-to-day work of any 
science (Suppe, 1977). By understanding the paradigm’s nature and meaning, it was 
easy to determine which problems are worthy of examination and which methods to 
use. Another task in this part of the research methodology is to select which research 
approach to follow. The deductive approach to research relies on empirical 
confirmation of general conclusions derivable from a specific and detailed number of 
observations (J. Adams, Khan, & Raeside, 2014). The researcher created Figure 4.1 to 





Figure 4.1 Deductive Research Steps  
 
The last task of this part is to choose between qualitative and quantitative 
research methods (Carr, 1994; Dzurec & Abraham, 1993; Gortner & Schultz, 1988; 
Moccia, 1988; Rolfe, 1994). The quantitative paradigm seeks facts or causes without 
advocating subjective interpretation. It is a logical-positivistic approach (Cook & 
Reichardt, 1979). This demonstrates that the thesis applies the positivist paradigm, a 
deductive approach and quantitative technique to examine the relationship between 
ownership structure, corporate governance Revolution impact and firm performance 
while controlling for some other variables, which means that it applies the positivist 
paradigm. 
 
4.3 Research Methodology  
 
4.3.1 Data Selection, Sources, and Criteria for Selecting the Final Sample 
 
The thesis tests the relationship of the firm’s performance with ownership-
structure and corporate-governance variables. It includes three data types: ownership 
structure, corporate governance and corporate firm-performance data. Ownership-
structure data is from the ownership-structure reports published by each company for 
each year at the Egyptian stock market. Ownership-structure types include 
Managerial/Director Ownership (MOWN), Block Ownership (BOWN), 
Government/State Ownership (GOWN) and Institutional Ownership (IOWN). 
Corporate-governance data, such as Board Size (BS), Board Independence (BI), 
Board Diversity (BD) and CEO Duality (CD), are also from the ownership-structure 
reports. Corporate firm-performance and control-variable data are collected from 
financial statements (income statement and balance sheet) and disclosure books. The 
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ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate firm-performance data cover 
101 companies out of 191 companies. These chosen companies are the most active 
listed Egyptian companies in different industries, based on their yearly transactions on 
EGX excluding the financial firms and banks, utilities firms, and less active firms. All 
listed companies were included in the sample; then, the inactive ones and those with 
missing data were excluded. In 2006, the Ministry of Investment issued the Code of 
Corporate Governance for State-Owned Companies in Egypt, so the year 2008 was 
late enough to have complete CG reports on the corporations and avoid the problem 
of missing data. Therefore, the thesis population is about listed firms on the Egyptian 
stock exchange, starting in 2008. Accordingly, the data cover the years from 
December 2008, to December 2017, presented by year.  
 
The thesis data were obtained from secondary sources, extracted from the annual 
reports and accounts of the listed firms in Egypt, for the period 2008 to 2017. The two 
sources that could have been used were the EGX 100 and DataStream, but after 
finishing the data collection and completing the sample using EGX only, due to data 
availability for all 101 companies (992 observations), the thesis excluded the 
DataStream data. The data used in this thesis include non-financial companies 
covering different industries, excluding financial firms whose financial statements 
differ from the others. The information came from financial statements, disclosure 
books and ownership-structure reports. As the data used were collected at different 
times, panel data enabled the analysis of many variables at different periods, useful 
for explaining change over time. The criteria used to select the final sample were 
based on the availability of the data from 2008 to 2017, including annual ownership 
reports, annual financial statements and corporate governance data. While gathering 
the data, some CG and ownership-structure data were missing. Since financial firms 
and utility firms were meant to be excluded, 90 of the 191 companies in the sample 
were excluded. The data used in this thesis are longitudinal panel data, as the same 
variables are observed over ten years (2008 to 2017). The rationale behind this is to 
consider three years prior to the Egyptian Revolution as well as the six years 
following the revolution. Panel data have some advantages over cross-sectional and 
time-series data. They yield more accurate implications, include more sample 
variability, simplify computation and statistical conclusions, and generate more 
accurate predictions for individual outcomes by pooling the data. Error measurement 
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and controlling omitted variables’ impact help to test dynamic hypotheses and cover 
short- and long-term effects (Hsiao, 2007). Data before and after the year 2011 are 
included, due to the occurrence of the Egyptian Revolution in January 2011, which 
may lead to different conclusions about the revolution’s effect on the financial 
performance of the Egyptian companies and fill the gap of missing answers to that 
question. 
A panel-data multiple regression model is used for data analysis. Panel data can 
control heterogeneity among the cross-sections and reduce the multicollinearity 
problem of the explanatory variables (Mira, 2005).  
Table 4.1 shows the final sample, with explanations of all the industries and how 
many companies in each industry are used in the sample before and after exclusions. 
It represents the final sample selection that includes 101 out of 191 companies and 
992 observations. The company-classification system is categorised as per to Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) developed by Dow Jones and the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange (FTSE); it is based on business nature and source of revenue. ICB 
hierarchy provides eighteen industries excluding four industries, namely, Banks and 
Financial Services, Insurance and Utilities. There are still 14 industries as shown in 
Table 4.1. The excluded firms are the financial firms and firms with some years and 
CG data missing. Utility firms are excluded because they are characterised by long-
term debt, more fixed assets, lower retained earnings and high dividend payout ratios. 
Financial firms are excluded due to their high leverage, which may lead to financial 












Table 4.1: Summary of the Final Selected Samples (Companies and Industries) 
Industry Type No. of Companies Per cent 
Real Estate  28 14.66% 
Consumer Goods 26 13.61% 
Construction and Materials 25 13.09% 
Industrial Goods and Services and Automobiles 16 8.38% 
Consumer Services 15 7.85% 
Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals 14 7.33% 
Personal and Household Products  10 5.24% 
Basic Resources 8 4.19% 
Chemicals 6 3.14% 
Retail  5 2.62% 
Telecommunications 4 2.09% 
Oil and Gas 3 1.57% 
Technology 3 1.57% 
Media 1 0.52% 
Financial Services 26 13.61% 
Utilities 1 0.52% 
Total Population 191 100% 
Less Financial Firms and Banks 26 13.61%  
Less Utilities Firms 1 0.52%  
Firms less active in market and with missing data 63 38.75%  
Total Sampled Firms with full data 101 47.09% 
Total Missing Observations 467 52.91% 
Total Observations   992 
 
 
Moreover, their financial reporting process is not the same as those of companies in 
other industries, and they use specific accounting rules associated with their business 
(Peasnell et al., 2005). Financial institutions also face controlling monitoring that 
relates explicitly to accounting data and creates incentives managing the income 
statement and balance sheet variables of interest to regulators (Healy and Wahlen, 
 107 
1999). Those firms also have a different capital structure than non-financial 
corporations. 
 
By this exclusion, the thesis will avoid bias that could affect the results of the analysis 
and will deliver a more accurate sample. Table 4.2 shows the different ownership 
structures included in the thesis.  
Table 4.2: Different Ownership Structure of Thesis Analysis  








Table 4.2 shows the listed ownership-structure types of the sample in percentages. As 
shown, institution ownership (IOWN) represents 50 per cent of the whole sample, 
government ownership (GOWN) represent 27 per cent of the whole sample, 
managerial ownership (MOWN) represents 20.3 per cent and block ownership 
(BOWN) represents 2.7 per cent.  
 
To evaluate the relationship between performance and the other variables, this thesis 
uses regression analysis, employing the ordinary least squares technique. Multiple 
regressions, System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM), and Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) were used for the analysis and STATA software was 
used to run the regression.  
 
4.4 Econometrics Models and Variables Definitions 
 
The model used in this thesis is a linear regression model, and STATA was used 
to run the regression to explore and examine the relationships between ownership 
structure and corporate governance with firm performance, through the System 
Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM), and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
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which are used in the following equation. The variables definitions and their 
measurements are summarised in Table 4.3. These methods are used to ad a 
methodological contribution and get accurate results and to add to the literature by 
examining the PCA findings as it was not used before to investigate these 
relationships.  
 
Model 1:  
This equation is used to describe the relationship between firm performance with 




This equation is used to describe the relationship between firm performance with 




This equation is used to describe the relationship between firm performance with 




• Dependent variables:  
FP = Firm performance 
 
• Independent variables:  
BOWN = Block ownership 
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MOWN = Managerial ownership 
GOWN = Government ownership 
IOWN = Institutional ownership 
BS = Board size 
CD = CEO duality 
BI = Board independence 
BD = Board diversity 
 
• Control variables:  
SIZE = Firm size 
LEV = Leverage 
LIQ = Liquidity Ratio 
AGE = Firm Age 
TANG = Assets Tangibility 
ε = error term 
 
4.4.1 The Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variable for these models is ‘corporate performance’. It is the 
firm's overall financial health over a certain period, measured in three ways (David, 
2011). The first method is the Tobin’s Q ratio, defined as the firm’s market value 
divided by the total assets, valued either at a book or replacement value: Tobin’s Q = 
MV/TA (Shepherd & Shepherd, 2003). Another definition is the firm’s market value 
plus the firm’s debt, all divided by its total assets: Tobin’s Q = (MVE + DEBT)/TA. 
MVE equals the product of a firm’s share price and the number of common stock 
shares outstanding. DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its 
short-term assets, plus the book value of the firm’s long-term debt; the TA is the book 
value of the total assets of the firm (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). Tobin’s Q is used in 
measuring the corporate performance in most studies (Cho, 1998; Harold Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001a; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell 
& Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). Both Tobin’s Q methods are used in this thesis, 
as the debt data was available for all the companies in the selected sample, which led 
to appropriate results.  
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The other two measurements—return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)—
are accounting profit rates. There are some differences between these corporate 
performance measurements. The ROA is measured as the ratio of net income to the 
total assets. It measures the firm’s ability to generate profits on its assets portfolio 
(Lee, 2012). It also measures profitability and asset-management efficiency. The 
higher this ratio is, the more profitable is the corporation (Monea, 2009).  
 
The ROE is measured as the ratio of net income to the book value of equity. It reflects 
the extent of management-use effectiveness of shareholders’ investments (Muda, 
Shaharuddin, & Embaya, 2013). It is also useful for comparison with other indicators 
of return, which are harder to make (Frezatti, 2007).  
 
These ratios are used to measure corporation profitability for several reasons. They 
can control the size of financial information because they enable comparing ratios of 
different firms, even if the assets and liabilities are not comparable. Another reason is 
that ratios control industry factors. Industry characteristics can be seen by comparing 
the firm’s financial ratios to those of an industry average (Rinkevičiūtė & Martinkute-
Kauliene, 2014).  
 
Tobin’s Q is forward-looking, based on investors’ estimations of future corporate 
profitability, which are affected by their psychology and their estimates of future 
events. The other ratios are backwards-looking and affected by accounting standards 
and practices, measuring assets (tangible and intangible) and depreciation, which can 
affect the recorded-profit levels 
 
4.4.2 The Independent Variables 
 
- Ownership structure 
To give a more accurate picture of the relationship between ownership 
structure and performance, the data include the fraction of shares owned by various 
shareholders and those owned by the management. Block ownership is defined as the 
total number of individual shareholders who own 5% or more of the stock, or who 
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have an extremely large amount of corporation stock, creating a block of stock 
(blockholders) (Pham, Suchard, & Zein, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012). Blockholders can 
influence decision-making processes by the management to increase shareholder 
value (Brockman, Chung, & Yan, 2009). Managerial ownership is elected 
members/managers (e.g. board members, CEO, top management) who supervise the 
activities of the corporation. This ownership includes the shares owned by the CEO, 
corporate board members and the top management (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003). 
Government ownership represents firms owned by the state rather than by an 
individual or a private entity. Government ownership could be viewed as a single 
entity, showing that state-owned corporations may have concentrated ownership 
funded by the state’s money as a whole; individuals within the government do not 
influence the firm’s actions. Institutional ownership occurs when large financial 
organisations own an ownership percentage of a corporation. The type of corporate 
ownership is measured by the fraction/ percentage of shares owned by each type of 
owner, and the exceeding percentage represents the ownership type (Brown, Chen, & 
Shekhar, 2011). 
 
- Corporate governance variables 
Corporate governance is important in determining how corporations are 
managed and monitored. It can be defined as the set of institutional and market-based 
mechanisms that encourage the self-interested company controllers. It helps to show 
how the company will be operated to maximise its value and to assure getting a return 
for suppliers of capital investment (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). It includes four variables.  
 
- Board Size 
 
Board size (BS) is the number of directors elected to govern the corporation. 
Some authors (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Michael, 1993) find that managers are less 
effective when the board size is large, while others (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; 
Barnhart, Marr, & Rosenstein, 1994; Renneboog, 2000; Yermack, 1996) mention that 
board size relates negatively to firm performance and decision-making quality. 
Additional evidence suggests a negative relationship between board size and Tobin's 
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Q in Malaysia and Singapore (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005); between board size and 
profitability in Finland (T. Eisenberg et al., 1998); and between board size and 
operating performance improvements in the UK (Carline, Linn, & Yadav, 2002). 
 
- CEO Duality 
CEO duality (CD) means that a single individual work as both CEO and board 
chair. It is measured as a number of the BOD; a dummy variable where ‘1’ represents 
that the same person occupies both roles and ‘0’ otherwise. 
 
- Board Independence 
 
Board independence signifies the extent to which independent 
directors/outside directors are board members with no material relationship with the 
corporation and owning no shares in it. Board Independence (BI) represents the 
directors who are not related to the corporation or any person in it and do not own 
shares in it. Independent directors have no controlling shareholder votes, defining 
them as outsiders. Outside directors are individuals previously employed by financial 
or other non-financial corporations. It is measured by dividing ‘number of 
independent directors’ by ‘total number of directors’ (Lefort & Urzúa, 2008). Some 
papers suggest that when there is board independence, corporate governance, firm 
performance effectiveness and market value all increase (Black et al., 2006; Brickley 
et al., 1997; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). In the U.S., firms with higher numbers of 
outside directors are related to good firm performance and improvement, as well as to 
better board decision-making (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2001; Kaplan & Minton, 1994). When performance is poor, the corporation may 
increase independent directors’ numbers or replace inside directors with independent 
ones to improve performance and attract investors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). 
Other authors show a negative relation between outside directors (board 






- Board Diversity: Gender 
 
The last corporate governance variable, Board Diversity (BD), is defined as 
the percentage of women on the board of directors. Many good-governance views 
assert a positive relation between board diversity and shareholder value. Board 
diversity is increasing over time (Brancato & Patterson, 1999; Dalton et al., 1999) as 
it enhances shareholder value, relates to improved financial performance and has a 
positive significant relationship with firm value. It helps to better reflect the 
marketplace, increases creativity and innovation, produces more effective problem-
solving and enhances corporate leadership effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003). 
Heterogeneous groups are more effective at engaging in organisational change and 
responding rapidly to the market changes that enhance financial performance 
(Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). 
 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
 
The control variables were chosen based on previous studies that measure firm 
performance by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Some studies use industry, size and 
leverage together (Ab Razak et al., 2008; Cho, 1998; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Le & 
Chizema, 2011; Martínez, Stöhr, & Quiroga, 2007; Zeitun, 2009), or size, leverage 
and liquidity (Desoky & Mousa, 2012; Wahba, 2013); while Ullah (Ullah, 2016) 
added tangible assets to size, leverage and liquidity as a control variable. Others use 
size and leverage (Al Mutairi & Hasan, 2010; Bhattacharya & Graham, 2009; Lin & 
Fu, 2017; Maury, 2006; Ramalingegowda & Yu, 2012; Ruan et al., 2011); some 
choose to combine size with industry (Nanka-Bruc, 2009; Tsao, Chen, Lin, & Hyde, 
2009) or leverage and industry (Xu & Wang, 1997). Size and tangible assets are used 
together (Cheung & Wei, 2006; Pham et al., 2011; Sulong, Gardner, Hussin, Sanusi, 
& McGowan, 2013). Other studies show one of the chosen control variables as 
leverage (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007) or age (Martínez et al., 2007; Nanka-Bruc, 







Leverage (LEV) is defined as the value sensitivity of equity ownership with 
respect to changes in firm value (Welch, 2011). Leverage is the debt owed to large 
creditors, such as financial institutions, and total leverage is an aggregation of short- 
and long-term leverage (Sulong et al., 2013; Whiting & Gilkison, 2000). Financial 
leverage is included as one of the control variables because most of the finance and 
economics literature indicates that capital structure of the firm’s impacts-investment 
decisions and other aspects of firm performance may constrain managers’ decisions. 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of debt to total assets (debt-to-asset ratio) (R. 
Anderson et al., 2003; Bhattacharya & Graham, 2009; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Kochhar 
& David, 1996; Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Ruan et al., 2011; Ullah, 2016). Profitability 
is known as the best predictor for firm leverage; when profitability is high, the 
possibility of retaining earnings increases and the need for debt decreases. If financial 
distress costs are changed to the cost of benefits, then the firm will be forced to 
operate in an efficient way (Opler & Titman, 1994). A negative relationship between 
corporate performance and leverage indicates that firm performance is reduced when 
leverage is high; operating profits are lower, and the firm may lose market share. 
More highly leveraged firms respond faster to a decline in firm performance because 
its value can decrease before it is forced into bankruptcy (Altman, 1971; Michael, 
1989). Firms with poor performance will be encouraged to sell their assets to repay 
the debt (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Stulz, 1990). Other control variables, such as size and 
firm age, are suggested as relating to the firm-performance outcome, the reason they 
are chosen for this thesis (R. Anderson et al., 2003; Braun & Sharma, 2007; Tsao et 
al., 2009).  
 
• Firm Size 
The size of the firm is included in the regression models as a control variable and 
measured as the natural log of assets to transform total assets (V. Chen, Tsao, & 
Chen, 2013; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981). Firm size can be a source of competitive 
advantage, as bigger firms are supposed to be more efficient than smaller firms. Size 
is a relevant variable affecting firm performance, as large firms are expected to have 
more resources, enhancing their ability to have and process information (Su, Xie, & 
Li, 2011; Wahba, 2008, 2013). Larger companies also are expected to be less efficient 
 115 
than smaller ones, due to top managers’ loss of control over strategic and operational 
activities, resulting in a decrease in company performance (Ab Razak et al., 2008; 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Lang & Stulz, 1994). Arguably, size is 
negatively related to ownership (Harold  Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) because owning a 
percentage of a large firm is harder than owning the same percentage of a small firm 
(Bhattacharya & Graham, 2009; Hawawini, Subramanian, & Verdin, 2003; Lun & 
Quaddus, 2011).  
 
Size also affects firm performance negatively because of bureaucratic intervention in 
larger firms (Xu & Wang, 1997), higher agency costs (Sun & Tong, 2003) and less 
flexibility in responses to changing market conditions. On the other hand, larger firms 
lead to better performance by benefitting from economies of scale (Lin & Fu, 2017). 
Firm size is positively related to sales growth, which affects firm profitability. 
Corporate-governance mechanisms and firm size and performance affect board role. 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002) recommend that good corporate governance 
affects and benefits the firm with lower costs of capital, easier financing, improved 
stakeholder and better company performance. The most commonly used term 
associated with the firm size is firm age, discussed next.  
 
• Firm Age 
The literature shows that age impacts a company’s performance and its strategic 
choices over time (Jovanovic, 2001; Levesque & Minniti, 2006; Marshall et al., 2006; 
Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Ageing enhances experience and competence and raises 
firm performance, enabling companies to acknowledge and achieve new technological 
opportunities (Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Reenen, & Zilibotti, 2007; W. Cohen & 
Levinthal, 2000). Inertia is one of the reasons that ageing affects firm performance 
negatively (Cucculelli, Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta, 2014; D. Miller & Shamsie, 
2001). Most studies published in top academic journals in economics and 
management find that firm age is used too much. For instance, the journal platform 
JSTOR recognises more than 3,000 contributions that address firm age, published 
from the 1980s until 2017 (Coad, Holm, Krafft, & Quatraro, 2018). Firm age is used 
as a control variable because it reflects organisational characteristics, and as the life 
cycle of the firm changes, its priorities vary (Wahba, 2013). Firm age is also used as a 
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control variable by taking the number of years from the date of incorporation to the 
year of analysis (Michaelas, Chittenden, & Poutziouris, 1999).  
 
• Asset tangibility 
Asset tangibility (TANG) is included as a control variable. It represents the firm’s 
asset structure, which impacts directly its capital-structure choice and operating 
performance. TANG is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Firms with 
a lower proportion of fixed assets tend to perform better, resulting in a negative 
relationship between the two variables (Ab Razak et al., 2008; Lin & Fu, 2017; Ullah, 
2016; Wahba, 2013; Weill, 2008). Tangible fixed assets can be used as collateral to 
minimise lenders' risks. They support an inverse relationship between firm 
performance and asset tangibility (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
 
• Liquidity Ratio LIQ 
Liquidity is another control variable related to firm performance, measured by 
dividing CA (current assets) by CL (current liabilities) (Lappalainen & Niskanen, 
2012). The ratio suggests that if the firm’s performance has high liquidity positions, it 
can pay current obligations; when the ratio increases/decreases, so will profitability. 
This means that the more liquid the assets, the more potential the company has to earn 
higher income from investment and contribute to better firm performance (Camelia & 
Vasile, 2014). Previous studies found inconclusive results about the liquidity effect on 
firm performance; a negative relationship between the liquidity ratio and performance 
is found by Dionne & Garand (Dionne & Garand, 2003), and a positive relationship is 
also concluded by Cho (Cho, 1998) and An & Naughton (An & Naughton, 2009). 
Liquidity is predicted to impact significantly on firm performance (Amiruddin, 2013).  
 
The previously mentioned references use resource-based theory and agency theory. 
They define firm size as the natural log of total assets and leverage as the value 
sensitivity of equity ownership with respect to changes in firm value, measured by 
dividing total debt by total assets. Firm age represents the years since foundation, and 
the liquidity ratio is measured by dividing current assets by current liabilities. The last 
control variable is tangible assets, the result of fixed assets divided by total assets.  
 
 117 
4.4.4 Dummy Variables 
 
Finally, there are two variables used as dummy variables in the models. The 
dummy variables used commonly in previous literature are for the time that can 
control for macroeconomic changes (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Lin & Fu, 2017; Yuan, 
Kang, Zhao, & Hu, 2008) and industry (Vandenbroucke, Knockaert, & Ucbasaran, 
2016; Wahba, 2010, 2013). These dummy variables are introduced to control for 
industry and time effects on ownership structure, corporate-governance variables and 
firm performance. The industry as a control variable has 14 dummy variables, used to 
clarify 14 different industries: (1) Basic Resources, (2) Chemicals, (3) Construction 
and Materials, (4) Consumer Goods, (5) Consumer Services, (6) Healthcare and 
Pharmaceuticals, (7) Industrial Goods and Services and Automobiles, (8) Oil and Gas, 
(9) Personal and Household Products, (10) Real Estate, (11) Retail, (12) Media, (13) 
Technology, (14) Telecommunications. There are some analyses which require using 
more dummy variables as for Revolution and for the different ownership structure.  
Table 4.3 summarises all these variables and differentiates between the 
definitions, measurements, sources of data and the thesis hypotheses.
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Table 4.3: Variables Definitions, Measurements and Hypothesis 
Variable Definition and Measurement Data Source  Hypothesis 
Corporate 
Performance 
Firm's overall financial health over a certain period of time.  
It is measured by ROA (ratio of net income to the total assets), 
ROE (ratio of net income to the book value of equity) and 
Tobin’s Q (firm’s market value divided by the total assets or 
firm’s market value added by the DEBT and divided by the 
total assets). 
Income statement and 
balance sheet from EGX 
  
Ownership Structure Variables 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant impact of the 
Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance 
Block  
Ownership  
It is measured by the per cent of shares owned by each type of 




reports published by each 
company for each year at 
the Egyptian stock 
market 
Hypothesis 1a1 : There is a positive relationship 
between block ownership and firm performance 
before the Revolution 
Hypothesis 1a2 :There is a negative relationship 




Hypothesis 1b1: There is a positive relationship 
between government ownership and firm performance 
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before the Revolution. 
Hypothesis 1b2: There is a relationship between 




Hypothesis 1c1: There is a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm performance 
before the Revolution. 
Hypothesis 1c2: There is a relationship between 





Hypothesis 1d1: There is a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance 
before the Revolution.  
Hypothesis 1d2: There is a relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance after the 
Revolution. 
Corporate Governance Variables 
There is a significant impact of the Egyptian 
Revolution on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance 
 120 
Board size  Number of directors (BOD) elected to govern the corporation. 
Ownership structure 
reports published by each 
company for each year at 
the Egyptian stock 
market 
Hypothesis 2a1: There is relationship between board 
size and financial performance before the Revolution. 
Hypothesis 2a2: There is a positive relationship 
between board size and financial performance after 
the Revolution 
CEO duality 
CEO duality means that a single individual works as CEO and 
board chair. It is measured by a dummy variable used as “1” 
represents that same person is the CEO and board chair, and 
“0” otherwise. 
Hypothesis 2b1: There is a relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance before the Revolution. 
Hypothesis 2b2: There is a negative relationship 




An independent director/outside director is a board director 
who does not have any material relationship with the 
corporation and does not own shares in the corporation. It is 
measured by the per cent of outside directors to the per cent of 
all directors. 
Hypothesis 2c1: There is a positive relationship 
between board independence and firm performance 
before the Revolution.  
Hypothesis 2c2: There is a relationship between board 




The per cent of women on the board of all directors. 
Hypothesis 2d1: There is a positive relationship 
between board gender diversity and firm performance 
before the Revolution.  
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Hypothesis 2d2: There is a relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm performance after the 
Revolution.  
Control Variables 
Firm Size Natural log of the book value of the total assets of a firm. 
Income statement and 
balance sheet from EGX 
  
Leverage 
The value sensitivity of equity ownership with respect to 
changes of the firm value (total debt to total assets). 
Tangible Assets It is fixed assets divided by total assets. 
Liquidity It is measured by dividing current assets by current liabilities. 
Firm Age The years since foundation. 
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4.5 Multiple Regressions 
 
Multiple regression analysis is one of the parametric techniques that is applied if the data is 
assumed to be normally distributed; however, regression analysis is properly used for validity 
against non-normality. Multiple regression analysis is the thesis of how a dependent variable is 
related to two or more independent variables. This analysis is used when testing more than two 
independent variables for their descriptive influence against one dependent variable, while 
correlation analysis is chosen when only one independent variable and one dependent variable 
are tested. Multiple linear regression is one of the most popular methods used to study the 
relationship between an outcome variable and several predictors, or independent, variables. This 
thesis uses regression analysis, in which the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique is employed 
to explore the relationship between ownership structure and corporate governance on the one 
hand, and firm performance on the other hand. OLS is used with for regressions and clusters, 
which are industries and years, to be close to the panel data analysis results. OLS was selected 
after confirming that the regression models do not suffer from a multicollinearity problem and 
after calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) for all the chosen variables in the models. The 
VIF values are insignificant, and all the values are below three. This indicates that there are no 
concerns in relation to multicollinearity among the independent variables in all of the models. To 
test the hypothesis, when the p-value is less than .05 (the standard significant level), then the 
independent variables affect the dependent variable. Otherwise, they have no relationship. They 
are used to test the hypotheses in this thesis (Sulong et al., 2013).  
 
4.5.1 Newey and West (1987) Pooled Regression 
 
For experimental testing of this thesis’ hypotheses, Newey and West pooled regression, 
as well as fixed and random effects regression, are employed by using STATA. The dependent 
variables of firm performance (ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa, Tobin’s Qb) are regressed against 
Revolution impact, ownership-structure, corporate-governance variables and control variables. 
The four firm performance models are estimated by using Newey and West (1987) pooled 
regressions for comparison through the entire sample over the ten-year test period from 2008 to 
2017, to examine the association between firm performance and the ownership-structure and 
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corporate-governance variables. Compared to a cross-sectional approach, pooled regression has 
some advantages, such as allowing the researcher greater flexibility in modelling differences 
across firms (Greene, 2012) and improving identification of significant-relationships (Gujarati, 
2003). Other advantages include increasing sample size, giving more variability and informative 
data among cross-sections and over time, more degrees of freedom and efficiency and less 
collinearity among variables (Gujarati, 2003). The Newey and West (1987) regression controls 
the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation effects (Francis et al.).  
 
4.6 Panel Data with Fixed and Random Effects 
 
Estimation techniques and theoretical results have a rich development environment that 
has increased the interest in the panel-data analysis, especially in the last decade (Greene, 2012). 
Panel data analysis and cross-sectional and time-series analysis, both have advantages and 
disadvantages. The main advantage of panel-data analysis is that it gives the researcher more 
flexibility, enabling pooling and analysing individual time series across several firms 
simultaneously, due to the data nature (same firms repeated observations over many periods). It 
eases the development of a model for more complicated and realistic data to clarify why firms 
perform contrarily during different periods. Panel datasets are larger than cross-sectional and 
time-series ones. Accordingly, panel data estimations are more accurate than other sources 
(Verbeek, 2012). Panel datasets are more efficient estimators when the model includes 
exogenous variables, for measuring their effects when compared with cross-section datasets or 
two data sources combined together (Verbeek and Nijman, 1992). Another advantage is that they 
reduce identification problems and control for some omitted variable types. In the case of fixed-
effects and random-effects models, a fixed-effects model with omitted variables that differ 
between cases will be controlled but constant over time. On the other hand, a random-effects 
estimator will control for variables varying differently in each case and over time (Hsiao, 2003). 
However, panel data also has some disadvantages, as shown below. First, it cannot be assumed 
that different observations are independent when observing the same firms over time is repeated. 
Therefore, the analysis can be complicated when the models are nonlinear and dynamic. Second, 
the panel data has a problem, mostly with the missing observations, but it is argued that missing 
observations can be supposed as a rule in the panel datasets (Verbeek and Nijman, 1992, p. 681)  
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4.7 Econometrics Analysis  
 
4.7.1 System Generalised Method of Moments  
 
The relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm 
performance is endogenous in nature and has lagged dependent variable among the covariates 
(Bushee, 2004; Harold Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001b) which requires the use of appropriate 
estimation techniques. Following the literature, on dynamic panel data models, the system 
generalised method of moments is used to address this endogeneity problem (Blundell & Bond, 
1998; Colombo et al., 2013). To address an endogeneity problem regarding the relationship 
between ownership structure types and corporate governance with firm performance, the author 
uses the system generalized method of moments (SGMM) estimator to examine this relationship. 
The data used in the thesis is linear dynamic panel-data which requires models including lags of 
the dependent variable. Notably, with regard to the validity of SGMM estimator, Hansen tests 
and AR2 tests are used to exclude the presence of autocorrelation (Lin & Fu, 2017).  
 
This thesis adopts the SGMM to deal with correlation between the independent variables and the 
error terms, heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across the residuals, and 
autocorrelation in the residuals. This explains why the author did not use the two-stage or three-
stage least squares methods to study this relationship as previous studies. The fixed or random 
effect panel can be used to discuss the limitations of estimating the static model (Model 1). The 
error term of these two models may give biased results because it is maybe correlated with the 
lagged variable. Instruments variables as lags of dependent and explanatory variables can be 
used to solve this correlation problem (Arellano & Bond, 1991). SGMM estimation control for 
the time-specific effects by including time dummy variables and eliminate data cross-sectional 
dependence. Nevertheless, the SGMM methodology has some weaknesses as follows. First, a 
significant finite sample bias can result from using a large instruments number (Roodman, 2009) 
which is not the case here in this thesis. Second, this methodology is only valid when the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms. It can be followed up with Hansen J-test and 
AR(2), post estimation specification tests, to eliminate autocorrelation (Arellano & Bond, 1991; 
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Khémiri & Noubbigh, 2018; Roodman, 2009). Hence, this thesis uses Hansen J- Statistic and AR 
(2) to identify and test validity and residuals autocorrelation.  
 
4.7.2 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
Clearly, the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance and on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance warrants further exploration. The principal component analysis is used for further 
examination. PCA consists of expressing a lower number of variables which are linear 
combinations of the original response vectors. The principal components contain the maximum 
data variance and to be orthogonal (El Barbri et al., 2007). Hence, the principal components 
analysis allows for data reduction and determines latent information from the raw data set.  
 
4.8 Summary  
 
This chapter identifies the thesis’ research philosophy, showing that the thesis uses the 
quantitative approach which regularly uses statistical tests to be able to conclude and study the 
information (Locke et al., 2010). It shows the research methodology, beginning with data 
selection, data collection sources, and different proxies for measuring firm performance, 
including return on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s Q. Then reaching the sample size 
description and the sample descriptive statistics in terms of information about all the variables. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the SGMM, principal component analysis and regression analysis 










































Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis   
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure variables on 
firm performance is examined to explain the variations in outcomes.  
Corporate governance is an important variable that determines a corporation’s management and 
monitoring approaches to encourage company controllers who are too narrowly focused. It also 
helps organisations to maximise their value and ensure the attainment of a return on the 
investment for the suppliers of the capital (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Accordingly, this chapter will examine CG impact on firm performance and the Revolution 
impact on this relationship.  
Ownership structure variables are also included to provide a more comprehensive assessment of 
performance with the governance variables. Therefore, the author focuses on the extent to which 
what is reported is positive and negative for the four models (ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa, and 
Tobin’s Qb) with the previously mentioned variables. This chapter will examine ownership 
structure types impact on firm performance and the Revolution impact on the relationship 
between ownership structure types and firm performance.  
In addition, this chapter examines the association between these variables and links the results of 
this thesis with the findings of previous studies. This chapter includes OLS analysis, SGMM 
analysis, and PCA method. These analyses are divided into descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis, SGMM main results, ownership structure types and corporate governance variables 
with each firm performance measure separately, revolution impact on ownership structure types, 
corporate governance and firm performance, comparison between pre-revolution and post-
revolution with a conclusion, PCA main results, impact on FP using composite variables (OWN 
and GOVN) with revolution, each ownership structure type with each firm performance measure 
and industry impact on ownership structure types, corporate governance and firm performance. 
Finally, the chapter also discusses regression assumptions tests (Heteroskedasticity, 
Multicollinearity of independent variables, VIF values with all FP models, OLS main results, 
panel data analysis fixed and random effects, and comparison between the results of OLS and 
SGMM regressions.  
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5.2 Main Results  
 
The main results of the analysis of this thesis will be discussed in details in the following 
parts starting with descriptive statistics results then SGMM results ending with PCA findings.  
 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in this thesis. They 
provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures used, along with the dependent 
and independent variables utilised in this study, including 101 companies with 992 observations. 
Table 5.1 shows the data measures. Four methods were used to measure firm performance (FP). 
The first measurement, return on assets (ROA), has an average value of 5% that varies between –
3% and 21%, with a median value of 4%. Thus, since the standard deviation (SD) is 6%, which is 
close to zero, the ROA data have little variation.  In contrast, other researchers have found the 
mean for the ROA (Egypt) to be 7.75% (Wahba, 2013), 8% (Azzam et al., 2013), and 2.53% 
(Desoky & Mousa, 2012), and other countries 1.75% (Visintin et al., 2017), 5.518% (Seo, 
2017),. The differences are because these studies covered different periods of time. The second 
measurement, return on equity (ROE), has a mean value of 9%, a minimum value of –0.07, and a 
maximum value of 0.36, with an SD of 11%, which appears to be greater than the value for ROA 
and with a greater variation. In contrast, other researchers have found the mean for ROE to be 
0.17% (Azzam et al., 2013)  (in Egypt), 2% (Kim, Mauldin, & Patro, 2014), and 12.40% (Yan 
Lam & Lee, 2008). The last FP measurement is Tobin's Q with an average value of 0.89 for 
Tobin’s Qa and 1.13 for Tobin’s Qb, along with a high SD (0.69 for Tobin’s Qa and 0.7 for 
Tobin’s Qb), minimum values of 0.16 and 0.34, and maximum values of 2.74 and 2.97, 
respectively. In other studies, researchers have found the mean for Tobin's Q to be 4.381 
(Wahba, 2013), 12 (Fauzi & Locke, 2012) in Egypt, 58.65 (Andow & David, 2016), 1.21 
(Issarawornrawanich, 2015), and 38 (Sulong et al., 2013). IOWN and GOWN have mean values 
of 19.77% and 21.41%, respectively, and median values of 2.18% and 3.03%, respectively. 
Because the SD values are not close to zero, the GOWN and IOWN data are not close to the 
mean values, which means both variables’ data have a greater variation and bias. In contrast, 
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various researchers have found the mean for GOWN to be 22% (Farag & Mallin, 2016), 11% 
(Wahba, 2013) in Egypt, and 21% (Firth et al., 2016). Table 5.1 details the descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in this thesis.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N 1 Mean2 Median3 Min Max SD4 
ROA 992 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.21 0.06 
ROE 992 0.09 0.07 -0.07 0.36 0.11 
Tobin’s Qa 992 0.89 0.65 0.16 2.74 0.69 
Tobin’s Qb 992 1.13 0.93 0.34 2.97 0.7 
MOWN 992 17.19% 1.45% 0% 74% 24.24% 
BOWN 992 3.78% 0% 0% 25.90% 7.38% 
GOWN 992 21.41% 3.03% 0% 92.93% 31.14% 
IOWN 992 19.77% 2.18% 0% 82.89% 27.30% 
BS 992 7.95 8 5 13 2.5 
BI 992 0.73 0.78 0.36 0.92 0.167 
BD 992 0.07 0 0 0.29 0.09 
CD 992 0.73 1 0 1 0.45 
LIQ 992 1.85 1.42 0.45 4.99 1.21 
SIZE 992 8.89 8.87 7.74 10.24 0.73 
LEV 992 0.23 0.20 0.02 0.61 0.18 
AGE 992 39.07 36 18 79 18.07 
TANG 992 0.49 0.50 0.05 0.92 0.25 
 
 
1 Number of cases (N): - that represent number of cases per each dependent variable.  
2 Mean :- is central value over data  
3 Median: - is the number separating the higher half of a data from the lower half 
4 SD: - measure used to quantify the amount of variation or dispersion of data 
Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The sample 
contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent variables: 
ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to government 
ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board independence, BD 
refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total assets; Tangible assets = fixed 
assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since foundation. Full definitions for these 





5.2.2 Correlation Analysis  
 
The relationships between each construct are tested using correlation analysis to examine 
how the analysis dimensions are correlated with each other and whether the variables are strong 
or weak and correlated positively or negatively. The relationships between variables are defined 
by the type and direction of this relationship. The next table presents a correlation matrix that 
describes the relationships of all variables with the degree of significance and the coefficient 
variables. Significance is set between 0 to 0.10. For significant relationships based on correlation 
factors, the relationship type (increase–decrease) can be defined as follows: if the coefficient has 
a positive sign, it is an increase, and if negative, it is a decrease. The value of the coefficient 
defines the degree of the relationship. If the value of the coefficient is between 0 and 0.01, there 
is little or no relationship; if it is between 0.01 and 0.05, the variables have a weak relationship; 
and if it is between 0.05 and 0.10, the variables are strongly related.  
  
The Pearson’s correlation matrix shows the relationship of all the independent variables with 
ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Pearson’s correlation of each independent variable’s pair should not 
exceed 0.80, since any independent variable with a coefficient in excess of 0.80 exhibits 
multicollinearity (Bryman & Cramer, 1997). STATA provides collinearity diagnostics, including 
collinearity statistics (tolerance and VIF), condition index and variance proportion. Therefore, 
the results do not produce any evidence of multicollinearity problems in the regression models 
(Böhm et al., 2013). Researchers must take care not to include two variables with a bivariate 
correlation higher than 0.7 in the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Therefore, the potential 
for multicollinearity was tested between the independent variables and linear regressions of all 
independent variables on ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q were performed. None of the VIF factors 
obtained a value exceeding 3, as mentioned in Chapter 4. This confirms that there is no 
multicollinearity problem for the regression analyses. Therefore, the inter-correlation between 
the mentioned independent variables does not appear to be problematic, and multicollinearity is 
not a serious concern in this thesis. This is explained in the next few paragraphs by testing the 
normality of residuals, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity of independent variables. 
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Table 5.2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients matrix and shows a number of highly 
positive significant associations among dependent variables (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Qa and 
Tobin’s Qb), and GOWN and CD. Similar results have been reported other studies (Ab Razak et 
al., 2008), which found a highly positive significant relationship between GOWN and CD with 
only ROA. When performance is measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q, a positive relationship is 
found (Zeitun, 2009). However, in contrast to the results reported, there is a strongly significant 
negative association between Tobin’s Q and GOWN (Wahba, 2013). When performance is 
measured by ROE, a negative relationship is found (Zeitun, 2009), as corroborated by a number 
of other studies (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1997; LI et al., 2009; Peng, 2004; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). 
As regards the strongly significant positive associations, these are also shown between Tobin’s 
Qa and Tobin’s Qb on the one hand, and BS and BD on the other. The relationship between BD  
and Tobin’s Q has been found to be positive and significant in previous studies (Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2017). However, the table also reveals the existence of weak positive 
associations between the same independent variables of BS with ROA and ROE, MOWN with 
other dependent variables of FP, namely ROA and BI with Tobin’s Qb. This finding is consistent 
with the findings of other studies (Fauzi & Locke, 2012), which have exhibited a positive 
relationship between BS and MOWN with FP (ROA), and a positive correlation between BS and 
BI and Tobin's Q. There is a strongly significant negative relationship between the dependent 
variables (ROA, ROE) and IOWN, while there are a number of moderately significant negative 
associations among the dependent variables (ROA and ROE) and BI, and also between (Tobin’s  
Qa and Tobin’s Qb) and MOWN and BOWN.
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Table 5.2: Correlations Matrix5 
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa 
Tobin’s 
Qb MOWN BOWN GOWN IOWN BS BI BD CD LIQ SIZE LEV AGE 
TAN
G 
ROA 1                                 
ROE 0.87*** 1                               
Tobin’sQa 0.37*** 0.32*** 1                             
Tobin’s Qb 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.96*** 1                           
MOWN 0.04* 0.01 -0.06** -0.06** 1                         
BOWN 0.03 0.01 -0.06** -0.06** 0 1                       
GOWN 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.14*** -0.38*** -0.22*** 1                     
IOWN -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.04* 0.01 -0.37*** -0.19*** -0.37*** 1                   
BS 0.05* 0.05* 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05* -0.18*** -0.01 0.14*** 1                 
BI -0.06** -0.06** 0 0.04* 0.05* -0.07*** -0.15*** 0.15*** 0.35*** 1               
BD 0 -0.01 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.11*** -0.04* -0.08*** -0.01 0.21*** 0.16*** 1             
CD 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.06** 0.01 0.07*** 0.18*** -0.25*** -0.04* -0.25*** -0.04* 1           
LIQ 0.25*** 0.07*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.06** -0.02 0.04 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.06*** -0.05** 0.12*** 1         
SIZE 0.07*** 0.18*** -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.01 -0.12*** 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.05* -0.04 -0.15*** -0.29*** 1       
LEV -0.15*** -0.06** -0.13*** 0.13*** -0.03 0 -0.09*** 0.20*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.07*** -0.12*** -0.36*** 0.17*** 1     
AGE 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.10*** -0.18*** 0.01 0.25*** -0.09*** -0.06** -0.03 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.10*** 1   
TANG -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.07*** 0.05* -0.08*** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.17*** 0.12*** -0.06** -0.35*** 0.16*** -0.03*** -0.07*** 1 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
 
5 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on 
Equity in year t; Independent variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance 
variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; 







The findings are consistent with the moderate negative relationship of BI but with ROA 
(Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Nanka-Bruc, 2009). Furthermore, BOWN and BD, when 
measured by ROA and ROE, have no significant effect.  
The next part will discuss multiple regression analysis then will examine the econometrics 
analysis results using SGMM estimator and PCA method.  
 
5.2.3 Multiple Regression Analysis  
 
Multiple regression analysis is used to explain how the firm performance is related to 
all the independent variables and to show their descriptive influence against this dependent 
variable. Most of the previously mentioned studies concentrated on only ownership structure 
and the corporate governance variables’ effect on FP; there are no studies showing the 
Egyptian revolution effect on performance, which motivated the author to compare the 
regression results with revolution as a variable and without it. Table 5.2 does not show the 
revolution effect but presents the regression results, indicating that the model’s adjusted R2 
for the ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb are 27%, 26%, 23% and 23%, respectively. 
This is the multiple coefficients of determination, giving the total proportion variation for the 
endogenous variable explained by the exogenous variables jointly. Hence, it signifies that 
23% to 27% of the total variation in the performance of Egyptian firms is caused by their 
ownership structure and corporate governance variables after controlling for the effect of firm 
size, leverage, liquidity ratio, firm age, assets tangibility, industry and time effects, taking 
into account the sample size and the number of independent variables. In this thesis, the 
coefficients of government ownership are found to be positively significant at 1% with ROA, 
ROE, Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb. These studies supported the finding that government 
ownership has an important impact on FP and is positively significant at the 10% level for 
Tobin’s Q (Ab Razak et al., 2008; Ang & Ding, 2006; Tian & Estrin, 2008) and significant at 
the 5% level (Ang et al., 2000). The BOWN coefficient is positively significant at 1% with 
ROA and at 10% with ROE, which contradicts what is found in the literature and could be 
the result of the specific nature of ownership in Egypt. The MOWN coefficient is positively 
significant at 1% with ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb. Consistent with this finding, 






other studies when measured with Tobin's Q and ROA, respectively (Fauzi & Locke, 2012; 
Hossain, Prevost, & Rao, 2001).  
Table 5.3: Results Table6 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
MOWN 0.00137*** (3.33) 0.00152*** (2.76) 0.0033*** (2.71) 0.0035*** (2.84) 
BOWN 0.00177*** (2.62) 0.00185* (1.69) -0.00164 (-0.22) -0.00125 (-0.081) 
GOWN 0.00134*** (3.72) 0.00142*** (2.65) 0.0047*** (4.52) 0.0050*** (4.79) 
IOWN 0.001095 (0.97) -0.001035 (-0.21) 0.0043*** (3.80) 0.0042*** (3.66) 
BS 0.00106 (0.075) -0.00146 (-0.31) 0.028*** (3.23) 0.027*** (3.07) 
BI 0.016 (1.38) 0.029 (1.44) 0.23* (1.73) 0.25* (1.84) 
BD -0.0092 (-0.44) -0.0012 (-0.034) -0.11 (-0.44) -0.091 (-0.36) 
CD 0.013*** (2.95) 0.018** (2.27) 0.056 (1.17) 0.046 (0.97) 
SIZE 0.021*** (7.29) 0.052*** (10.1) -0.20*** (-5.63) -0.21*** (-5.67) 
LEV -0.042*** (-3.29) -0.068*** (-2.84) -0.35** (-2.44) 0.71*** (5.01) 
LIQ 0.0090*** (4.46) -0.0013 (-0.38) 0.029 (1.30) 0.029 (1.26) 
AGE 0.00125** (2.21) 0.00198*** (4.34) 0.0043*** (3.18) 0.0046*** (3.36) 
TANG -0.035*** (-3.67) -0.11*** (-6.06) 0.015 (0.14) 0.029 (0.26) 
Constant -0.17*** (-5.31) -0.37*** (-6.36) 1.79*** (5.01) 1.79*** (4.98) 
N 992 992 992 992 
adj. R2 0.265 0.257 0.227 0.226 
 
 
6 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 
foundation. Full definitions for these variables are provided. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 








This result supports the agency theory: when MOWN is higher, agency costs are reduced and 
FP is increased. Other studies supported the coefficient of MOWN as being negatively 
significant or having a non-linear significant relationship when associated with FP and 
measured by ROE and Tobin’s Q, which can be supported by the entrenchment effect 
argument (Andow & David, 2016; Harold Demsetz, 1983; Harold  Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Desoky & Mousa, 2012; Drakos & Bekiris, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Sulong et al., 2013). Moving to the CD, this coefficient is 
positively significant at 1% with ROA and positively significant at 5% with ROE only. In 
contrast, the results of the CD in previous studies are negatively significant at 5% in ROA 
and Tobin’s Q, showing that firms with a CEO who is also the board chairman have lower 
performance (Issarawornrawanich, 2015). The coefficient of BS is positively significant at 
1% with Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb. In previous studies, it was found that the BS coefficient 
exhibits a 5% significant and positive relationship with FP for Tobin's Q and ROA, consistent 
with the agency and resource dependency theory that a larger BS creates greater firm value. 
The result indicates that large boards enhance Egyptian FP, providing better supervision, 
effective monitoring mechanisms, increasing BI and reducing the managerial entrenchment, 
therefore increasing FP (Coles et al., 2008; Fauzi & Locke, 2012). Contradictory results can 
be caused by the different data characteristics and methods which are also found in the US 
and New Zealand (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Hossain et al., 2001; Yermack, 1996). IOWN is 
positively significant at 1% with Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb.  BI is positively significant at 
10% with Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb. Previous studies also found positive and significant 
coefficients for BI for ROA at 1% and 5%, respectively (Fauzi & Locke, 2012; 
Issarawornrawanich, 2015; Paul, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). This is because outside directors 
are more effective in monitoring and developing the firm’s reputation. In contrast, the BI for 
Tobin's Q is negative and significant at 5% (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Reddy, Locke, & 
Scrimgeour, 2010). This can be the result of a very high BOWN concentration, which 
interferes with effective firm corporate governance. A non-significant effect of BI on FP is 
also found (Hossain et al., 2001; Reddy et al., 2010). BD is not significant in this regression 
model.  
Regarding the control variables, firm size is significant at 1% with the four models; leverage 






firm age is significant with all models except ROA and significant at 5%, while liquidity is 
significant at 1% with only ROA.  
 
5.2.4 Regression Assumptions  
 
Ordinary least square regression is the most commonly used method in the literature 
to test the statistical relationship of firm performance to corporate governance and ownership 
structure. Assuring use of OLS regression and preventing distortion of the results requires 
checking that the data have met the OLS regression assumptions: normality of residuals, 
heteroscedasticity and no multicollinearity of independent variables (Field, 2005). 
 
- The Normality of Residuals 
By using the STATA, the normality assumptions inspected, as follows. Firstly, by 
processing the regression, then starting the predict command, next running the ‘Kdensity’ 
command, creating the Kernel-density plot with the normal option of the thesis main 
regressions. Figure 5.1 shows that there are several normality problem which can be ignored, 









































































Any error term variance is supposed to be constant and random for all independent 
variables’ values and if it is non-constant, then the residual variance is called 
‘heteroscedastic’. The Breusch-Pagan and White tests are used to check the 
heteroscedasticity by using the commands ‘hettest’ and ‘imtest’ for running these tests. Table 
5.4 shows that the p-values are small (0.001), while they should be 0.5, which reject the null 
hypothesis that the residuals variance is homogenous. The Newey and West (1987) standard 
error pooled regression can solve this problem by controlling the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation effects (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005). 
Table 5.4: Heteroskedasticity Tests  
Regression 
The Breusch-Pagan The White test 
Chi2 p-value Chi2 p-value 
ROA Model 14.63 0.0011 443.60 0 
ROE Model 21.01 0 434.24 0 
Tobin’s Qa Model 106.49 0 513.38 0 
Tobin’s Qb Model 81.40 0 524.65 0 
 
- Multicollinearity of Independent Variables 
It is assumed that there will be a linear association between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables and that there will be no perfect linear association between any 
of the independent variables. Multicollinearity occurs when there is a strong correlation 
between two independent variables, which means that two predictors are measuring the same 
thing (see Field, 2005, p. 174). This means that significant variables on the dependent 
variable may seem to be nonsignificant in the model due confounded effect by another 
independent variable. The researcher examined the non-multicollinearity assumption of 
independent variables using the STATA program. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are 
considered to measure the multicollinearity severity in each regression analysis. VIFs 






10 has been recommended as the maximum level of VIF (Marquardt, 1970; Neter, 
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990; Kennedy, 1992’ Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). This 
value corresponds to the tolerance value of .10 (1/.10 = 10). Though the maximum acceptable 
VIF value, which means the minimum level of tolerance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), of 5 
(Rogerson, 2001) and even 4 (Pan and Jackson, 2008). However, a recommended minimum 
value as high as .20 has been suggested (Menard, 1995) and a value of .25 appears in the 
literature (Huber & Stephens, 1993). The researcher concluded that a tolerance level less than 
0.20 or 0.10 and/or a VIF of 5 or 10 and above indicate a multicollinearity problem.  
Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 provide the VIF values showing that none of the VIFs is 
exceeding three, suggesting that there is no multicollinearity problem. A value of 10 has been 
recommended for the maximum level of VIF (Damodar, 2009; Field, 2013; Gujarati, 2003); 
Marquardt, 1970; Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990; Kennedy, 1992; Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, & Black, 1995).  
Table 5.5: The VIF Values (ROA Model)  
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
MOWN 2.38 0.4197 
BOWN 1.38 0.7231 
GOWN 2.75 0.3641 
IOWN 2.68 0.3735 
BS 1.41 0.7088 
BI 1.44 0.6935 
BD 1.21 0.8233 
CD 1.25 0.8023 
SIZE 1.69 0.5932 
LEV 1.38 0.7252 
LIQ 1.74 0.5736 
AGE 1.39 0.7207 
TANG 1.86 0.539 






Table 5.6: The VIF Values (ROE Model)  
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
MOWN 2.38 0.4197 
BOWN 1.38 0.7231 
GOWN 2.75 0.3641 
IOWN 2.68 0.3735 
BS 1.41 0.7088 
BI 1.44 0.6935 
BD 1.21 0.8233 
CD 1.25 0.8023 
SIZE 1.69 0.5932 
LEV 1.38 0.7252 
LIQ 1.74 0.5736 
AGE 1.39 0.7207 
TANG 1.86 0.539 

























Table 5.7: The VIF Values (Tobin’s Qa Model)  
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
MOWN 2.38 0.4197 
BOWN 1.38 0.7231 
GOWN 2.75 0.3641 
IOWN 2.68 0.3735 
BS 1.41 0.7088 
BI 1.44 0.6935 
BD 1.21 0.8233 
CD 1.25 0.8023 
SIZE 1.69 0.5932 
LEV 1.38 0.7252 
LIQ 1.74 0.5736 
AGE 1.39 0.7207 
TANG 1.86 0.539 
























Table 5.8: The VIF Values (Tobin’s Qb Model)7 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
MOWN 2.38 0.4197 
BOWN 1.38 0.7231 
GOWN 2.75 0.3641 
IOWN 2.68 0.3735 
BS 1.41 0.7088 
BI 1.44 0.6935 
BD 1.21 0.8233 
CD 1.25 0.8023 
SIZE 1.69 0.5932 
LEV 1.38 0.7252 
LIQ 1.74 0.5736 
AGE 1.39 0.7207 
TANG 1.86 0.539 
Mean VIF 1.85  
 
VIF was tested and it does not exceed 3 which concluded that multicollinearity does not pose 
a problem and is not a serious concern in this thesis. Therefore, fixed and random effects are 
applied and their results are shown in the next part.  
 
5.2.5 Panel Data Analysis Fixed and Random Effects  
 
The panel data analysis (fixed and random effects) is used because of the repeated 
observations of the same companies over the period from 2008 to 2017 as it gives more 
flexibility and enables pooling and analysing individual time series across several firms 
 
7 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current 






simultaneously with more accuracy (Verbeek, 2012). This thesis used two types of panel 
data-analysis—the fixed effects and the random-effects models. The fixed-effects model 
intercepts vary over the firms, as shown in this thesis, but it still assumes that the coefficient 
slope is constant through firms. For example, an individual effect for firms is presented using 
dummy variables in this model (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). The model may have too 
many cross-sectional units, explaining the need for dummy variables within its requirements. 
Furthermore, this model may be troubled with multicollinearity and an increase in the 
standard errors and thus decreasing the statistical power to test parameters. The random-
effects model, an alternative approach to the fixed effects model, assume that the individual 
cross-sectional unit constant is a random representation from a larger population with a 
constant mean value (Gujarati, 2003). The random-effects’ assumptions are as the fixed 
effects ones, moreover that the constant is independent of all explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2010). The random-effects model is economical in degrees of freedom 
(Gujarati, 2003). To conclude whether a fixed- or a random-effects model is more 
appropriate, a Hausman test is performed to investigate if there is a correlation between 
constant independent variables. The difference between models can explain this. The fixed-
effects model produces consistent results when constant and independent variables correlate, 
while the random-effects model produces inconsistent results.  
 
According to Table 5.9, the fixed effects, the results show that there are significant relations 
between BOWN and BS with ROA and there are significant associations between GOWN, 
IOWN and BD with Tobin’s Qa. Regarding the random effects, the results show significant 
relationships between BOWN with ROE and there are significant associations between 
MOWN, GOWN, and IOWN with Tobin’s Qb. The fixed and random effects panel data 
models control the unobservable firm-specific characteristics that may affect the firm 
performance (Wooldridge, 2010). The Hausman test is employed to distinguish between the 
fixed effects and the random-effects model.  
The null hypothesis is tested to find whether the estimated coefficients by random effects 






Based on the Hausman test, the random effects estimations are more appropriate than fixed 
effects estimations for ROE and Tobin’s Qa. The results also indicate that fixed effects 
estimations are more appropriate than random effects estimations for ROA and Tobin’s Qa.  
Table 5.9 reports the results and finds that the largest effect on FP is observed for GOWN, 
followed by BOWN, IOWN and BS, BD. 
Table 5.9: Panel Data Analysis Fixed and Random Effects8 
  ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
 Fixed Random Fixed Random 
MOWN -0.00111 (-0.97) -0.001079 (-0.40) 0.0016 (1.54) 0.0020* (1.84) 
BOWN 0.00163** (2.46) 0.0010** (2.18) 0.0011 (0.45) 0.00144 (0.17) 
GOWN 0.00111 (1.21) 0.00125 (1.47) 0.002** (2.14) 0.0025*** (2.63) 
IOWN -0.00112 (-1.15) -0.00124 (-1.27) 0.002** (1.99) 0.0018* (1.76) 
BS -0.0014* (-1.65) -0.0023 (-1.50) -0.013 (-1.54) -0.0063 (-0.73) 
BI -0.0048 (-0.40) 0.015 (0.70) -0.048 (-0.41) -0.033 (-0.27) 
BD 0.014 (0.70) 0.0038 (0.11) 0.34* (1.75) 0.31 (1.54) 
CD 0.0023 (0.51) 0.012 (1.46) 0.046 (1.05) 0.023 (0.51) 
SIZE -0.012 (-1.45) 0.034*** (3.64) -1.04*** (-12.6) -0.59***(-10.2) 
LEV -0.030*** (-2.59) -0.021 (-1.02) -0.044 (-0.38) 0.96*** (8.22) 
LIQ 0.0052*** (2.77) 0.0025 (0.76) 0.001 (-0.034) 0.0032 (0.17) 
AGE 0.0055** (2.00) 0.00179* (1.80) -0.077*** (-2.92) 0.0022 (0.71) 
TANG -0.030** (-2.46) -0.081*** (-4.14) -0.44*** (-3.68) -0.30*** (-2.63) 
Constant -0.029 (-0.25) -0.20** (-2.30) 13.3*** (11.6) 6.13*** (11.2) 
N 992 992 992 992 
Hausman 0.0147 0.58 0 0.1129 
 
 
8 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 







5.2.6 SGMM Estimation 
 
The system generalised method of moments is used to address this endogeneity 
problem of the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm 
performance as also the data used in the thesis is linear dynamic panel-data requiring models 
including lags of the dependent variable. The four models in Table 5.10 investigate the 
impact corporate governance and ownership structure types on the firm performance of 
Egyptian listed companies, evidence from the application of the system generalized method 
of moments estimation. L. Performance presents the lagged value impact of firm performance 
on firm performance change. Findings in Table 5.10 illustrate that GOWN, BOWN, IOWN, 
and MOWN have a significant level at 1% and positive impact on ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa 
and Tobin’s Qb. The findings show that BS and CD have significant level at 1% and positive 


















Table 5.10: SGMM Main Results9 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
L. Performance 0.101*** (0.021) 0.0703*** (0.016) 0.1542*** (0.008) 0.1587*** (0.011) 
MOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.0016*** (0.001) 0.0061*** (0.001) 0.0062*** (0.001) 
BOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.0017*** (0.001) 0.0089*** (0.001) 0.0093*** (0.001) 
GOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.0017*** (0.001) 0.0071*** (0.001) 0.0072*** (0.001) 
IOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.0013*** (0.001) 0.0048*** (0.001) 0.0047*** (0.001) 
BS 0.003*** (0.001) 0.0023*** (0.001) 0.0640*** (0.004) 0.0634*** (0.004) 
BI 0.019*** (0.007) 0.0441*** (0.014) -0.1527* (0.082) -0.1384** (0.070) 
BD -0.050** (0.019) -0.0471 (0.039) 0.2942** (0.131) 0.2738** (0.138) 
CD 0.024*** (0.003) 0.0410*** (0.004) 0.1224*** (0.028) 0.1260*** (0.025) 
SIZE -0.044*** (0.006) -0.0826*** (0.006) -1.2791*** (0.043) -1.2392*** (0.049) 
LEV -0.023*** (0.005) 0.0825*** (0.006) 0.2678*** (0.075) 1.2659*** (0.065) 
LIQ 0.003** (0.001) -0.0012 (0.002) -0.0497*** (0.008) -0.0477*** (0.008) 
AGE 0.001*** (0.001) 0.0024*** (0.001) 0.0244*** (0.002) 0.0239*** (0.002) 
TANG -0.107*** (0.011) -0.2343*** (0.015) -1.5058*** (0.084) -1.4944*** (0.082) 
Constant 0.358*** (0.057) 0.7152*** (0.068) 11.0526*** (0.449) 10.6507*** (0.487) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 
Number of firms 100 100 100 100 
AR(2) 0.728 0.178 0.013 0.012 
J-test Hansen 1 1 1 1 
 
Regarding BI, it demonstrates that BI has a significant level at 1% and positive impact on 
ROA and ROE and on the contrary, it has a significant level at 5% and negative impact on 
 
9 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Size = log of total assets in year t; Leverage = total debt 
deflated by total assets in year t; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; 







Tobin’s Qb and a significant level at 10% and negative impact on Tobin’sQa. The table also 
shows that BD has a significant level at 5% and positive impact on Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s 
Qb and on the contrary, it has a significant level at 5% and negative impact on ROA and has 
insignificant impact on ROE. The controlling variables SIZE and TANG have significant and 
negative impact on ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb, while AGE has significant and 
positive impact on the four measurements. Regarding LEV, it has significant and positive 
impact on ROE, Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb and negative impact on ROA. Last control 
variable LIQ, it has significant and negative impact Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb, and positive 
impact on ROA while it is insignificant on ROE.  
AR (2) and Hansen J-Statistic are used to test the SGMM validity. The null hypothesis for 
AR(2) test is that the error terms are not serially correlated at 5% (level 2). Accordingly, to 
accept the null hypothesis, higher p-value is required for the autocorrelation test (AR2) to 
examine the error terms to accept SGMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Roodman, 
2009). As shown in Table 5.10 the Hansen statistic results assure the moment conditions’ 
validity in all the estimations at 1. Although AR (2) results for Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb 





















Table 5.11: Ownership Structure Types and CG Variables Effect on ROA only 
Variables ROA 
L.ROA  0.361*** 0.385*** 0.344*** 0.351*** 0.423*** 0.362*** 0.382*** 0.390*** 0.101*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) 
MOWN -0.001***        0.001*** 
 (0.001)        (7.90e-05) 
BOWN  0.001***       0.001598*** 
  (0.001)       (8.42e-05) 
GOWN   -0***      0.001459*** 
   (0.001)      (7.92e-05) 
IOWN    0***     0.001374*** 
    (0.001)     (6.98e-05) 
BS     0.003***    0.00269*** 
     (0.001)    (0.001453) 
BI      0.024**   0.0192*** 
      (0.010)   (0.00660) 
BD       0.038**  -0.0504** 
       (0.014)  (0.0197) 
CD        0.017*** 0.0242*** 
        (0.003) (0.00332) 
LIQ -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.003** 0.00341** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00130) 
SIZE -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.040*** -0.004 -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.0444*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.00595) 
LEV 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.004 -0.008 0.003 0.026** 0.029*** -0.0226*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.00493) 
AGE -0.001 0.001 0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 0.00133*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001209) 
TANG -0.075*** -0.080*** -0.056*** -0.076*** -0.052*** -0.065*** -0.087*** -0.098*** -0.107*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.0105) 
Constant 0.338*** 0.343*** 0.229*** 0.432*** 0.074 0.328*** 0.340*** 0.419*** 0.358*** 
 (0.053) (0.061) (0.056) (0.063) (0.053) (0.058) (0.063) (0.064) (0.0565) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 
No. of firms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
AR(2)  0.308 0.279 0.265 0.248 0.244 0.241 0.265 0.304 0.728 






Table 5.12: Ownership Structure Types and CG Variables Effect on ROE only 
Variables ROE 
L.ROE  -0.043** 0.436*** 0.381*** -0.040** 0.415*** 0.393*** 0.404*** 0.404*** 0.0703*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.028) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.0159) 
MOWN 0.001***        0.0016*** 
 (0.001)        (0.0011) 
BOWN  0***       0.0017*** 
  (0.001)       (0.0011) 
GOWN   -0***      0.0017*** 
   (0.001)      (0.0011) 
IOWN    -0***     0.0013*** 
    (0.001)     (0.0011) 
BS     -0.002*    0.0023*** 
     (0.001)    (0.0017) 
BI      0.043***   0.0441*** 
      (0.016)   (0.0143) 
BD       0.060***  -0.0471 
       (0.016)  (0.0389) 
CD        0.035*** 0.0410*** 
        (0.006) (0.0044) 
LIQ -0.006* 0.003* 0.001 -0.004 0.005** 0.003 0.004** 0.002 -0.0012 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0015) 
SIZE -0.171*** 0.105*** 0.081*** -0.185*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.030*** -0.0826*** 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0064) 
LEV 0.107*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.132*** 0.047*** 0.025*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.0825*** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.0064) 
AGE 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.0024*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0012) 
TANG -0.258*** -0.099*** -0.113*** -0.254*** -0.132*** -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.163*** -0.2343*** 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.0149) 
Constant 1.601*** -0.890*** -0.662*** 1.730*** -0.594*** -0.650*** -0.531*** -0.189* 0.7152*** 
 (0.243) (0.140) (0.137) (0.101) (0.111) (0.117) (0.100) (0.104) (0.0676) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 
No. of firms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
AR(2)  0.191 0.751 0.808 0.106 0.654 0.741 0.681 0.612 0.178 






Table 5.13: Ownership Structure Types and CG Variables Effect on Tobin’s Qa only 
Variables Tobin’sQa 
L. Tobin’s Qa  0.242*** 0.206*** 0.196*** 0.280*** 0.267*** 0.240*** 0.273*** 0.049*** 0.1542*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.0081) 
MOWN 0.001***        0.0061*** 
 (0.001)        (0.0015) 
BOWN  -0.003***       0.0089*** 
  (0.001)       (0.0018) 
GOWN   0.001***      0.0071*** 
   (0.001)      (0.0015) 
IOWN    0.002***     0.0048*** 
    (0.001)     (0.0015) 
BS     0.049***    0.0640*** 
     (0.007)    (0.0044) 
BI      0.213***   -0.1527* 
      (0.077)   (0.0824) 
BD       0.336***  0.2942** 
       (0.095)  (0.1313) 
CD        0.192*** 0.1224*** 
        (0.042) (0.0275) 
LIQ -0.074*** -0.049*** -0.068*** -0.063*** -0.046*** -0.075*** -0.064*** -0.051*** -0.0497*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0083) 
SIZE -1.059*** -1.224*** -1.462*** -1.041*** -0.951*** -1.193*** -1.276*** -1.916*** -1.2791*** 
 (0.040) (0.063) (0.098) (0.048) (0.071) (0.069) (0.063) (0.093) (0.0433) 
LEV 0.067 0.049 0.083 -0.029 -0.030 -0.043 0.038 0.205*** 0.2678*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.063) (0.073) (0.070) (0.0750) 
AGE 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.004** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.046*** 0.0244*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.0019) 
TANG -0.701*** -0.679*** -0.798*** -0.645*** -0.516*** -0.650*** -0.648*** -1.401*** -1.5058*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.118) (0.093) (0.118) (0.110) (0.087) (0.125) (0.0839) 
Constant 0.001 0.001 13.996*** 0.001 0.001 11.441*** 12.109*** 17.022*** 11.0526*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.844) (0.001) (0.001) (0.530) (0.502) (0.701) (0.4491) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 
No. of firms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
AR(2)  0.072 0.068 0.068 0.092 0.087 0.074 0.079 0.041 0.013 






Table 5.14: Ownership Structure Types and CG Variables Effect on Tobin’s Qb only10 
Variables Tobin’s Qb 
L. Tobin’s Qb 0.051*** 0.238*** 0.217*** 0.286*** 0.285*** 0.261*** 0.294*** 0.041** 0.1587*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.0106) 
MOWN 0.003***        0.0062*** 
 (0.001)        (0.0016) 
BOWN  -0.002**       0.0093*** 
  (0.001)       (0.0017) 
GOWN   0.002***      0.0072*** 
   (0.001)      (0.0014) 
IOWN    0.002***     0.0047*** 
    (0.001)     (0.0015) 
BS     0.047***    0.0634*** 
     (0.007)    (0.0044) 
BI      0.235***   -0.1384** 
      (0.076)   (0.0696) 
BD       0.338***  0.274** 
       (0.088)  (0.1377) 
CD        0.193*** 0.126*** 
        (0.041) (0.0250) 
LIQ -0.068*** -0.051*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.079*** -0.066*** -0.051*** -0.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.0078) 
SIZE -1.922*** -1.040*** -1.290*** -0.954*** -0.891*** -1.044*** -1.155*** -1.921*** -1.239*** 
 (0.087) (0.036) (0.073) (0.044) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061) (0.093) (0.0486) 
LEV 1.371*** 1.161*** 1.068*** 1.040*** 1.023*** 0.988*** 1.079*** 1.205*** 1.266*** 
 (0.095) (0.051) (0.059) (0.057) (0.061) (0.059) (0.067) (0.068) (0.0649) 
AGE 0.045*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.005** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.046*** 0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0020) 
TANG -1.479*** -0.722*** -0.654*** -0.673*** -0.504*** -0.663*** -0.619*** -1.420*** -1.494*** 
 (0.093) (0.089) (0.099) (0.092) (0.109) (0.101) (0.079) (0.124) (0.0823) 
Constant 0.001 9.943*** 12.236*** 0.001 8.556*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 10.651*** 
 (0.001) (0.296) (0.577) (0.001) (0.554) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.4870) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 
No. of firms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
AR(2)  0.038 0.016 0.072 0.091 0.089 0.079 0.084 0.039 0.012 
J-test Hansen  0.051 0.070 0.242 0.399 0.361 0.298 0.326 0.129 1.000 
 
 
10 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 






The previous tables, Table 5.11, Table 5.12, Table 5.13, Table 5.14, investigate each variable 
with each model separately at a time to test if the AR (2) results are improved.  




  L.ROA  MOWN BOWN GOWN IOWN BS BI BD CD 
Observations 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 
Number of firms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
ROA AR(2)  0.308 0.279 0.265 0.248 0.244 0.241 0.265 0.304 0.728 
ROE AR(2)  0.191 0.751 0.808 0.106 0.654 0.741 0.681 0.612 0.178 
Tobin’s Qa AR(2)  0.072 0.068 0.068 0.092 0.087 0.074 0.079 0.041 0.013 
Tobin’s Qb AR(2)  0.038 0.016 0.072 0.091 0.089 0.079 0.084 0.039 0.012 
 
Table 5.15 shows a comparison between each variable with each model and finds that the AR 
(2) tests results have better and higher p-values for all the four firm performance models and 
accordingly assure the moment conditions’ validity in all the estimations and the 
autocorrelation tests. Based on the validity and autocorrelation tests and SGMM results, the 
author decided to investigate the impact of the Revolution on the Egyptian firm performance 




11 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 







Table 5.16: Revolution Impact on the Relationship between Ownership Structure 
Types, CG and Firm Performance12 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
L. Performance 0.080*** (0.023) 0.381*** (0.019) 0.137*** (0.012) 0.141*** (0.012) 
MOWN 0.001 *** (0.001) -0.001 *** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 
BOWN 0.001 *** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 
GOWN 0.001 *** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 
IOWN 0.001 *** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
BS 0.002*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.055*** (0.004) 0.056*** (0.004) 
BI 0.017** (0.007) 0.062*** (0.018) -0.100 (0.091) -0.075 (0.087) 
BD -0.030* (0.017) 0.005 (0.033) 0.438*** (0.122) 0.460*** (0.127) 
CD 0.020*** (0.003) 0.032*** (0.004) 0.087*** (0.033) 0.093*** (0.034) 
LIQ 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003* (0.002) -0.058*** (0.008) -0.059*** (0.008) 
SIZE -0.021*** (0.004) 0.054*** (0.011) -1.080*** (0.036) -1.067*** (0.040) 
LEV -0.031*** (0.004) 0.010 (0.016) 0.131** (0.060) 1.110*** (0.050) 
AGE 0.001*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.001) 0.024*** (0.002) 0.024*** (0.002) 
TANG -0.081*** (0.010) -0.126*** (0.013) -1.359*** (0.080) -1.374*** (0.079) 
Revolution -0.016*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.197*** (0.016) -0.200*** (0.016) 
Constant 0.178*** (0.045) -0.453*** (0.099) 9.520*** (0.412) 9.377*** (0.444) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 
Number of firms 100 100 100 100 
AR(2) 0.720 0.655 0.014 0.013 
J-test Hansen 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
12 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 








As discussed in previous chapters, the main contribution is about the impact of the Egyptian 
Revolution on ownership structure, corporate governance and firm performance. It is also 
important to examine and investigate its impact on the relationship between ownership 
structure with firm performance and on the relationship between corporate governance with 
firm performance. Revolution has negative impact on the Egyptian firms’ performance when 
measured by ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb with significance level at 1%. This 
result motivated the author to compare between pre-revolution and post-revolution as Table 






















Table 5.17: Comparison between Pre-Revolution and Post-Revolution13 
  Pre-Revolution (2008-2010) Post-Revolution (2011-2017) 










L.Performance -0.1645** -0.1390** 0.0213 0.0263 -0.165*** -0.066*** 0.7636*** 0.7586*** 
  -0.077 -0.0549 -0.0856 -0.0821 -0.0252 -0.0223 -0.0279 -0.0251 
MOWN 0.0014*** 0.0028*** 0.0105 0.0104 0.0014*** 0.0011 0.0024 0.0017 
  -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0076 -0.0072 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0025 -0.0027 
BOWN 0.0025** 0.0062*** 0.0631*** 0.0631*** 0.0019*** 0.0013 -0.0049** -0.0017 
  -0.001 -0.0016 -0.013 -0.013 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0023 
GOWN 0.0012 -0.0019 0.0023 0.0021 0.0019*** 0.0011*** 0.0033 0.0032 
  -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0105 -0.0104 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0024 -0.0026 
IOWN 0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0051 -0.0052 0.0012*** -0.0013** -0.0048* -0.0069** 
  -0.0017 -0.001 -0.0084 -0.0087 0 -0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0031 
BS 0.0107** 0.0131* -0.0532 -0.0528 0.0043*** 0.0019** 0.0684*** 0.0711*** 
  -0.0045 -0.0074 -0.0579 -0.0573 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0143 -0.0146 
BI 0.0393 0.0744 -0.3628 -0.3701 -0.0052 0.0296** 0.0756 0.1208 
  -0.041 -0.0575 -0.5557 -0.5313 -0.011 -0.0128 -0.1521 -0.166 
BD -0.375*** -0.597*** 0.7266 0.8018 0.0086 -0.066*** 3.1123*** 2.6999*** 
  -0.0963 -0.1587 -1.1865 -1.1846 -0.0111 -0.0239 -0.3379 -0.3376 
CD 0.0241 -0.0357 -0.1424 -0.1538 0.0055 0.0433*** 0.1415** 0.1514** 
  -0.0186 -0.032 -0.3528 -0.3497 -0.0042 -0.0116 -0.0694 -0.0717 
LIQ 0.0099*** 0.0045 -0.0222 -0.0191 0.0011 -0.006*** -0.316*** -0.312*** 
 
13 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 







  -0.0031 -0.0059 -0.0456 -0.0448 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0321 -0.0312 
SIZE -0.0217 0.0154 -0.783*** -0.776*** -0.0024 -0.0094 -0.187** -0.250*** 
  -0.0144 -0.028 -0.2046 -0.2041 -0.0055 -0.0132 -0.0846 -0.0789 
LEV -0.0576 0.0604 0.5442 1.5848** -0.0095** 0.1069*** -0.265*** 0.4583*** 
  -0.0402 -0.0596 -0.5865 -0.623 -0.0045 -0.0078 -0.0859 -0.0973 
AGE 0.0019 0.0019 0.0295** 0.0307** -0.0014 -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 
  -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0127 -0.0126 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0023 
TANG -0.0565 -0.0515 0.5387 0.5928 -0.119*** -0.344*** -1.500*** -1.582*** 
  -0.0478 -0.0687 -0.605 -0.6047 -0.01 -0.0166 -0.114 -0.141 
Constant 0.1084 -0.1937 6.9991*** 6.8541*** 0.0777 0.3094** 2.7639*** 3.3315*** 
  -0.1281 -0.2579 -1.7316 -1.7083 -0.0603 -0.1342 -0.7601 -0.7584 
Observations 198 198 198 198 592 592 592 592 
No of firms 99 99 99 99 100 100 100 100 
AR(2)   0.4 0.109 0.273 0.162 
J-test Hansen 0.646 0.661 0.494 0.367 0.761 0.573 0.36 0.304 
 
 
Table 5.17 shows a comparison between the sample before the revolution (198 observations) 
and after the revolution (592 observations), including the revolution effect in the SGMM 
analysis to show this effect. It signifies that the total variation in the performance of Egyptian 
firms is caused by their ownership structure and corporate governance variables after 
controlling for the effect of firm size, leverage, liquidity ratio, firm age, assets tangibility, 
industry and time effects, and taking into account the sample size and the number of 
independent variables. This shows that, before the Revolution, GOWN, IOWN, BI, and CD 
have no significant effect on firm performance. Following the Egyptian revolution, GOWN is 
found to be positively significant at 1% with ROA and ROE, while IOWN is positively 
significant at 1% with ROA, and negatively significant at 5% with ROE and Tobin’s Qb and 
negatively significant at 10% with Tobin’s Qa. Regarding the CD, this coefficient is 
positively significant at 1% with ROE and is positively significant at 5% with Tobin’s Qb. 






shows that some significant levels increased as follows. Pre-revolution BS has positive 
significant effect on firm performance when measured by ROA and ROE while BD has 
negative significant effect on firm performance when measured by ROA and ROE. Following 
the Egyptian revolution, BS has positive significant effect on firm performance when 
measured by the four models with 1% except ROE with 5%. BD has positive significant 
effect on firm performance when measured by Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb at 1% and 
negative effect when measured by ROE at 1%. It is shown that some significant levels 
decreased as follows. Pre-revolution BOWN has significant effect when measured by the four 
models and MOWN has significant effect when measured by ROA and ROE. Following the 
Egyptian revolution, MOWN is found to has only positive significant effect when measured 
by ROA only and BOWN has positive significant effect when measured by ROA and 
negative significant effect when measured by Tobin’s Qa. 
In conclusion, Table 5.17 and 5.18 show a number of differences between the pre- and post-
revolution regressions. There was a significant relationship between BOWN and MOWN 
with FP before the revolution, which decreased after the event. After the revolution, new 
significant relationships appeared as GOWN, IOWN, BI, and CD. There was a significant 







Table 5.18: Conclusion of Pre-revolution and Post-revolution 
Pre-Revolution  Post- Revolution  
Relationship Model and significant level Relationship Model and significant level 
Increased significant relationships 
There is significant relationship  
between BS and FP 
ROA at 5%  
ROE at 10% 
There is a significant positive 
relationship between BS and FP 
ROA, Tobin's Qa and Tobin's Qb at 1%  
ROE at 5% 
There is significant negative  
relationship between BD and FP  ROA and ROE at 1% 
There is a significant relationship 
between BD and FP 
Tobin's Qa and Tobin's Qb positive at 1%  
ROE negative at 1% and ROA disappeared  
Decreased significant relationships 
There is a significant positive  
relationship between BOWN with FP  All models at 1% 
There is a significant relationship 
between BOWN with FP 
ROA positive at 1%  
Tobin's Qa negative at 5% 
There is a significant positive  
relationship between MOWN with FP  ROA and ROE at 1% 
There is a significant positive 
relationship between MOWN with FP  With ROA only at 1%  
New significant relationships 
There is no significant  
relationship between GOWN with FP  
There is a significant positive 
relationship between GOWN with FP  ROA and ROE at 1% 
There is no significant relationship  
between IOWN and FP   
There is a significant relationship 
between IOWN and FP 
ROA positive at 1%,  
ROE and Tobin's Qb negative at 5%  
Tobin's Qa negative 10% 
There is no significant relationship  
between BI and FP   
There is a significant positive 
relationship between BI and FP ROE at 5% 
There is no significant relationship  
between CD and FP   
There is a significant positive 
relationship between CD and FP 
ROE at 1%  






5.2.7 Principal Components Analysis 
 
As explained previously PCA is used to lower the variables number which are linear 
combinations of the original response vectors. To apply this method, ownership structure 
types are grouped together into the variable OWN and corporate governance are grouped 
together into the variable GOVN. These groups are expected to contain highly collinear 
variables carrying most of the impact on firm performance. Table 5.19 provides results from 







Table 5.19: PCA Method (Governance, Ownership Structure and Performance)14 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
L.Perfromance -0.030** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.038* -0.038* -0.021 0.212*** 0.245*** 0.235*** 0.246*** 0.273*** 0.252*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) 
OWN 0.003**  0.003** 0.006*  0.005*** -0.035***  -0.014* -0.020*  -0.022** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.010)  (0.008) 
GOVN  0.007*** 0.007***  0.010** 0.012***  0.101*** 0.109***  0.104*** 0.118*** 
  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.013) (0.011)  (0.012) (0.011) 
LIQ -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.008** -0.005* -0.004 -0.049*** -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.062*** -0.067*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
SIZE -0.108*** -0.076*** -0.069*** -0.227*** -0.185*** -0.172*** -1.160*** -1.104*** -1.078*** -1.139*** -1.004*** -1.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.023) (0.021) (0.012) (0.036) (0.071) (0.040) (0.047) (0.064) (0.034) 
LEV 0.022** -0.002 -0.005 0.122*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.225*** -0.082 -0.030 1.137*** 0.947*** 0.988*** 
 
14 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on 
Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to government 
ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: 
Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since foundation. Full definitions for 






 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.055) (0.065) (0.048) (0.062) (0.062) (0.049) 
AGE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TANG -0.149*** -0.115*** -0.118*** -0.255*** -0.241*** -0.229*** -0.749*** -0.612*** -0.766*** -0.715*** -0.567*** -0.762*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.086) (0.110) (0.071) (0.081) (0.102) (0.066) 
Constant 1.021*** 0.722*** 0.001 2.098*** 0.001 1.593*** 11.045*** 10.700*** 0.001 11.239*** 9.841*** 10.131*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.001) (0.192) (0.001) (0.110) (0.326) (0.545) (0.001) (0.411) (0.515) (0.290) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 
No. of firms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
AR(2) 0.998 0.936 0.847 0.189 0.144 0.194 0.014 0.066 0.067 0.080 0.072 0.070 







Table 5.19 shows all ownership structure types grouped into OWN and all corporate 
governance variables grouped into GOVN. It concludes the impact of GOVN on firm 
performance resulting a positive impact on firm performance when measured by ROA and 
ROE while negative impact when measured by Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb. The same 
analysis is done but with corporate governance GOVN indicating that it has positive 
significant impact on firm performance when measured by all models. These results need 























Table 5.20: Composite Variables (OWN and GOVN) with Revolution Impact on FP15 
 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
L.Perfromance 0.382*** 0.375*** 0.255*** 0.272*** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
OWN 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.012) 
GOVN 0.001 0.002 0.039*** 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) 
Revolution 0.016*** -0.014*** 0.280*** 0.301*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.037) (0.045) 
Revolution X OWN -0.003** -0.011*** -0.079*** -0.098*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.014) 
Revolution X GOVN 0.005*** -0.005** 0.097*** 0.087*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.014) 
LIQ -0.001 -0.002 -0.066*** -0.062*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
SIZE -0.001 0.047*** -0.938*** -0.874*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.044) (0.055) 
LEV -0.026*** 0.026*** -0.104** 0.892*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.050) (0.039) 
AGE 0.001*** 0.001** 0.007*** 0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
TANG -0.061*** -0.122*** -0.576*** -0.483*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.072) (0.084) 
Constant 0.001 -0.317*** 8.688*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.086) (0.468) (0.001) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 
Number of firms 100 100 100 100 
AR(2) 0.251 0.707 0.072 0.075 
J-test Hansen 0.889 0.833 0.955 0.963 
 
 
15 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 







Table 5.20 shows that ownership structure types have a positive significant impact on firm 
performance at 1% when measured with all models. This result is changed totally when the 
Revolution is examined together with OWN which explains that it has a negative impact on 
ownership and accordingly negative impact on firm performance. The same analysis is done 
but with corporate governance indicating that it has a positive significant impact on firm 
performance but when measured by Tobin’s Qa, Tobin’s Qb and ROA. After adding the 
Revolution effect, the result changed to has a positive significant impact on firm performance 
at 1% when measured by all models except ROE, which shows a negative impact at 5%. This 
shows that Revolution has a positive indirect effect on firm performance through corporate 
governance. These results can be explained as the government concentrated on the corporate 
governance factor more than the ownership structure after the revolution to improve the firm 
performance of the Egyptian companies. Accordingly, it is interesting to investigate if all the 
ownership types have a negative effect on the firm performance or there is one or more with a 
different result. So, table 5.21 shows each ownership structure type impact individually on 
firm performance by creating a dummy variable for each type where 1 represents one type 






Table 5.21: Ownership Structure Types with each Firm Performance Measurement Model16 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
L. Perf.  0.103*** 0.093*** 0.055** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.053*** 0.049** 0.066*** 0.187*** 0.160*** 0.176*** 0.274*** 0.190*** 0.158*** 0.179*** 0.17*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
MOWN 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BOWN 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GOWN 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
IOWN 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BS 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.035*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.07*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
16 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on 
Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to government 
ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: 
Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since foundation. Full definitions for 







BI 0.024** 0.007 0.036*** 0.027** 0.043** 0.028* 0.082*** 0.044*** -0.009 -0.091 -0.013 0.360*** 0.005 -0.124* 0.006 -0.139* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.085) (0.073) (0.072) (0.084) (0.086) (0.069) (0.069) (0.076) 
BD -0.05*** -0.029* -0.038* -0.048** -0.089** -0.079* -0.13*** -0.068 0.314** 0.409*** 0.324** 0.271*** 0.357** 0.306** 0.268* 0.302** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.034) (0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.141) (0.147) (0.161) (0.102) (0.150) (0.139) (0.147) (0.139) 
CD 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.071** 0.120*** 0.126*** 0.099*** 0.138*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.031) (0.025) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028) 
LIQ 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.065*** -
0.045*** 
-0.054*** -0.054*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
SIZE -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -1.31*** -1.26*** -1.30*** -0.89*** -1.288*** -
1.243*** 
-1.229*** -1.228*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.043) (0.046) (0.039) (0.046) (0.050) (0.049) (0.040) (0.048) 
LEV -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.014* -0.02*** 0.079*** 0.087*** 0.100*** 0.086*** 0.303*** 0.245*** 0.373*** -0.066* 1.278*** 1.255*** 1.375*** 1.26*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.016) (0.077) (0.076) (0.066) (0.035) (0.065) (0.069) (0.064) (0.067) 
AGE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.02*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TANG -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -1.50*** -1.45*** -1.37*** -0.84*** -1.477*** -
1.482*** 
-1.386*** -1.514*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.018) (0.089) (0.095) (0.103) (0.073) (0.087) (0.083) (0.101) (0.091) 
IOWN -0.021**    0.049***    -0.424***    -0.453***    
 (0.010)    (0.013)    (0.128)    (0.146)    






  (0.035)    (0.059)    (0.462)    (0.485)   
GOWN   0.096***    0.11***    0.540***    0.516***  
   (0.017)    (0.033)    (0.141)    (0.130)  
MOWN    -0.029**    -0.09***    0.256*    0.099 
    (0.013)    (0.018)    (0.148)    (0.184) 












 (0.059) (0.051) (0.062) (0.055) (0.067) (0.078) (0.071) (0.084) (0.424) (0.470) (0.404) (0.429) (0.505) (0.496) (0.417) (0.481) 
Obs. 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 
No. of 
firms 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
AR(2) 0.731 0.764 0.664 0.777 0.183 0.174 0.175 0.173 0.014 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.012 
J-test 
Hansen 








It is important to examine each type of ownership structure effect on firm performance with 
each method separately to conclude which type has the most significant impact.  As shown in 
Table 5.21, blockholder ownership has the least impact on firm performance while the most 
one with the highest positive significant impact is the government ownership structure. 
The next part introduces industry dummy variable. Based on the number of observations, 
Consumer Goods Industry (No. 4) has the largest number as compared with the other 
industries. It motivated the author to examine if it has an impact on Egyptian firm 























Table 5.22: Industry Impact on Ownership Structure Types, CG and Firm 
Performance17 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
L.Perfromance 0.080*** (0.026) 0.062*** (0.022) 0.187*** (0.023) 0.178*** (0.021) 
MOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 
BOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 
GOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 
IOWN 0.001*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
BS 0.003*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.072*** (0.005) 0.075*** (0.005) 
BI 0.016** (0.008) 0.058*** (0.017) -0.167** (0.084) -0.293* (0.171) 
BD -0.009 (0.021) -0.050 (0.039) -0.099 (0.192) -0.154 (0.181) 
CD 0.023*** (0.003) 0.042*** (0.006) 0.071* (0.041) 0.071 (0.045) 
LIQ 0.003*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) -0.052*** (0.009) -0.053*** (0.010) 
SIZE -0.050*** (0.006) -0.082*** (0.009) -1.312*** (0.077) -1.261*** (0.076) 
LEV -0.012** (0.006) 0.097*** (0.015) 0.012 (0.083) 0.935*** (0.088) 
AGE 0.001*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.021*** (0.005) 
TANG -0.108*** (0.012) -0.213*** (0.016) -1.424*** (0.113) -1.436*** (0.121) 
Industry 0.050** (0.019) 0.160*** (0.034) -1.236*** (0.186) -1.379*** (0.196) 
Constant 0.403*** (0.059) 0.659*** (0.082) 12.106*** (0.734) 0.001 (0.001) 
Observations 890 890 890 890 
Number of firms 100 100 100 100 
AR(2) 0.710 0.174 0.073 0.064 
J-test Hansen 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
17 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The 
sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent 
variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to 
government ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board 
independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total 
assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since 







Industry dummy variables are used to distinguish among the sectors, Consumer Goods 
Industry is assigned the value of one (1) other industries are assigned the value of zero (0). 
The result in Table 5.22 revealed that there is a significant negative relationship between the 
industry dummy when measured by Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb with corporate governance 
practices and ownership structure types. Contradict to this result there is a significant positive 
relationship between the industry dummy when measured by ROA and ROE. This implies 
that consumer goods firms contribute more to firm performance than other industries when 
ignoring the market effect.  
 
5.2.8 Comparison between the Results of OLS and SGMM Regressions 
 
This thesis uses OLS and SGMM regressions so it is important to compare between 
them as shown in Table 5.23 This Table is very important as it presents the difference 
between running the regression without controlling the problem of endogeneity (OLS) and 
after controlling the problem of endogeneity (SGMM). As shown that SGMM estimator 
produces different results changing all the non-significant relationships to significant ones 
except BD and LIQ continue to be non-significant when measured by ROE. Therefore, the 
SGMM shows the highest significant results as compared to panel data and OLS analysis due 










Table 5.23: Comparison between the Results of OLS and SGMM Regressions18 
Panel Data OLS SGMM 
Variables 
ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb 
ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb ROA ROE Tobin’s Qa Tobin’s Qb  
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
MOWN Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
BOWN Sig Sig Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
GOWN Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig Sig Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
IOWN Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig Sig Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
BS Sig Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
BI Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
BD Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
CD Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
SIZE Non-sig.  Sig Sig Sig Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
 
18 Sample description and variable definitions: The total sample = 992 firm-year observations over 2008-2017 including 14 different industries. The sample contains firms’ performance measurements: Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on 
Assets in year t; ROE = Return on Equity in year t; Independent variables: ownership structure types including MOWN refers to managerial ownership, BOWN refers to blockholder ownership, GOWN refers to government 
ownership, IOWN refers to institutional ownership; Corporate governance variables include BS refers to board size, BI refers to board independence, BD refers to board diversity, and CD refers to CEO duality; Control variables: 
Firm Size = log of TA; Leverage = total debt/total assets; Tangible assets = fixed assets divided by total assets; Liquidity ratio = deflated current assets by current liabilities; Firm Age = years since foundation. Full definitions for 







LEV Sig Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
LIQ Sig Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  
AGE Sig Sig Sig Non-sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  






As a conclusion, the findings of SGMM estimator and PCA method can be classified into 2 
groups. The first group is concerned with the findings without adding the Revolution effect 
and as it is shown in the previous section all ownership structure types have a positive impact 
on firm performance by using both analysis methods. The PCA gives a more specific finding 
that this result is changed when all ownership structure types are combined into one variable 
and measured with Tobin’s Q it is changed to be negative. This can be explained by the 
market effect on firm performance. Regarding the corporate governance variables, have a 
positive effect on firm performance by using both analysis methods but BI has a positive 
impact when measured with accounting measurement and negative with market ones and BD 
vice versa which required further investigations. All these relationships can be found in 
previous studies but not with using the PCA method and compared with SGMM and not the 
same results. Accordingly, it adds to the thesis contribution by investigating also the 
Revolution impact and compare the results of both methods. By examining the Revolution 
impact on firm performance, it is found that it has a negative effect on it. Therefore, the 
second group is concerned with the findings by adding the Revolution effect. It has a 
negative impact on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance by 
using the PCA method while the SGMM method indicated that BOWN and IOWN have an 
only negative effect when Tobin’s Q is used. SGMM and PCA supported each other that the 
Revolution has a positive effect on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance which is explained that the companies are more concerned with the CG 
practices to reach better performance and recover from the Revolution. These findings will be 








































Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis examines and describes the relationship between types of ownership 
structure, corporate governance (CG) variables and corporate performance. As mentioned 
above, this relationship represents a significant debate in the corporate-finance literature, 
which started with the study by Berle and Means (1932) and explains the importance of this 
thesis. This chapter presents the thesis conclusions and discussion, providing further detail on 
the study of ownership types and CG variables at the corporation level in Egypt – an 
emerging market – before and after the Egyptian Revolution. This approach identifies the 
thesis as work that fills the existing gap in the literature regarding the effect of the Revolution 
on Egyptian firm performance. This thesis provides new evidence regarding the impact on 
firm performance of different ownership-structure types and a select number of corporate-
governance variables.  
The sample included a selection of conglomerate firms listed on the Egyptian stock exchange 
with available longitudinal panel data from 2008 to 2017. Using multiple regression analysis, 
fixed- and random-effects models, Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression 
analyses for the sample of these listed firms to control heterogeneity among the cross-
sections and to reduce the multicollinearity problem with the explanatory variables (Mira, 
2005). The data cover 101 (992 observations) of Egypt’s most active listed companies. The 
research deals with objective reality and follows hypothetico-deductive logic to test the 
logical framework and analyse the hypotheses. The thesis applies the positivist paradigm, a 
deductive approach, and quantitative techniques. It also uses a linear regression model and 
STATA software to run the regression through the SGMM and PCA. Accordingly, the 
empirical testing of this thesis’ hypotheses depended on a review of the regression 
assumptions: normality of residuals, heteroscedasticity, no multicollinearity of independent 









6.2 Summary of Research Objectives and Hypotheses  
 
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the Egyptian Revolution’s effect on 
firm performance concerning the relationships among ownership-structure types, corporate-
governance variables and performance. The researcher primarily tests the extent to which 
firm performance changed after the Revolution. The thesis also aims to investigate the 
ownership-structure types – namely, block ownership, government/state ownership, 
institutional ownership and managerial/director ownership – and to investigate corporate 
governance variables, such as board size, CEO duality, board independence, and board 
diversity after adding the Revolution impact. By referring to the financial literature, the thesis 
also aims to determine the variables that have changed by comparing pre- and post-
revolution. Based on theory and consistent with previous studies discussed in earlier chapters, 
this thesis investigates whether high firm performance is associated with the Egyptian 
Revolution, managerial ownership, board size, CEO duality, high levels of block ownership, 
state ownership, institutional ownership, board independence and board gender diversity.  
 
6.3 Summary of Research Philosophy and Methodology  
 
Regarding research philosophy, the researcher views this thesis as a set of variables 
influencing firm performance within the positivist paradigm, dealing with objectivity and 
reality, with its roots in regulation sociology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This thesis also 
uses a deductive approach and quantitative technique. The thesis sample covers 101 listed 
Egyptian firms with 992 observations from 2008 to 2017. The Egyptian Stock Exchange 
(EGX) was the source for collecting all necessary variables observations. Following the 
literature review, the researcher excluded financial and utility firms from the sample 
(Peasnell et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2005). There are fourteen industries identified, four 
industries were excluded – i.e. Banks and Financial Services, Insurance and Utilities – and 
the remainder yielded a total of 992 firm-year observations. This thesis applies system 
generalised method of moments to address the endogeneity problem and to deal with models 
including lags of the dependent variable. The dynamic SGMM panel model is the chosen 






models can cause dynamic panel bias by omitting dynamics which can be explained as mis-
specified models due to excluding the right-hand-side variables history (Badi, 2008; 
Christopher & Christopher, 2006; Stephen, 2002). Second the SGMM, as a dynamic panel 
model, addresses much easier the problem of potential endogeneity than in OLS. The lagged 
and differenced variables, which are regression variables, can be potentially used as valid 
instruments which are not correlated with the error term (Roodman, 2009). Last advantage of 
SGMM is the identification of both short-run and long-run impact of variables used in this 
thesis (Adnan, Pugh, & Adnett, 2009; Badi, 2008). The principal component analysis is also 
applied for more advanced analysis and to add to the previous literature.  
 
6.4 Summary of Empirical Results and Contribution Discussion 
 
Following is a summary and discussion of the main findings resulting from the data 
analysis and based on the references in previous studies. It indicates the impact of the 
Egyptian Revolution (excluding any political consequences), ownership structure and 
corporate governance on firm performance in emerging markets, by analysing dataset from 
2008 to 2017 to explain the contributions in more details.   
The econometrics methods - SGMM and PCA - are used to empirically test the thesis’ 
hypotheses. In its developed model, the thesis examines alternative firm-performance 
measures as dependent variables (e.g. ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Qa and Tobin’s Qb), while 
ownership-structure variables (e.g. MOWN, BOWN, GOWN and IOWN) and corporate-
governance variables (BS, BI, BD and CD), as well as several control variables (SIZE, LEV, 
LIQ, AGE, TANG), are also included in the prescribed model. SGMM examines each 
variable individually with the different firm performance measurements together and with 
each measurement separately to be able to further enrich the results. While PCA examines all 
the ownership structure variables combined in OWN and all the corporate governance 
variables in GONV. The discussion of findings will also show whether they support the 
hypotheses or not. A review of the findings after the Revolution compares them with their 
counterparts before the Revolution. A discussion of all findings is categorized into three 







First of all, Pre-Revolution or without adding the Revolution effect, the results are as 
expected in hypothesis 1a1, hypothesis 1b1, hypothesis 1c1, hypothesis 1d1 supporting the 
positive effect of the different ownership structure types on firm performance when using the 
SGMM estimator. PCA was incorporated into the analysis to compare these results and add 
to the literature and contribute to the previous results. Principal Component Analysis finds 
that the accounting performance (ROA and ROE) are the ones resulting this positive impact 
as they only focus on the current profitability. However, market performance (Tobin’s Q) 
shows that OWN has a negative effect on firm performance and therefore the companies 
neglect and do not focus on future expectations and market conditions. This has to be 
changed and improved to cope with future plans and utilise the youth to investigate the 
market (Resource-Dependence Theory). Corporate governance variables effect on firm 
performance is also examined by using both methods. They supported a positive effect on the 
Egyptian firm performance except for some minor differences. Board independence has 
negative effect when measured by Tobin’s Q using SGMM which explains that they 
concentrate only on the internal management information (Resource-Dependence Theory) 
without taking into consideration any outside advises to adapt with the market changes. It 
additionally can be considered as a dishonestly by being objective and ignoring the outsiders 
which that has to be improved (Resource-Dependence Theory). So SGMM is important to 
find out why BI and board diversity have different effect than the other corporate governance 
variables. Board diversity’s negative effect is explained that it is only a present and internal 
effect which can be a reason of intergroup conflicts (Agency theory) or that women are more 
risk averse and concentrate only on current plans. This negative effect should be enhanced by 
the new corporate governance code and will be reviewed after the Revolution period. So 
overall, both ownership structure and corporate governance have positive effect on firm 
performance before the Revolution except the explained ones. The findings support the thesis 
hypotheses as they are built on only studies without having the Revolution effect covered 
through them.  
As per the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first thesis to show the Revolution impact 
and to analyse these variables all together using PCA method and comparing it with SGMM 






having new ones, OWN for ownership structure types and GOVN for corporate governance 
variables, the results changed slightly than analysed with SGMM.  
The second part of the findings is about one of the main contributions of this thesis which is 
the Revolution impact which is categorized into three different groups. First one is about the 
Revolution impact on performance, which is a major change and a connection topic between 
Pre-Revolution and Post-Revolution. Revolution impact is analysed separately with firm 
performance resulting a negative effect on the Egyptian firm performance. Second one is the 
Revolution impact on the relationship between ownership structure types with firm 
performance. It has a negative impact on the ownership structure types combined (PCA) or 
individually (SGMM) which indicates that the companies’ owners were not concerned with 
the structure of the firms after the Revolution and focused on the internal corporate 
governance mechanism. This is shown in the third part about the Revolution impact on the 
relationship between corporate governance with firm performance. Post-Revolution impact 
on this relationship is positive explaining that voluntary corporate governance setting and a 
comply or explain corporate governance code together has a better impact on the corporate 
governance practices within the Egyptian companies.  
The Post-Revolution findings can be explained through Egyptian complaints and 
explanations that drove the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. One of these complaints was an 
economic one (Ali, 2012) that included inequality, corruption and authoritarianism 
(Resource-Dependence Theory) (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2011). The Egyptian Revolution put 
an end to the thirty-year regime of President Mubarak (Azzam et al., 2013). A previous 
Egyptian study (Abdel Shahid 2003) indicated that economic or political factors other than 
ownership-structure types might have affected firms’ performance. What follows is the 
author’s knowledge and personal opinion about what happened after the Revolution and its 
effect on Egyptian firms’ performance. 
The findings of the impact on the relationship between ownership structure types with firm 
performance is a result of concentrating on only the internal mechanisms (Agency theory) 
and ignoring the ownership structure. While, the relationship between corporate governance 
with firm performance indicates that the Revolution affected CEO duality, board size, board 
diversity and board independence. CEO duality can help to increase firm performance 






Egyptian firm performance by enhancing the response of the firms to this external event. 
Commands are unified and clear, and companies have better communication supporting a 
faster decision-making process. After the Revolution, companies needed to apply resources, 
capabilities and greater information processing to their response to external complexity 
(Resource-Dependence Theory), all of which can occur with a large and efficient board. This 
explains how board size positively affects firm performance. It also helps to have experts 
who are useful in meeting discussions and for greater monitoring, with specialised directions 
for better communication. Females can increase productivity and have different viewpoints, 
backgrounds and qualifications. Women also demonstrate commitment, are sensitive market 
observers with a wider range of views, have better attendance records and increase the firm’s 
innovative power. Although, it confirms the fact that female roles in Egyptian companies 
became one of the most important topics discussed after the Egyptian Revolution – 
specifically, how it should be highlighted to improve firm performance. Board independence 
increases transparency, effectiveness and objectivity, facilitates information flow, reduces 
agency problems and enhances board decision-making because increasing outsider 
participation decreases the concentration of decision management. All these characteristics 
were needed after the Revolution to overcome its negative effects on firm performance.  
As a conclusion, this thesis adds to the current literature as follows. It used both theories 
(agency theory and resource-dependence theory) to theoretically and practically examine the 
Revolution impact on corporate governance mechanism, ownership structure and firm 
performance. It comprises how the Egyptian firm changed before and after the Revolution 
that has not been analysed before as well as its negative impact on the relationship between 
ownership structure with firm performance and its positive impact on the relationship 
between corporate governance with firm performance by using SGMM and PCA.  
 
6.5 Thesis Implications 
 
 These findings could help investors, analysts, regulators, policymakers and 
managers who are interested in firm performance and would like to understand and to 
overcome the economic consequences of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. This thesis 






the level of firm performance. The findings related to CG show the importance of the 
corporate governance practices and how it should potentially interest the Ministry of 
Investment and its concern with improving firm performance in Egypt. The stock exchange 
or the law should require listed companies to comply with Egyptian corporate-governance 
rules or explain why they do not comply. Companies’ annual reports should be declaratory 
and relatively to companies’ data.  
The needs of shareholders and other stakeholders for information on the firms in which they 
invest might prompt providing corporations with more tools to enable enhanced firm 
disclosures regarding corporate governance and firm performance (FP). The more reliable 
information the stakeholders can obtain about FP, the stronger investor decision-making 
ability is, and the more efficient the allocation of assets becomes. Also, the authorities in 
Egypt could use this thesis as empirical support for the effect of the Revolution on 
ownership-structure types, corporate governance and firm performance. This thesis indicates 
that consistent with the CG variables and the Egyptian Stock Market, authorities can also 
employ its results to enhance the current disclosure of CG practices and the CG annual 
reports to support future empirical studies. An interesting implication of these findings is 
their usefulness for researchers investigating how the Revolution affected ownership structure 
of the Egyptian firms. Also, these findings give firms a clear view of their practical 
implications and show the importance of the types of ownership structure for CG. Managerial 
ownership has to cope with market discipline and achieve firm interests that aligned with 
those of their shareholders. Other than fulfilling this requirement, the board of directors 
(BOD) has to work effectively, accurately and independently with its decision-making 
process, using the members’ experience and skills to carry out its duties of generating 
profitability and ensuring the company’s sustainability after the Revolution, while covering 
any negative or bad effects. Privatisation is one way to avoid the mismanagement that 
occurred before and during the Revolution and to manage at lower cost, benefit from 
managerial skills and knowledge and provide funding and resources. Some companies that 
the Revolution affected could need long-term funds and facilitated access to government-
supported financial resources supported to deal with poor investor protection, coping with 
external uncertainties, having guarantees to secure debt financing, increasing shareholder 






This could help the Egyptian authorities update the corporate-governance code, create 
enterprise value, deepen capital markets, mobilise savings, increase foreign investment, raise 
investment rates and increase inflows needed for the Egyptian economy.  
6.6 Future Research and Limitations 
 
The results and discussion include some highlights that represent limitations of the 
thesis, which could also indicate opportunities for future research. First, doing cross-country 
studies among the Arab countries would be interesting, particularly investigating the 
association between ownership-structure variables, corporate-governance variables and firm 
performance in light of revolutions in the area. This would shed further light on the factors 
affecting firm performance. Equally interesting would be future research that considers 
attributes of CG affecting FP, other than board characteristics; for instance, legal 
environments, protection of minority-stockholder rights, disclosure and corporate 
transparency. Third, this thesis intended to examine the economic effects of the Revolution 
and suggest possible avenues for future research in this area. The researcher encourages a 
study of the impact of the political effects of the Egyptian Revolution. Fourth, carrying out an 
investigation with a more extended sample that could provide a better understanding of the 
interplay among these variables would be worthwhile. Fifth, the author suggests an in-depth 
comparative study between the USA, the UK, and Arab countries, to determine any 
differences among them, in terms of the effect of ownership, corporate governance and 
revolution on firm performance. Sixth, the author suggests an in-depth comparative study 
between listed and unlisted firms, in terms of their corporate-governance applications and the 
effect on their performance. Finally, in terms of board characteristics, the researcher suggests 
a study of gender diversity to discover its effect on Egyptian firms’ performance, especially 
after the Revolution, and how its significance increased and explain its effect and importance.  
Despite the careful preparation that went into the drafting of this thesis, it retains a number of 
limitations. Some of these are enumerated below.  






The thesis excludes Egyptian financial and utility firms. The financial statements of financial 
firms are prepared according to different reporting standards. In addition, their high leverage 
may lead to financial distress. Utility firms were excluded because they are characterised by 
long-term debt, more fixed assets, lower retained earnings and high dividend payout ratios, as 
well as a different capital structure from that of non-financial  corporations. CEO tenure was 
removed, as those data were unavailable. 
2. Time Period 
The data included in the analysis span the period from 2008 to 2017. To obtain the most 
comprehensive data and the most accurate results, the period of the financial crisis was 
excluded. The time period does not include before 2008 to be assured that the Egyptian 
corporate governance code is applied in the Egyptian firms.  
 
3. Reliability  
The data collected in this research included only secondary data. Primary data was not used – 
an important factor to consider when assessing the reliability of this study’s conclusions.  
 
6.7 Thesis Conclusion 
The thesis contains different chapters with different parts of the topic as the 
introduction, overview of corporate governance, corporate governance developments in 
Egypt and Egyptian Revolution, theoretical literature review, empirical literature review and 
hypotheses development for ownership structure types and corporate governance variables, 
research design, empirical analysis and finally the contributions discussion and conclusions. 
The last chapter includes summary of research objectives and hypotheses, research 
philosophy and methodology, empirical results and contribution discussion, thesis 
implications and future research and limitations to help other researcher to implement future 
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Appendix A. Laws governing the legal framework that impacts CG in Egypt 






One month before the general assembly 
meeting, the company should notify the 
authority with balance sheet, other financial 




BOD’s approval is needed to let any 
board member or company’s employee 
deal in securities 
Article 
16 
The BOD shall establish a system to 
guarantee the fulfillment of  Central 
Depository members of their financial 
obligations about securities transactions 






Transactions of unlisted securities should be 
announced in the stock exchange according 
to the rules specified by the Authority's 




The BOD of a joint 
stock company shall 
form assistant 
administrative 
committee to be 
constituted from the 
employees. It should be 
attended by the 
managing director or 




Central Depository member shall sign a 
written agreement with the company to 
remain its decisions of BOD of the 
company regarding  its services and to 
share loss incurred by the company as set 
by the BOD rules approved by the 
Capital Market Authority 
 








The Authority Board of Directors shall 




The BOD shall be 
concerned with 
implementing the 
provisions of this Law, 




BOD shall adopt all the rules for those 




Companies’ Managers should have the 
experience and technical qualifications to 
conduct the business as specified by the 
Authority Board of Directors' decree to get 
the license  
 Article 
25 
The company shall create a certificate to 
replace the securities certificate for 
purposes of attending the general 
assembly according to the provisions and 
procedures required by this law 
Any of the founders, managers, and board 
members of the company should not have 
been convicted, during the past five years 
prior to the license request, in any 
misdemeanor or felony related to honor or 
integrity, or in any of the crimes specified 
by the provisions of company and 
commercial laws, and in adjudication of 
Article 
38 
A central depository members group is 
responsible to coordinate the voting at a 
general assembly or BOD meeting 















Past 3 years audited financial statements 
should be compared with the disclosure 
rules provided by the authority. 
 Article 
43  
The company shall observe and appoint 
external audit to evaluate the financial 




The company's financial statements should 




The Internal audit shall be done by two 









They have to publish information like the 
purpose of the company, characteristics of 
the shares being offered, board members 
names, directors and officers, each 
shareholder’s name and ownership per cent 






committee shall prepare 
an annual report within 
3 months of the end of 
fiscal year of the 
company and submit it 





Past 3 years audited financial statements  
 
  








Semi-annual activity and progress reports 
revealing its actual financial position and 
annual financial statements 
Every company should disclose immediately 
any contingent fundamental conditions 
which would affect its business or financial 
position  
 








The Authority's Board of Directors may take 
an action if in an emerging danger will 
affect the capital market stability, or the 
company's shareholders interest, or the 




The company shall complete the security 
registration and to the issuers inquiries 
and other parties interests  
 
